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“Deteriorating fiscal conditions have an adverse impact on the stability
of banking systems everywhere. . . Sovereign risk has emerged as the main
challenge to global financial stability.”
[Mark Carney and Fabio Panetta, 2011]
“The emergence of doubt about the ability of sovereigns to manage their
debt undermines the perceived soundness of the banks, both directly, because
the latter hold much of the debt of the former, and indirectly, via the
dwindling value of the sovereign insurance.”
[Martin Wolf, 2011]
1. Introduction
As the recent financial crisis entered a far more virulent phase around the time of Lehman
Brothers’ bankruptcy in late September 2008, the most powerful response of monetary
authorities, in combinations with fiscal authorities, took the form of policies that applied
to the financial and banking systems (Mishkin, 2011). Governments made extensive use of
bank bailouts, both collective and individual; some guarantees were explicit, others were
implicit; some financial institutions were bailed out, others were not (e.g., Panetta et al.,
2009). It has been argued that bank bailouts reduced the tail risk of financial institutions,
making them safer, and helped curb the turmoil in financial markets; thus, in safe-haven
countries such as the US, government guarantees generated beneficial effects for banks, and
helped reduce bank funding costs (Gandhi and Lustig, 2015; Kelly et al., 2016). However,
such policies might have also contributed to increase banks’ exposures to aggregate risk,
in two ways. First, government support hindered the fiscal capacity of some sovereigns,
and the resulting sovereign fragility, in turn, fed back to the banks (Acharya et al., 2014).
Second, guarantees might have made banks exposed to policy uncertainty, a source of non-
diversifiable risk (Pástor and Veronesi, 2013).
Banks are not, however, equally exposed to the risks affecting their guarantor, and
therefore to aggregate risk. For example, Correa et al. (2014) show that sovereign credit
rating downgrades have a large and negative effect on the stock returns of those banks that
are more likely to receive stronger support from their governments. Also, the guarantees
seem to reduce the exposure of bondholders to bank risk, as the spread-to-risk relation
weakens with the too-big-to-fail status (Acharya et al., 2016). These findings, taken together,
suggest that government support makes guaranteed banks exposed to sovereign risk and less
sensitive to measures of intrinsic bank riskiness. Therefore, government guarantees tend to
alter the source of bank risk; for the banks benefiting from guarantees, the amount of
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idiosyncratic risk drops, but that of aggregate risk can potentially increase through their
exposure to sovereign risk. We conjecture that this shift in the source of bank risk can impact
on bank risk premiums, possibly attenuating the beneficial effects of government guarantees.
In this paper, building on these earlier studies, we revisit the asset-pricing implications of
government guarantees using an international perspective; put simply, guarantees are not
certain in all countries, and cross-sectional variation in the strength of the guarantees across
countries can, in turn, affect the cross-section of international bank risk premiums.
We develop a tractable theoretical framework to characterize the risk-return trade-off
that government guarantees can generate in bank asset returns. We bring together the
model of Bester and Hellwig (1987) that features risk taking but no guarantees, with a
more recent strand of the theoretical asset-pricing literature on government policies and
guarantees (Pástor and Veronesi, 2013; Acharya et al., 2014; Gandhi and Lustig, 2015;
Kelly et al., 2016). We show that when implicit guarantees are risky – that is they vary
with the aggregate state of the economy – an increase in the strength of a bank’s guarantee,
for a given riskiness of the bank, has an ambiguous effect on the risk premium commanded
by the bank’s equity and debt claims. On the one hand, a stronger guarantee ensures a
higher payoff to debt and equity holders, which acts to compress risk premiums. On the
other hand, if the implicit support offers higher protection in “good” than in “bad” states
of the world, it can make the payoff of debt and equity claims more positively correlated
with the aggregate state of the economy, raising risk premiums. These direct effects of the
guarantee arise even separately from the indirect effects operating through risk taking.
The theoretical framework also shows that stronger implicit support can be associated
with higher risk premiums of the guaranteed claims only if the guarantee is sufficiently risky,
which could be due to sovereign risk or, more generally, to uncertainty about government
support. The theoretical framework illustrates conditions under which an individual bank’s
implicit guarantee depends on the market share of its deposits, paving the way to test the
theoretical predictions. Moreover, the optimally chosen implicit support in our framework
is greater in “good” than in “bad” states of the world, even though the government’s will-
ingness to support banks does not vary across states. Intuitively, the procyclicality of the
implicit support relates to the fact that weaker public finances in recessions can constrain
the government’s ability to support banks.
Our empirical analysis is organized around this simple theoretical framework and tests its
predictions on the direct effects of implicit guarantees using data for 88 banks, covering 15
countries, over the sample period from January 2004 to November 2018. We use standard
portfolio-sort techniques: consistent with the theory, to isolate the direct effects of the
guarantee, we double-sort banks first by bank risk, and then by a measure of expected
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government support (EGS), namely the deposit-to-GDP ratio, which proxies for the bank
market share of deposits. Intuitively, banks with high deposit-to-GDP ratios benefit from
stronger EGS as the failures of these banks can adversely affect not only the financial system,
but also the real economy. Indeed, we find that banks with higher deposit-to-GDP ratios
are more exposed to sovereign risk than banks with low deposit-to-GDP ratios. Thus, in
both our theoretical framework and empirical analysis, guaranteed banks are characterized
by high levels of deposits relative to the size of the national economy. That is, differently
from the too-big-to-fail literature, we focus on the importance of the guaranteed banks for
the national economy, rather than on their systemic importance at the global level. We also
depart from previous studies that use the rating uplift to measure the bank EGS, as we
employ a measure that is more likely to be exogenous to bank asset returns and sovereign
risk, which makes it particularly suitable for testing the theoretical predictions using an
international panel of banks.1
We perform the empirical analysis on a set of reasonably large banks based in developed
countries. In this way, we can exploit the cross-sectional variation in terms of sovereign risk,
complementing the existing literature that typically focuses on the US alone (Gandhi and
Lustig, 2015). For a given country, we select those banks for which senior credit default
swap (CDS) data are available. We then also obtain the equity prices for these banks. In
this way, we can test the theoretical predictions on both bank debt and equity returns; this
combined use of CDS and equity data is also a distinctive feature of our study. The sample
period is constrained by the low liquidity of the CDS market prior to 2004. For this reason,
we carry out the core empirical analysis over the 2004-2018 sample period.
Our empirical results suggest that equity spread portfolios – high minus low deposit-to-
GDP portfolios – deliver economically large and statistically significant returns; this return
can reach 11% per annum. These spread portfolios are the main object of interest as they are
self-financed and contain banks of similar riskiness, thus isolating the direct effect of EGS on
bank returns. Hence, we can use the spread portfolios to examine the testable predictions
implied by the theoretical framework. Even allowing for a reasonably large set of pricing
factors, we find that these risk factors fail to explain the spread portfolio returns: equity
spread portfolio returns are largely unchanged on a risk-adjusted basis. Thus, based on a set
of standard risk factors, there is a puzzle in bank returns. However, we uncover a clear factor
structure in the risk-adjusted returns of the double-sorted portfolios, i.e. sorted on bank risk
1The rating uplift is measured as the difference between the bank’s ability to repay its deposit obligations
that also accounts for the EGS (all-in-all rating) and the bank’s intrinsic safety and soundness (stand-alone
rating). In essence, the rating uplift should capture the probability of support conditional on the bank
failing without support. However, this measure increases not only with the market share of deposits of the
bank, but also with the intrinsic riskiness of the bank and the solvency of the domestic sovereign. These
latter features make undesirable the use of the rating uplift as sorting variable in our study.
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and EGS. In particular, the weights associated with the third principal component (PC)
align well with the equity risk-adjusted returns: they are positive for high deposit-to-GDP
banks, and negative for low deposit-to-GDP banks. This finding holds qualitatively both
for equity and CDS portfolios. Thus, the third PC is a natural candidate to complete the
set of pricing factors.
Instead of working directly with the PC factor, in most of the empirical analysis, we
use an EGS return factor. To do so, we simply multiply the double-sorted portfolio excess
returns by the weights associated with the third PC. As a result, the EGS return factor
is tradable by construction, so that its expected return (or price of risk given that it has
unit exposure) is simply its mean. We find that it averages about 11% per annum, and
is statistically significant. When we repeat the time-series (first-pass) regressions including
this additional factor, a number of interesting results emerge. First, the spread portfolios
load positively on the EGS factor, and these exposures are precisely estimated, for both
equities and CDSs; thus, the EGS risk premium is priced consistently in both markets.
Second, there is no longer a puzzle in bank equity returns, given that the alphas on the
equity spread portfolios become small in economic terms, and their statistical significance
either drops substantially or disappears depending on the sample considered.
Moreover, the cross-sectional (second-pass) regressions reveal that, by including the EGS
return factor, we can price a cross section of 36 test assets, consisting of the double-sorted,
as well as the spread, equity and CDS portfolios. In particular, when we include the EGS
factor in the pricing model, the R2 increases by roughly 20 percentage points and the
mean absolute error (MAE) halves. Taken together, these findings show that the equity
risk premium associated with the government guarantee is in the range of 5-9% per annum.
However, the subsample analysis also reveals that this premium is substantially higher when
we exclude the period following the adoption of the bail-in regime by EU members, consisting
of the last five years of our sample. Under the bail-in regime bondholders and/or depositors,
rather than taxpayers, are forced to bear the burden of bank recapitalizations. In principle,
during a fully operational bail-in regulation, the key mechanism underneath our theoretical
framework should either no longer be at play or be far less prominent. Our findings of a
higher risk premium in the period prior to the bail-in regime show that the adoption of
the bail-in regulation led market participants to reassess this aspect of the sovereign-bank
nexus. We also find that, prior to the onset of the sub-prime crisis, there was no evidence
of an EGS premium.2
2This evidence is also confirmed when we analyze a sample of equities only (i.e. removing CDS data from
the analysis), which allows us to extend the analysis back to 2000. This finding accords well with the fact
that rating uplifts were also small prior to the onset of the crisis.
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These results establish the existence of an EGS risk premium. Moreover, as suggested
by the theoretical framework, an EGS premium appears to exist only when banks can be
bailed out and sovereign risk is non-negligible. To further characterize the EGS risk-return
trade-off, we show that sovereign risk is central to our results. When we focus on the sample
of banks based in core EU countries, we find that the EGS risk premium is substantially
larger and more precisely estimated. We also show that EU banks drive the result that
such premium is absent in the bail-in regime. By contrast, when we restrict the analysis
to banks based in the safest sovereigns in our sample (US, Germany, Japan, Switzerland),
no such premium exists. These findings are consistent with the theoretical prediction that
more uncertain guarantees are associated with higher risk premiums.
Finally, we complement the analysis of sovereign risk with three additional exercises.
First, we show that the main turning points of the EGS return factor are associated with
key policy events that took place during the sample. It is possible to identify five distinct
phases, which indicate that the premium seems to arise during the 2007-13 period, when
governments made extensive use of bailouts.3 Second, we illustrate through a simple graph-
ical analysis the main intuition behind the theoretical framework: the EGS return factor
drops when sovereign risk increases, and vice versa, confirming that sovereign risk is an
important determinant of the EGS factor. We find that the factor also drops when US
economic policy uncertainty increases. On the contrary, high EGS banks are less exposed to
tail risk than low EGS banks, given that the factor comoves positively with innovations to
the VIX index. Thus, although government guarantees offer protection from tail risk, as in
Gandhi and Lustig (2015) and Kelly et al. (2016), they expose banks to sovereign risk and
policy uncertainty. This finding also contributes to the ongoing debate about the disconnect
between VIX and policy uncertainty (see, e.g., Pástor and Veronesi, 2017). Third, a horse
race shows that the EGS factor comoves with bank portfolios sorted on variables that reflect
sovereign risk, sovereign exposures and other proxies for EGS. Taken together, these addi-
tional exercises provide further evidence on the existence of an EGS risk-return trade-off,
consistent with the theoretical framework, which arises when sovereign risk (or uncertainty
about government support) is sufficiently high. Finally, a simple exercise seems to sug-
gest that the indirect effects of the guarantees on bank risk premiums are less economically
relevant than the direct effects.
Related literature. The sovereign-bank nexus and its implications for financial stability
are at the center of an active debate among policy makers and academics alike. Historically,
3We refer the reader to Panetta et al. (2009) for a comprehensive assessment of financial sector rescue
programmes across the world during the global financial crisis, whereas European Commission (2017) covers
the 2008-2015 period with a focus on Europe.
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the link between the state and the banking system has been umbilical, with causality re-
versing on a few occasions (Haldane and Alessandri, 2009). Even during the recent global
financial crisis, causality has reversed. At first, system-wide rescue packages led to a trans-
fer of credit risk from the banks to the sovereigns. Thereafter, the guarantees hindered the
fiscal capacity of governments, and such sovereign fragility eventually fed back to the banks
(Acharya et al., 2014). Furthermore, banks are not equally exposed to sovereign/aggregate
risk (Correa et al., 2014; Acharya et al., 2016). In this paper, we show that the shift in
the type of bank risk generated by government guarantees can have important asset-pricing
implications, given that only the exposure to non-diversifiable risk should command a risk
premium. Indeed, risk-averse investors demand a premium for holding assets whose payoff is
positively correlated with the aggregate state of the economy, as they provide poor insurance
in “bad” states of nature.
A similar mechanism is present also in Pástor and Veronesi (2013), although their fo-
cus is more generally on government policies. On the one hand, uncertainty about future
government actions could have a positive effect if the government responds adequately to
unanticipated shocks. This effect parallels the protection provided by government guar-
antees to banks. On the other hand, political uncertainty is non-diversifiable by investors
and, for this reason, commands a positive risk premium. A similar mechanism arises in our
framework due to the riskiness of the guarantee. Although our study relates to this stream
of literature, it rests on a different theoretical framework, and uses a substantially different
empirical methodology to test the theoretical predictions. A key difference from Pástor and
Veronesi (2013) is that our focus is on cross-sectional differences in bank risk premiums,
rather than on the market-wide equity risk premium.4
Our study also closely relates to Gandhi and Lustig (2015) and Kelly et al. (2016);
however, it differs under a number of key dimensions. Kelly et al. (2016) relate, both
theoretically and empirically, the surge in the basket-index put spread in 2007-09 to the
introduction of collective guarantees. They argue that in a systemic crisis, and in the
absence of such guarantees, the spread should have otherwise dropped. In Gandhi and
Lustig (2015), a realization of a disaster event can trigger a collective bailout of larger
banks, but not of smaller banks: this is why larger commercial banks have lower risk-
adjusted returns. Similarly, in Gandhi et al. (2017), larger banks benefit from a collective
government guarantee, the strength of which depends on the characteristics of the guarantor;
for example, it is taken to be increasing in the fiscal health of the government. Consequently,
4More specifically, while in our paper changes in risk premiums are due to the fact that guarantees alter
banks’ exposures to aggregate risk, holding the price of risk constant, in Pástor and Veronesi (2013) political
uncertainty makes the price of market risk state dependent, holding the exposure constant (given that the
effects are evaluated on the market index that has unit exposure by definition).
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larger banks in fiscally strong countries earn lower risk-adjusted returns than smaller banks.
However, the guarantee is not state-contingent, and has no effect on the risk taking of banks.
We instead show, both theoretically and empirically, that when the analysis is extended to
banks guaranteed by a risky sovereign, the result can potentially be reversed, regardless of
any indirect effects due to the risk taking of banks. Put simply, while in Gandhi and Lustig
(2015) government guarantees make larger commercial banks less exposed to aggregate risk,
in our study, if the risks associated with guarantees are sufficiently high, they can raise banks’
exposures to non-diversifiable risk. Thus, we differ from these studies as in our framework
government guarantees are risky in the sense of providing protection that depends on the
aggregate state of the economy.
Another strand of the literature has examined the presence of a risk-taking channel as-
sociated with the guarantees. A priori the effect of this channel is ambiguous. On the one
hand, government support reduces market discipline, i.e. the incentive of outside investors
to monitor, and therefore increases the risk taking of protected banks. On the other hand,
by reducing bank funding costs, government support should increase the charter value of
the bank, and as a result diminish the bank’s incentive to take on risk. While the empirical
evidence is mixed for high EGS banks, outright publicly owned banks, as well as the com-
petitors of banks benefiting from EGS, seem to take on risk (Gropp et al., 2011; Altavilla
et al., 2017; Brandao-Marques et al., 2018). In our theoretical framework, we model risk
taking à la Bester and Hellwig (1987) to account for potential indirect effects of the guaran-
tee operating through this separate channel, although the main focus is on the direct effects
of the guarantee on bank risk premiums.
Finally, a large number of studies has referred to bank holdings of sovereign debt, i.e. di-
rect sovereign exposures of banks, to explain how sovereign fragility transmits to banks. For
example, in Gennaioli et al. (2014) the distressed state of public finances can endanger the
stability of the private domestic banking sector through their holdings of domestic sovereign
debt. Similarly, in Brunnermeier et al. (2016) home bias of banks’ sovereign debt portfolios
makes their equity value and solvency dependent on swings in the perceived solvency and
market value of government debt. Our theoretical framework uncovers a different channel,
which does not require banks to hold government debt.
The paper is organized as follows. We start by presenting the theoretical framework and
its two testable predictions in Section 2. We then present the data and portfolio sorting
strategy in Section 3. Section 4 reports the main empirical findings. First, we show that
an EGS risk premium exists, and then that this premium relates to EGS banks’ exposures
to sovereign risk. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. An Appendix provides technical
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details, and a separate Internet Appendix presents additional robustness exercises.
2. Theoretical framework
Our theoretical examination of the effects of implicit government guarantees on bank
risk premiums builds on the framework of Bester and Hellwig (1987), which features a
principal-agent problem with a focus on risk taking.5 We deem this to be an important
feature as risk taking has been suggested to be directly influenced by government guarantees
(Brandao-Marques et al., 2013, among others). Risk taking arises in the framework of Bester
and Hellwig (1987) due to a two-dimensional moral-hazard problem. The agent chooses a
risk class and an effort level, neither of which can be observed by the principal. These
two dimensions of moral hazard correspond to the agency costs involved in outside finance
identified by Jensen and Meckling (1976): moral hazard taking the form of excessive risk
taking arises in the presence of debt, while equity finance is associated with moral hazard
involving suboptimal effort.
When considering both debt and equity finance, it is natural to consider a model à la
Bester and Hellwig (1987), combining the two types of moral hazard. In such a model,
managers can compensate for exerting less effort by choosing riskier assets. Due to this
feature, as pointed out by Hellwig (2009, p. 496), “risk choices and effort choices are two
sides of the same coin. It makes no sense to talk about their agency costs separately.” Due
to the two-dimensionality of the moral hazard problem, excessive risk taking arises as an
equilibrium outcome in Bester and Hellwig (1987) despite the fact that the financing contract
between the managers and the outside investors can take any form. Differently, a model
that considers only one of the two dimensions of moral hazard would not give rise to such
an outcome. Rather, the outside investors would have full control over the choices of the
managers by appropriately specifying the financing contract. As a result, the contracting
problem between the managers and the investors would involve no agency costs. For this
reason, observed financing patterns could no longer be explained as optimal responses to
problems arising from agency costs.6
The model of Bester and Hellwig (1987) has the added advantage of speaking to cap-
ital structures that can emerge as responses to problems of asymmetric information. The
5Tirole (2006) provides a discussion of the mechanisms present in the framework of Bester and Hellwig
(1987). Hellmann and Stiglitz (2000), Hellwig (2009), and At and Thomas (2017) employ similar frameworks
to study risk taking and related issues.
6Leland (1994) and its many extensions focus explicitly on other determinants of capital structure than
agency costs. Recent contributions to this literature, such as Chen and Kou (2009), show how the optimal
capital-structure problem can be solved even under very flexible distributional assumptions. In frameworks
that extend Leland (1994) by introducing risk taking, such as Leland (1998), risk choices are analyzed in
the context of somewhat less flexible financing contracts than in Bester and Hellwig (1987).
8
second-best financing contract between managers and investors in their framework can be
implemented with a combination of debt and equity. In this sense, their results can be
interpreted to imply a determinate capital structure. Importantly, the framework of Bester
and Hellwig (1987) is also tractable enough to allow for both the introduction of govern-
ment guarantees and the derivation of closed-form expressions for the object of our ultimate
interest, that is, bank risk premiums.7
In Section 2.1, we present the economic environment, which extends Bester and Hellwig
(1987) along two dimensions. First, we specify both the objective and the risk-neutral
probability distribution of the state of the world, which is instrumental to quantify risk
premiums. Second, we introduce government guarantees, so that we can study how they
affect risk premiums, both directly through the protection they provide and indirectly by
altering the risk-taking behavior of banks.
In Section 2.2, after having examined the effects of government guarantees on bank
risk taking, we characterize how they influence bank risk premiums. We first consider the
case of non-state-contingent guarantees, before turning to the more general case of risky
guarantees, i.e. guarantees that vary across the states of the world. These two cases are
useful to illustrate the mechanisms at play in our framework; some of the mechanisms
absent from the framework are discussed at the end of the section. In Section 2.3, we shed
light on the factors that determine the strength of government guarantees, which will help
guide the subsequent empirical analysis. The two main testable predictions, which focus on
the direct effects of the guarantees on bank risk premiums, are stated in Section 2.4.
The analysis reveals two different channels through which implicit government guarantees
can be associated with risk premiums. First, the insurance offered by guarantees makes
investors more “tolerant” to being only partially reimbursed by the banks they finance. As
a result, bank managers invest in riskier assets and this is reflected in the risk premium
demanded by the investors. Second, if the implicit guarantee is risky in that its strength
varies across the aggregate states of the economy, it will command a risk premium. In
this case, the risk premium associated with the guarantee is a function of the state of
public finances and potential uncertainty about government support. This second channel
operates even when abstracting from risk taking, i.e. when comparing risk premiums of
banks of similar riskiness. For this reason, it is the focus of our empirical analysis.
7While introducing risk taking in models à la Leland (1994) that feature government guarantees, such as
Albul et al. (2016) and Chen et al. (2017), would allow for a richer analysis of capital structure, the effect
of government guarantees on risk premiums could not be derived in closed form. A separate strand of the
literature relies on rare disaster models to derive rich predictions on bank risk premiums in the presence of
government guarantees (see, e.g., Gandhi and Lustig, 2015; Kelly et al., 2016; and, Gandhi et al., 2017).
However, these models only consider non-state-contingent guarantees and abstract from the modeling of
capital structure and of risk taking, as the value of the bank follows an exogenously specified process.
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2.1. Economic environment
We consider the following environment, in which no arbitrage opportunities are assumed
to exist.
Stochastic environment. The state of the world ω ∈ R is distributed according to a con-
tinuous (objective) probability distribution function F (·). The absence of arbitrage implies
the existence of an equivalent risk-neutral probability measure (Dalang et al., 1990). The
probability distribution function of the state of the world under the risk-neutral measure is
denoted by G(·), which, by being equivalent to the objective measure, is also continuous.
Technology and agents. We consider a bank whose managers are subject to double moral
hazard, as in Bester and Hellwig (1987). Namely, the asset payoff of the bank depends on
both the effort exerted by the managers and the risk class of the bank’s assets chosen by
them. Specifically, the managers choose a threshold ω¯ that is such that the assets yield a
positive payoff if and only if ω ≥ ω¯. Thus, for any given threshold ω¯, the risk-neutral proba-
bility of obtaining a positive payoff is equal to 1−G(ω¯) =: p. Due to G(·) being continuous,
equivalently, the managers choose p ∈ [0, 1], with lower values of p corresponding to riskier
assets. Interpreted literally, the probability p determines, in the absence of government sup-
port, the failure risk of the bank. Thus, a decrease in p, which implies a higher failure risk,
is associated with an increase in risk taking. However, we prefer to interpret the parameter
as pinning down the riskiness of the bank’s assets in a wider sense. This interpretation is
supported by the fact that, as will be shown, the risk premium required by investors of the
bank depends only on ω¯, or equivalently p, chosen by the bank managers. Moreover, under
a mild restriction, the risk premium is decreasing in p. For any p and ω ≥ ω¯, the asset
payoff is proportional to − ln p. This functional form captures the idea that riskier assets
offer higher upside returns and is chosen for the sake of tractability. The bank managers
can increase the payoff by exerting effort. This second dimension of moral hazard makes
it impossible to eliminate excessive risk taking by adjusting the financing contract between
the managers and the investors. Moreover, as pointed out by Hellwig (2009), adding the
second dimension delivers a model in which the two types of moral hazard first analyzed by
Jensen and Meckling (1976) are formally combined. When ω ≥ ω¯ a level of effort equal to
a > 0 produces a payoff of (− ln p)aβ, with β < 1, but it involves a cost equal to a for the
managers.8 Thus, the expected asset payoff under the risk-neutral measure, net of the effort
cost, is equal to
p(− ln p)aβ − a. (1)
8We consider this parameterized setting as the double moral-hazard problem formulated more generally
is not tractable (Bester and Hellwig, 1987; Tirole, 2006).
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The managers need to raise an exogenously fixed amount of funds equal to I from outside
investors. This amount can be interpreted as the difference between the size of the balance
sheet of the bank and its internal funds, both of which are determined exogenously. Both
managers and investors maximize their expected payoffs under the risk-neutral measure.9
Financing contract. The investors do not observe the pair (a, p) chosen by the managers
but only the realized asset payoff. Thus, the contract between the investors and the managers
can be contingent only on the realized payoff, which is equal to either 0 or (− ln p)aβ.10 The
bank managers are protected by limited liability. To control the choices of the managers, the
investors can specify a contract that stipulates a payoff to the managers for each level of the
realized asset payoff. Given the risk class and effort choices associated with each realized
payoff, the investors set the payoffs to be such that the managers choose the pair (a, p)
preferred by the investors. Specifically, the investors can specify a contract that delivers a
positive payoff to the managers only if the realized asset payoff is equal to the level, denoted
by pi, preferred by the investors. Denoting the payments to the managers and the investors
in this contingency by pib and pil, respectively, satisfying pi = pib +pil, the managers’ problem
becomes
max
{a,p}
p pib − a subject to (− ln p)aβ = pi. (2)
This formulation shows that the managers can compensate for exerting less effort by choosing
riskier assets, which is the potential distortion arising from asymmetric information between
the investors and the managers.
Government guarantee. The investors obtain the contractually specified payment pil
whenever ω ≥ ω¯, and are protected by a government guarantee whenever ω < ω¯. Namely,
when the bank’s assets yield a payoff equal to 0, the investors obtain ατ(ω) from the gov-
ernment. We interpret α as measuring the strength of the guarantee, i.e. the government’s
willingness to support the bank, whereas the state-dependent component τ(ω) captures,
among other things, the riskiness of the guarantee, being a function of the guarantor’s ex-
posure to aggregate risk. Although the level of the guarantee clearly depends also on τ(ω),
9That is, investors and managers are equally averse to risk; see Philippon and Sannikov (2007) for a
discussion about this assumption.
10Note that without the second dimension of moral hazard (i.e., the effort choice), corresponding to the
case in which β = 0, the positive realization of the payoff would perfectly reveal p chosen by the managers.
Consequently, the investors could have full control over p chosen by the managers. Offering the following
financing contract will constrain the managers to choose the risk class preferred by the investors, say p∗.
The managers obtain a payoff of  > 0 when the realized payoff is equal to − ln p∗ and 0 otherwise. Were
the managers to choose p 6= p∗, they would obtain a payoff of 0 in all states of the world. This strategy is
dominated by choosing p∗, which yields a strictly positive expected payoff. By letting  → 0, the investors
can also extract all the surplus, leaving no information rents to the managers. Consequently, the case of
β = 0 involves no agency costs. For this reason, it is uninteresting for our purposes as agency costs, in the
tradition of Jensen and Meckling (1976), are central to our analysis of risk taking.
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perturbing the distribution τ(·) in a mean-preserving manner allows us to examine the role
played by the riskiness of the guarantee. While τ(ω) is common to all banks guaranteed by
the same government, thus varying only across countries, α is allowed to vary across both
banks and countries, but not across the states of the world. Decomposing the guarantee
into these two components allows us to distinguish between effects due to its strength and
riskiness.11 The investors’ problem is
max
{pib,pil}
α
∫ ω¯
−∞
τ(ω)dG(ω) + p pil − I, (3)
subject to p, and therefore ω¯, being chosen optimally by the managers. While the first term
in Eq. (3) represents the investors’ payoff attributable to the guarantee, the second reflects
the fact that the bank’s assets yield a positive payoff when ω ≥ ω¯. Given that pi = pib + pil,
by choosing the two payoffs the investors constrain the choices of the managers.
The timing of actions is such that the implicit guarantee is determined before the fi-
nancing contract is stipulated, which in turn precedes the effort and risk class choices of
the managers. In this way, risk taking can respond to the government guarantee. Fig. 1
illustrates the timing in the model. Before proceeding further, let us point out that for
F (·) = G(·) and α = 0 the model becomes identical to that of Bester and Hellwig (1987).
This feature makes it straightforward to discern how the presence of the guarantee affects
risk taking.
2.2. Effects of government guarantees
As a prelude to our analysis of risk premiums, we investigate how the guarantee affects
bank risk taking. In this way, we are able to better understand the different mechanisms
through which the guarantee influences risk premiums.
2.2.1. Risk taking
Considering the effect of an increase in the strength of the guarantee α on the managers’
choice of the risk class of the bank’s assets p, we obtain the following result.
Lemma 1 An increase in the strength of the guarantee α leads to the managers choosing a
lower p, corresponding to riskier assets.
11Alternatively, we could set α equal to 1 and define the strength of the guarantee in terms of the
distribution of τ(·). However, we prefer introducing the parameter α to this solution because the distribution
of τ(·) encodes how the guarantee varies across the states of the world, thus determining the riskiness of
the guarantee. Therefore, we perturb the distribution of τ(·) only when we study how bank risk premiums
depend on the riskiness of government support.
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Stronger guarantees being associated with more risk taking is intuitive. The guarantee makes
the investors more “tolerant” to the bank’s assets yielding a zero payoff. Consequently, the
investors design a financial contract that induces the managers to take more risk, i.e. to
choose a lower p.
Importantly, as in Bester and Hellwig (1987), the contract between the investors and
the managers can be implemented by a combination of debt and equity finance. Suppose
the investors and the managers stipulate a debt contract specifying a reimbursement, and
additionally agree that a share of profits net of interest payments is paid to the investors.
Then, the contract underlying Lemma 1 can be implemented by appropriately choosing the
reimbursement and the share of profits. In other words, we can think of the investors as
holding a portfolio comprising an equity and a debt claim on the bank. In what follows, we
quantify the risk premium on this portfolio held by the investors.
To conclude our analysis of risk taking, we investigate how the payoff obtained by the
investors when ω ≥ ω¯ varies with the risk class of the bank’s assets p. We obtain the
following result.
Lemma 2 The payoff pil is decreasing in p.
Lemma 2 completes the picture of how the guarantee affects the investor’s claim on the
bank by altering risk taking behavior. Consequently, we can characterize how the guarantee
influences the risk premium commanded by the claim both directly and indirectly through
its effect on risk taking, to which we turn next. However, before doing so, we introduce a
natural restriction on the guarantee ατ(ω) for all ω. Namely, we require it to be below the
positive payoff pil obtained by the investors when ω ≥ ω¯. Given that pil is decreasing in p
by Lemma 2, a sufficient condition is that the guarantee ατ(ω) is lower than the payoff pil
obtained by the investors in the absence of the guarantee.12
2.2.2. Risk premiums
Having derived the implications of the guarantee on risk taking, we can analyze its effects
on risk premiums. It is, however, useful to first derive the risk premium of the investor’s
claim on the bank in the absence of a government guarantee. This premium can be easily
quantified. Under no-arbitrage, the price of any claim is equal to its expected payoff under
the risk-neutral measure, discounted at the risk-free rate. Thus, the price of the investors’
claim is equal to pil [1−G(ω¯)] /R¯, where R¯ is the (gross) risk-free rate. Its expected payoff,
on the other hand, is pil [1− F (ω¯)]. Thus, the risk premium, or excess return, of the investors’
12In the absence of the guarantee, pil = (1− β2)
[
β2(1 + β)2e−(1+β)
] β
1−β .
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claim in the absence of a government guarantee is
E[Rl]− R¯ = 1− F (ω¯)1−G(ω¯)R¯− R¯
= G(ω¯)− F (ω¯)1−G(ω¯) R¯.
(4)
Note that the risk premium depends only on ω¯, which determines the risk class of the bank’s
assets, and not on the effort exerted by the managers. This result is intuitive as the effort
choice only affects the magnitude of the positive payoff. When the state of the world ω under
the objective measure first-order stochastically dominates ω under the risk-neutral measure,
i.e. F (ω¯) ≤ G(ω¯) for all ω¯, the risk premium in Eq. (4) is always positive. The required
relation of stochastic dominance can be viewed as a sufficient condition for the market risk
premium to be positive (Ross, 2015). We assume throughout that this relation holds. Also
note that the risk premium in Eq. (4) is increasing in ω¯ whenever the state of the world
ω under the objective measure hazard rate dominates ω under the risk-neutral measure.13
Given that hazard rate dominance is only a slightly stronger restriction than first-order
stochastic dominance, this observation further supports the interpretation of higher values
of ω¯ corresponding to riskier assets. We can now turn to analyze the effects of government
support on risk premiums, starting with the simpler case of a non-state-contingent guarantee.
Case I: Non-state-contingent guarantee. When the guarantee is constant across the states
of the world, the investors obtain a non-zero payoff also when ω < ω¯. Denoting the non-
state-contingent guarantee by ατ , the expected payoff of the investors’ claim in this case
is equal to ατF (ω¯) + pil [1− F (ω¯)]. Thus, the risk premium of the investors’ claim on the
bank takes the following form
E[Rl]− R¯ = ατF (ω¯) + pil [1− F (ω¯)]
ατG(ω¯) + pil [1−G(ω¯)]R¯− R¯
= (pil − ατ) [G(ω¯)− F (ω¯)]
ατG(ω¯) + pil [1−G(ω¯)] R¯.
(5)
Note that this risk premium is positive as F (ω¯) ≤ G(ω¯), by first-order stochastic dominance,
and pil > ατ , by assumption. We are interested in characterizing how Eq. (5) varies with α.
Building on Lemmas 1 and 2, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 1 An increase in the strength α of a non-state-contingent guarantee has an
13Differentiating the risk premium in Eq. (4) with respect to ω¯, one notices that the risk premium is
increasing in ω¯ when G′(ω¯) [1− F (ω¯)]−F ′(ω¯) [1−G(ω¯)] ≥ 0, which is equivalent to the stated condition of
hazard-rate dominance.
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ambiguous total effect on the risk premium commanded by the investors’ claim on the bank.
The effect of the guarantee on the risk premium required by the investors is ambiguous,
due to two opposing effects. On the one hand, by Lemma 1, stronger guarantees are asso-
ciated with more risk taking. The managers of the bank investing in riskier assets, in turn,
has two effects. First, an increase in the payoff pil, obtained by the investors when ω ≥ ω¯,
results in higher variability of the investor’s payoff and, as a consequence, in a higher risk
premium. Second, more risk taking implies a lower probability that the investors obtain pil;
whenever G′(ω¯) ≥ F ′(ω¯), this effect also leads to a higher risk premium.14
On the other hand, for a given level of risk taking, the guarantee has a direct negative
effect on the risk premium of the claim held by the investors. This effect arises as the
guarantee makes the investors less exposed to aggregate risk, as it ensures them a positive
payoff when ω < ω¯. Such a negative effect of the guarantee on the risk premium required
by the investors is also present in Gandhi and Lustig (2015), Kelly et al. (2016) and Gandhi
et al. (2017). Although in substantially different setups, they consider guarantees that are
non-state-contingent, as we do here.15 As we will show in what follows, when the guarantee
is instead risky, i.e. varies across states of the world, the direct effect of the guarantee on
risk premiums can be of the opposite sign.
Case II: State-contingent guarantee. When the guarantee varies across states of the
world, the risk premium of the investors’ claim on the bank, following analogous steps as
above, can be written as
E[Rl]− R¯ =
{
α
∫ ω¯
−∞ τ(ω)dF (ω) + pil [1− F (ω¯)]
α
∫ ω¯
−∞ τ(ω)dG(ω) + pil [1−G(ω¯)]
− 1
}
R¯. (6)
For future reference, we term the ratio
∫ ω¯
−∞ τ(ω)dF (ω)/
∫ ω¯
−∞ τ(ω)dG(ω) the risk premium
of the guarantee, that is, the risk premium commanded by the transfer attributable to the
guarantee obtained by the investors, 1{ω<ω¯}ατ(ω). Due to the state contingency of the
guarantee, its direct effect on risk premiums is no longer necessarily negative. In other
words, stronger guarantees can imply higher risk premiums even when abstracting from any
indirect effects of the guarantee operating through risk taking. Such a positive association
requires the guarantee to be sufficiently risky, as measured by the risk premium of the
guarantee, which in turn reflects the exposure of the guarantor to aggregate risk.
14Intuitively, the condition G′(ω¯) ≥ F ′(ω¯) requires that ω¯ chosen by the managers corresponds to a “bad”
state of the world, which is deemed to be more likely under the risk-neutral than the objective probability
measure.
15Note that here we simply require the guarantee not to vary across the states of the world, rather than
requiring it to be deterministic. Specifically, the guarantee could be non-deterministic as in Kelly et al.
(2016), meaning that in each state of the world the investors obtain a transfer with a given probability.
Indeed, if α were a probability, none of the results presented in this section would change.
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Proposition 2 Both the direct and the total effect of an increase in the strength α of a
state-contingent guarantee on the risk premium commanded by the investors’ claim on the
bank are ambiguous.
Intuitively, the possibility of the direct effect of the guarantee being positive arises from
the guarantee being risky. More specifically, if the guarantee is procyclical in the sense of
providing higher protection in “good” than in “bad” states of the world, it commands a
positive risk premium. Thus, an increase in the strength α of the guarantee can, by making
the investors more exposed to aggregate risk, lead to an increase in the risk premium of the
investors’ claim. The guarantee could be procyclical, for instance, because weaker public
finances in recessions can constrain the government’s ability to support banks and make
bailouts harder to justify to taxpayers.
Also note that if the guarantee is risky, its indirect effect, operating through risk taking,
is more ambiguous. This finding relates to the fact that an increase in pil due to more risk
taking lowers the risk premium of the investor’s claim if the guarantee is riskier than the
underlying unguaranteed claim.16 Thus, the overall effect due to risk taking is less clear cut
in this case.
Proposition 2 has the following corollary, which will allow us to formulate an additional
testable prediction.
Corollary 1 Holding constant the level of risk taking, an increase in the strength of the
guarantee can lead to an increase in the risk premium commanded by the investors’ claim
only if the guarantee is sufficiently risky.
Corollary 1 is derived by assuming that the risk class of the bank’s assets does not respond
to an increase in the strength of the guarantee, that is, when the mechanism revealed by
Lemma 1 does not operate. This mechanism would be absent, for instance, when the risk
class of the asset is chosen before the change in the strength of the guarantee takes place.
We make this assumption to be able to isolate the direct effect of the guarantee on bank
risk premiums, as we do in the empirical analysis by controlling for risk taking.
One can think of the riskiness of the guarantee as depending primarily on the riskiness of
the sovereign granting it. An alternative interpretation is that increased uncertainty about
which banks and under which conditions will be supported makes implicit guarantees riskier.
In Section 2.3, we shed more light on how a guarantee granted by a sovereign depends on
its fundamentals, and in particular on its riskiness.
16The term multiplying dpildα in Eq. (A.17) is negative when the risk premium of the guarantee exceeds
that of the underlying unguaranteed claim.
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Discussion. Before turning to the determinants of the implicit government support, let
us discuss some potential limitations of our framework. First, our static model abstracts
from any effects operating through charter value. A stronger government guarantee, by
lowering refinancing costs, can raise the guaranteed bank’s charter value (Gropp et al.,
2011), and therefore temper the managers’ incentives for risk taking (Keeley, 1990). Thus,
in the presence of this mechanism, stronger guarantees would not necessarily imply more
risk taking.
Second, guarantees could influence risk taking through general equilibrium effects, which
our partial equilibrium framework is not able to capture. In principle, providing support to
a bank can affect the stochastic discount factor (SDF) in a number of ways, thus having an
effect on the risk-neutral distribution of the state. Note that in our framework, the SDF is
given by ϕ(ω) = g(ω)
f(ω)
1
R¯
. Suppose, for instance, that government support involves a transfer
from the taxpayers to the marginal investors. In such a setting, an increase in the strength of
the guarantee could lead to a decrease in the SDF in states of the world in which government
support is provided.17 Alternatively, the SDF could be affected through changes in banks’
risk taking, induced by increases in the strength of their guarantees. Such an effect would
arise if the SDF depended on whether banks are able to repay the investors. Specifically,
an increase in the strength of the government support of a bank could lead to an increase
in the SDF in the states in which the bank is no longer able to honor its obligations. These
two effects on the SDF, taking opposite signs, could in turn influence bank risk premiums,
but in a priori ambiguous manner. We leave for future research to formally examine these
potential mechanisms.
Finally, although the model we employ allows for the coexistence of debt and equity, it
is not possible to obtain a clear-cut characterization of their risk premiums if considered
separately. The reason is that, when implementing the contract between the managers and
the investors with a combination of debt and equity finance, their weights in the investors’
portfolio vary in a non-trivial manner with the strength of the guarantee. Therefore, it
remains a question for future theoretical work whether stronger effects should be expected
on debt or equity claims, which could be interesting in light of the previous literature showing
that not only the return on debt (e.g., Acharya et al., 2016), but also that on equity (e.g.,
Gandhi and Lustig, 2015), is affected by government guarantees. We will return to the risk
premiums of debt and equity claims in Section 4.1.4.
17In a framework in which the SDF is a function of the marginal utility of the investors, this would be the
case if investors’ consumption were increasing in the strength of the support. More generally, any transfer
that leads to a change in aggregate consumption, due for example to differing propensities to consume of
the agents involved, would affect the SDF.
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2.3. Determinants of implicit guarantees
To examine the factors that could determine the implicit guarantee granted by a sovereign
to a bank, we augment the framework described above with the following elements. Let the
country in which the bank operates be populated by a representative agent who, as in Romer
(1985), has preferences defined over aggregate consumption C and aggregate deposits D,
represented by the utility function u(C,D). The function u(·, ·) is increasing in both of its
arguments. The bank under consideration, in addition to raising funds from the investors and
investing in risky assets, issues deposits amounting to d to the representative agent. When
ω < ω¯ and the bank’s assets yield a payoff of 0, the investors can initiate the bankruptcy
proceedings, forcing the bank to close doors. In this case, its customers lose access to their
deposits.18 However, if the investors receive a transfer ατ(ω) from the government, they
refrain from legal action, allowing the bank to remain open. The government of the country
is benevolent and can levy lump-sum taxes on the representative agent. Thus, a transfer
amounting to ατ(ω) to keep the bank operating, which is required to prevent customers
from losing their deposits, is optimal if
u (C(ω)− ατ(ω), D) ≥ u (C(ω), D − d) . (7)
In words, the government provides the transfer if the utility loss due to the reduction in the
aggregate amount of deposits available to the representative agent that would take place if
the bank were to close doors is larger than the utility loss attributable to the lump-sum taxes
that reduce consumption. Note that the representative agent is assumed not to benefit from
the transfer directly, which is the case if their only significant claim on the bank consists of
deposits.
Due to the fact that u(·, ·) is increasing in each of its arguments, the highest transfer the
government is willing to provide to the investors, ατ ∗(ω) satisfies
u (C(ω)− ατ ∗(ω), D) = u (C(ω), D − d) . (8)
We interpret ατ ∗(ω) as the implicit support of the bank by the government.
18Banks’ total deposits comprise both uninsured deposits and insured deposits, i.e. deposits guaranteed
up to some threshold via deposit-insurance schemes that are in place in the countries examined in our
empirical analysis. Even if these deposit-insurance schemes were fully credible (riskless), the impact of the
loss of uninsured deposits in the case of bankruptcy of a bank is of first-order importance for the national
economy. For example, for the largest US commercial banks, uninsured deposits represent more than half of
their total deposits, and cross-sectional variations in total deposits are driven largely by changes in uninsured
deposits (Egan et al., 2017). Thus, even in the presence of a deposit-insurance scheme, and regardless of the
degree of risk associated with it, total deposits provide a meaningful empirical measure of the loss inflicted
on the national economy by the failure of the bank.
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For the purposes of examining the determinants of τ ∗(ω), we need to make some assump-
tions about u(·, ·). Feenstra (1986) and Croushore (1993), in studying the microfoundations
of the money-in-the-utility-function model, find that relatively weak assumptions imply re-
strictions about second partial derivatives of the utility function with real balances as the
second argument. Using these restrictions in our formulation with deposits in the utility
function, we obtain the following result.
Lemma 3 If ucc ≤ 0, udd ≤ 0 and ucd ≥ 0, then τ ∗(ω) is increasing in C(ω) and in d/D.
The fact that the implicit support of the bank ατ ∗(ω) varies positively with aggregate
consumption is intuitive. Due to decreasing marginal utility of consumption, the higher is
the level of consumption, the lower is the utility cost of funding the transfer to the investors.
The positive dependence of ατ ∗(ω) on C(ω) shows that the support optimally chosen by the
government is procyclical.
Implicit support varying positively with d/D arises from two effects. First, the larger
are the deposits of the bank, the higher is the utility cost of letting it close doors. Sec-
ond, due to the decreasing marginal utility of deposits, the higher is the level of aggregate
deposits in the economy, the smaller is the utility gain from keeping the bank open. Conse-
quently, banks whose deposits represent a larger share of the aggregate deposits benefit from
stronger implicit supports. Therefore, for a given C(ω), d/D determines the willingness of
the government to support the bank, i.e. the strength of the guarantee.
To illustrate how the riskiness of the sovereign shapes that of the implicit support, it is
useful to consider a functional form for the utility function. Namely, we assume that the
representative agent’s preferences can be represented by the function u(C,D) = CγD1−γ,
considered in the analysis of Poterba and Rotemberg (1986). For this functional form, which
satisfies the restrictions in Lemma 3, one immediately obtains
ατ ∗(ω) =
1− (1− d
D
) 1−γ
γ
C(ω). (9)
Thus, in this case, the implicit support of the bank, for a given level of aggregate deposits,
is a linear function of aggregate consumption. Note that with this functional form both the
bank-specific strength of the guarantee α and the component that is common to all banks
guaranteed by the same government are unambiguously defined. Namely, α = 1−
(
1− d
D
) 1−γ
γ
and τ ∗(ω) = C(ω). In our empirical analysis, we employ the expression for α to construct
a measure of the strength of implicit support. This measure is a function of the relative
size of banks’ deposits as we interpret banks with a larger deposit base as those that are
more important for the national economy, and hence more likely to benefit from strong
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government guarantees. In contrast, the too-big-to-fail literature focuses on absolute bank
size to capture a bank’s systemic importance at the global level.
Given that aggregate consumption also represents the tax base in this framework, it is
natural to interpret an increase in the volatility of C as an increase in the riskiness of the
sovereign. This interpretation is also consistent with Jeanneret (2015), showing that the
volatility of the fundamentals is a key determinant of sovereign risk.19 For these reasons,
we maintain that the riskiness of an implicit guarantee is increasing in the riskiness of the
sovereign granting it, allowing us to translate Corollary 1 to a testable prediction, stated in
what follows.
2.4. Testable predictions
Let us conclude the theoretical analysis by translating some of the results to empirically
testable predictions. While the framework is rich enough to deliver multiple predictions, we
focus on the predictions that lend themselves most readily to empirical investigation and,
at the same time, have not been previously evaluated. For this reason, for instance, we do
not study the effects of the guarantees on bank risk taking as such, which are the focus
of several recent papers (see, e.g., Brandao-Marques et al., 2018). Instead, we concentrate
on the direct effects of government guarantees on bank risk premiums, which is the most
novel aspect of our theoretical analysis. Yet, the theory suggests that to isolate such direct
effects, we need to control for the presence of the indirect effects. Therefore, empirically we
should consider a cross section of banks with similar riskiness, i.e. same level of risk taking.
In this way, any resulting differences in risk premiums in the cross section of banks can be
attributed solely to direct effects of government guarantees.
Based on Proposition 2, we formulate the following prediction:
Prediction 1: Among banks of similar riskiness, bank risk premiums can either increase
or decrease with the strength of the implicit guarantee that they benefit from.
This prediction is important as the previous literature suggests that stronger guarantees are
always associated with lower risk premiums.
With regard to the riskiness of implicit support, from Corollary 1 and the discussion on
the determinants of implicit guarantees, we obtain the following additional prediction:
Prediction 2: Among banks of similar riskiness, those that are guaranteed by riskier
sovereigns should offer higher risk premiums.
19Similarly, Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010) find that sovereign credit spreads depend to a significant extent
on the volatility of fundamentals. This finding is analogous to the strong link between corporate bond yield
spreads and asset volatility, as proposed by Merton (1974), and empirically shown by Campbell and Taksler
(2003).
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Next, we turn to testing the above two predictions arising from the theoretical framework
by applying suitable portfolio-sort techniques; in essence, we evaluate the risk premiums
associated with the direct effects of government guarantees, and study the risks reflected in
these premiums.
3. Data and empirical strategy
This section describes the sample selection criteria, the asset return data, the sorting
techniques used to construct the portfolios, and the econometric methods employed. We
also provide some descriptive statistics.
3.1. Sample selection
Our goal is to test the predictions implied by the theoretical framework on data for bank
debt and equity returns. We use CDS contracts, rather than corporate bonds, to examine
the impact of the guarantees on the cost of bank debt. CDS contracts are standardized, with
the terms set by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). While CDS
spreads largely reflect the credit risk of the underlying entity, corporate bond yield spreads
are often affected by microstructure, tax and illiquidity effects (Elton et al., 2001; Berndt
and Obreja, 2010). Therefore, CDS-implied returns can be easily computed and compared
across banks of different countries.
We use five-year CDS contracts with modified restructuring clause for senior unsecured
debt. For European banks, we use the Euro-denominated contracts, whereas for the re-
maining banks we use the USD-denominated contracts. As a result, we use the most liquid
CDS contracts. The CDS data are obtained from Credit Market Analytics (CMA) through
S&P Capital IQ, covering daily mid quotes for the period from January 2004 to November
2018.20 The starting date is dictated by the low liquidity of the CDS contracts before that
date.
We select those entities that S&P Capital IQ categorizes as banks, regardless of whether
a bank is a subsidiary or a parent company, and for which CDS contracts are available. We
restrict the analysis to developed countries’ banks. Although CDS contracts are generally
written on larger banks, we filter out those banks with assets in place less than 10 USD
20S&P Capital IQ was formed in 2010 from offerings previously provided by Capital IQ, which is also used
in academic research mainly for balance-sheet data for corporations (see, e.g., Kahle and Stulz, 2013). On
29 June 2012, S&P Capital IQ acquired CMA Limited from the CMA group. CMA provides independent
data concerning the over-the-counter markets, being one of the major providers of CDS quotes, along with
Markit. CMA data seem to lead the price discovery process in comparison with the quotes provided by
other providers (Mayordomo et al., 2014). Also note that while for sovereigns some data suppliers provide
CDS quotes in different currencies, this is not the case for banks.
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billion. In this way, we organize our empirical analysis around a group of reasonably large
banks, following, for example, Beltratti and Stulz (2012), who identify large banks as those
with assets in excess of $50 billion, thus via an even more restrictive filter. In total, our
sample contains 88 banks. The banks’ names, along with their available assets, are given in
the Internet Appendix (Table A1). We also collect equity prices for the selected banks from
S&P Capital IQ. Although many banks have publicly traded equity but no CDS contracts,
the opposite can also happen for some banks. This fact slightly limits the sample of banks
for which both equity prices and CDS contracts are available.
3.2. Equity and CDS returns
Equity returns are computed simply as the daily log-difference of the total return price
index. By contrast, there is no time series data on actual transaction prices for a specific
CDS contract (Berndt and Obreja, 2010). Indeed, default swap contracts with constant
maturity are reported at market spreads. It is standard to translate the spread on a newly
issued CDS into a one-day return. To do this, we follow, among others, He et al. (2017).
Let us denote by CDSi(t, T ) the annualized spread at day t of a CDS contract written on
bank i and maturing in T years; then, the one-day return of a short CDS strategy (in the
case of no default) is given by
ri(t, T ) = CDSi(t-1, T )/252−∆CDSi(t, T )×RDi(t-1, T ), (10)
where CDSi(t-1, T )/252 is the carry component, i.e. the seller’s daily receipt of the insurance
premium component, and ∆CDSi(t, T )×RDi(t-1, T ) is the capital gain component, which
results from being long a defaultable bond and short a risk-free bond. The lagged risky du-
ration, RDi(t-1, T ), is constructed by interacting the default-free discount curve, implied in
US Treasury yields up to the five-year maturity (data are from Gürkaynak et al., 2007), with
the bank default survival probabilities implied in the daily 5-year CDS spreads. Precisely,
to extract survival probabilities, we assume a flat term structure of survival probabilities
and a loss given default of 50% (see Appendix I in the Internet Appendix).21
Table A3 in the Internet Appendix reports asset return summary statistics; we show
the annualized daily asset return statistics for the average bank, along with those for the
25th, 50th and 75th percentiles for the panel of banks, for the 2004-2018 period. Panel
21As a caveat, if the CDS spreads include an (il)liquidity component, capturing both liquidity risk and
risk premiums, this will be reflected in somewhat lower extracted risk-neutral survival probabilities, which
would lower the capital-gain component, and consequently increase the CDS returns. Such an effect is,
however, partly attenuated by the fact that we focus on the most liquid contract, i.e. the 5-year CDS (see,
e.g., Li and Zinna, 2017).
22
A presents the statistics for equity returns, while Panel B for CDS returns. During the
full sample period, the average equity return is -4% per annum. However, while over the
pre-crisis period the average stock return was 20% per annum, over the 2007-18 period it
fell substantially, mainly because of the losses that materialized during the 2008-09 global
financial crisis. Bank stock returns display little autocorrelation, high standard deviations
and high kurtosis, thus being fat tailed. The cross-sectional distribution of bank stock
returns seems to be fairly symmetric, being only marginally left skewed.
Turning to CDS returns, it is apparent that their daily variation is substantially smaller
than that of equities. Therefore, it emerges that movements in CDS spreads actually result
in small CDS returns when compared to equities; in fact, equity returns display a standard
deviation that is roughly ten times higher than that of CDS returns. Of particular interest
is also that CDS returns show almost no variation prior to the onset of the sub-prime crisis
(see, e.g., Eichengreen et al., 2012). Compared with equities, CDS returns are also somewhat
more autocorrelated.
3.3. Portfolio construction
We examine the predictions of the theoretical framework by resorting to equally-weighted
portfolios of bank asset returns. In doing so, we can average out idiosyncratic components
of bank returns and focus only on their systematic risk (Cochrane, 2009). Specifically, to
examine whether the EGS commands a risk premium, we need to group banks according
to their EGS. However, given that the theoretical analysis suggests that bank-specific risk
– captured in the model by the variable p – should be controlled for, we first sort banks on
different measures of their riskiness.
3.3.1. First sorts by bank risk
In our theoretical framework, the variable p captures bank-specific risk that stems from
the risk taking behavior of the bank. Empirically, however, measuring bank specific risk
is not trivial, and there is no single measure that can capture its full complexity. We
therefore attempt to capture bank risk by using three commonly used measures. A natural
way to proceed is to use accounting ratios; these ratios are widely used by practitioners
and academics, given that they are easy to compute and generally available for all banks
(Iannotta et al., 2013). First, we use leverage, calculated as the ratio of total assets and
equity, both at book value. An advantage of using book values is that there is no clear reason
to expect them to have a relation with expected returns (Gandhi and Lustig, 2015). Our
measure of leverage is essentially the inverse of the capital ratio, which in turn determines the
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resilience of the bank to withstand adverse shocks. Second, we use deposits to total assets
(another standard accounting ratio) to capture the part of bank risk that is associated
with the bank business model, with low deposits to total assets indicating riskier banks.
Third, we resort to a market-based measure. Differently from accounting ratios, market-
based measures incorporate a number of factors, ranging from the bank’s financial and
economic conditions to aspects such as management quality, organization, and governance.
Specifically, we employ equity volatility, estimated over the three months of daily equity
returns prior to the sorting date. Equity volatility provides information complementary to
book-value leverage about the default probability of the bank, and is a key input to the
Merton model (see, e.g., Acharya et al., 2016).
3.3.2. Second sorts by EGS
We double-sort banks, first by the selected measure of bank risk, as described above,
and then by a measure of the EGS. The theoretical framework suggests that the implicit
guarantee of a bank should increase with the bank’s market share of deposits. Therefore,
in line with the theoretical framework, we measure the bank EGS with a proxy for the
bank market share of deposits, the bank deposit-to-GDP ratio. Intuitively, banks with high
deposit-to-GDP ratios benefit from stronger EGS as the failures of these banks can adversely
affect not only the financial system, but also the real economy.
A simple exercise reveals that banks with high deposits to GDP have indeed large ex-
posures to their sovereign, as also suggested by the theoretical framework. Fig. A1 in the
Internet Appendix plots bank deposit-to-GDP ratios versus their sovereign exposures in the
cross section. The sovereign exposures are estimated by regressing bank CDS returns on
sovereign CDS returns. Therefore, these estimates capture the market assessment of bank
sovereign exposures, both direct and indirect, which arise from factors including the EGS
(Li and Zinna, 2017). We find that for the sample of banks of all countries the correlation
coefficient between these two measures is equal to 24%. When restricting the sample of
banks to those based in core-EU countries, this correlation coefficient more than doubles to
66%, and is more precisely estimated. This finding is not surprising given that sovereign
risk is likely to be more elevated in EU countries. However, for non-EU core banks, the
correlation is 27%, suggesting that there is substantial heteroskedasticity across banks lo-
cated in different EU countries, being stronger for core EU and much weaker for non-core
EU banks, especially for the full sample. Generally, the correlations tend to be higher over
the pre bail-in sample, when sovereign risk was more elevated. Overall, these findings seem
to support the use of deposits to GDP as an appropriate sorting variable for our purposes.
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The use of the deposit-to-GDP ratio as proxy for the EGS, and therefore as an appropri-
ate variable to test the theoretical predictions, is motivated by Eq. (9). It is, however, useful
to compare this measure with two alternative measures widely used in the literature: the
rating uplift (see, e.g., Gropp et al., 2011; Correa et al., 2014; Acharya et al., 2014), and bank
size (see, e.g., Gandhi and Lustig, 2015; Acharya et al., 2016). Relative to the rating uplift,
the bank-to-deposit ratio is more likely to be exogenous to bank asset returns. Indeed, the
rating uplift captures not only the implicit guarantee, i.e. the bank market share of deposits,
but also many other factors, including bank risk and the ability of the sovereign to rescue
a bank (see, e.g., Schich and Lind, 2012; Li and Zinna, 2017). In fact, we find a positive
and strongly statistically significant correlation between rating uplifts and deposit-to-GDP
ratios only when controlling for sovereign and bank risk. This evidence lends support to
the use of the deposit-to-GDP ratio as suitable sorting measure in a cross-country analysis,
not reflecting sovereign risk, being instead a more direct measure of the implicit support.
Moreover, unlike the rating uplift, which changes across rating agencies and over time in
response to revisions in the methodologies of the rating agencies, the deposit-to-GDP ratio
measures EGS consistently over time. Therefore, the deposit-to-GDP ratio is an objective
measure, not being contaminated by the judgment of the rating agency.
Turning to bank size, bigger commercial banks also tend to have more deposits, so that
bank size and deposits move closely together. What is crucial instead is that our proxy for
the EGS measures the importance of the bank for the national economy, rather than its
systemic importance at the global level. In fact, standard measures of systemic importance,
which largely reflect (absolute) bank size, tend to deliver a substantially different bank
ranking than one would obtain using our measure. For instance, Bank of America and
Citibank are classified as more globally systemically important than Banco Santander and
Unicredit in terms of size. However, when banks are single-sorted by their deposit-to-GDP
ratios, the former two are allocated to the low deposit-to-GDP portfolio, whereas the latter
two to the high deposit-to-GDP portfolio. This observation also rationalizes why we no
longer find a relation between the EGS and sovereign exposures when the deposit-to-GDP
ratio is replaced by bank size (or absolute deposits).
Finally, one might argue that deposit-to-GDP ratios capture banks’ direct sovereign ex-
posures. However, we find that, using the sovereign debt holdings released by the European
Banking Association in the 2011 stress test exercise, while deposit-to-GDP ratios correlate
with domestic holdings of sovereign debt over GDP, they do not correlate with the holdings
of sovereign debt when standardized by total assets. If anything, smaller banks display
higher direct sovereign exposures, as measured by domestic sovereign holdings over total
assets. This finding suggests that, despite holdings of domestic sovereign debt potentially
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being one of the factors determining the level of the implicit support of a bank, these types
of sovereign exposures do not correlate with our measure of EGS. Therefore, deposit-to-GDP
ratios convey different information than measures of banks’ direct sovereign exposures.
3.3.3. Sorting strategy
Fig. 2 illustrates our sorting strategy, which consists of a series of 2×2 sorts. At the
beginning of each month, we allocate banks to two portfolios according to the selected mea-
sure of bank risk. Then, we further split each of these two portfolios into two subportfolios
according to the bank EGSs. As a result, for each measure of bank risk, we obtain four
portfolios. The double-sorted portfolios are denoted by LL, LH, HL, HH, where the first
letter denotes the level of the first sorting variable (bank risk) and the second letter that
of the second sorting variable (EGS). The return differences between portfolios LH and LL,
and between HH and HL denote the low bank risk and high bank risk spread portfolios,
respectively. Spread portfolios are self-financed strategies, and represent a long position in
high EGS banks and short position in low EGS banks. These portfolios are of particular
interest as they contain banks of similar riskiness, i.e. level of risk taking, and therefore
isolate the direct effects of the EGS on bank returns. We repeat the analysis separately for
bank equity and CDS returns. This sorting strategy yields, for each measure of bank risk, a
total of eight double-sorted portfolios and four spread portfolios. Using the three measures
of bank risk, we obtain a total of 36 portfolios.
Finally, define rajt the time–t return on the double-sorted portfolios for j =LL, LH, HL,
HH of asset class a, denoting either equities or CDSs. Then, the excess returns at time t
for double-sorted portfolios are given by rxajt = rajt − rft−1, where rft−1 is the lagged daily
risk-free rate, proxied by the daily US 1-month T-Bill rate. Since the spread portfolios are
self financed, resulting from long-short strategies, their returns are already excess returns.
Before turning to present the empirical results, we briefly present the two-pass method
associated with Fama and MacBeth (1973).
3.4. Asset-pricing methods
Under no-arbitrage pricing, risk-adjusted excess returns have zero price and satisfy the
basic Euler equation E[ϕt+1rxjt+1] = 0. A linear SDF in turn implies the beta pricing model,
E[rxj] = λ′βj, so that portfolio-j expected excess returns depend on factor risk prices (λ)
and risk quantities (βj). The objects of interest λ and βj can be estimated using a two-pass
procedure (Fama and MacBeth, 1973).
The first pass is a time-series regression of each portfolio’s excess return on the vector
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of risk factors
rxjt = αj + ftβj + eit, t = 1, . . . , T, for j = 1, . . . , n (11)
where ft is the vector of risk factors, αj captures the risk-adjusted average realized returns of
portfolio j, and βj is the vector of its corresponding exposures to the risk factors. The second
pass is a cross-sectional regression of average portfolio excess returns on the estimated betas
rxj = β̂
′
jλ+ aj, for j = 1, . . . , n (12)
where rxj = 1T
∑T
t=1 rxjt, β̂j is the OLS estimate of βj, and aj is the cross-sectional pricing
error associated with portfolio j.
A few observations are in order. First, it is standard in the literature to proxy expected
returns with average realized returns, also in the case of CDS portfolios (e.g., He et al.,
2017). Second, while the vector βj can be estimated equation by equation using OLS, we
report throughout the analysis GMM VARHAC standard errors to account for potential
serial correlation. Third, in the second pass, we impose the restriction that the constant
(αj) is equal to zero. Finally, note that the second-pass regressors β̂j are generated, so that
OLS standard errors would understate the degree of parameter uncertainty. While the point
estimates of the factor risk premiums are unaffected by the fact that β̂j are estimated in
the first pass, the use of OLS standard errors would compromise inference about the factor
risk premiums. There are three standard ways to take into account the uncertainty around
the regressors β̂j: the Shanken (1992) correction for the standard errors, GMM standard
errors, and bootstrap methods. We use all three methods to test statistical significance.
4. Empirical results
The empirical results are organized in three parts. Section 4.1 details the steps necessary
to estimate the EGS risk premium, and evaluates Prediction 1. Then, we turn to assess
Prediction 2, in Section 4.2, by showing how the EGS risk premium varies with sovereign
risk. Finally, Section 4.3 offers complementary evidence by investigating the types of risk
that underlie the EGS factor.
4.1. The EGS risk premium
The key testable prediction of the theoretical framework in Section 2, Prediction 1,
states that, for a given level of bank riskiness, banks that are more exposed to a risky
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government guarantee can offer an EGS risk premium. We evaluate this prediction using
the portfolio sorts and asset-pricing methods described earlier. The test assets include the
36 portfolios formed by double-sorted banks, first by their intrinsic riskiness, using three
alternative measures, and then by deposits to GDP, as described in Section 3, for the period
from January 2004 to November 2018. Specifically, the test assets consist of 12 double-
sorted equity portfolios and the 6 associated EGS spread portfolios, and 12 double-sorted
CDS portfolios and the 6 associated EGS spread portfolios. Therefore, the set of dependent
variables to be explained includes a broad set of portfolios, which helps mitigate the problems
that can arise in the presence of a strong factor structure in test-asset returns (Lewellen et al.,
2010). Moreover, the inclusion of the EGS spread portfolios, in addition to the double-sorted
portfolios, is instrumental to identify the EGS price of risk in the second-pass regressions,
when the pricing factor is itself a return (e.g., Della Corte et al., 2016); we will return to
this point later when discussing second-pass regressions.
Table 1 presents the average realized excess returns (rxj). We find that double-sorted
equity portfolios tend to deliver large negative average excess returns for low deposit-to-
GDP banks, and roughly zero average excess returns for high deposit-to-GDP banks. While
none of the average returns of the double-sorted portfolios are statistically lower than zero,
the EGS spread portfolios, which are the ultimate object of interest, are positive, large and
statistically significant, with the only exceptions of those associated with the low leverage
and equity volatility portfolios, which are not statistically significant. The low deposit-
to-total assets spread portfolio generates the highest return of roughly 11% per annum.
The average excess returns for the double-sorted CDS portfolios also tend to be negative,
but they are not statistically significant. More importantly, EGS spread portfolios rxj are
economically small for CDS markets, which is not surprising in light of the evidence on the
return descriptive statistics, and they are also not statistically different from zero.
We test the robustness of the portfolios along two important dimensions. First, we
double-sort the banks using the market share of deposits, so that the banks’ deposits are
standardized by the country deposits, and not by the country GDP. This exercise is subject
to the caveats that i) at a practical level, the resulting portfolios are not tradable in real time
given that the country deposits are released with a two year lag, and ii) some extrapolation
of the data is needed, such as for the UK where the data are only available until 2009 (we
simply use the latest data available). Nevertheless, we find that the double-sorted portfolios
are essentially unchanged. Second, one might argue that changes in the deposit-to-GDP
ratios can be driven by changes in GDPs. This possibility would clearly contaminate the
analysis. The reasoning is as follows: as GDP drops, holding fixed the bank deposits, bank
deposit-to-GDP ratios would increase, which would translate to an increase in the EGSs for
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the banks located in that country, and change the allocation of the banks to the portfolios
in a potentially counterintuitive manner. To rule out this possibility, we change our EGS
sorting variables; specifically, we standardize the bank deposits by the 2003 level of GDP
so that the denominator is held constant, and all the variability is driven by changes in the
numerator, i.e. bank deposits. The resulting evidence is clear cut, that is, the portfolios are
again unchanged. It is also important to note that the portfolios are populated by a similar
number of banks, which helps exclude the possibility that a few banks might be driving our
findings. In short, our portfolios are robust to these refinements and are not likely to be
driven by outliers.
Summing up, the presence of positive equity EGS spread portfolio returns, which are
statistically and economically significant, is suggestive that an EGS risk premium might
indeed exist, as predicted by the theoretical framework. However, before making more
definite conclusions, we need to examine whether the average risk-adjusted returns are also
positive and statistically significant. In essence, we need to establish whether such excess
returns reflect compensation for risk and hence reflect a risk-return trade-off consistent with
the theoretical framework.
4.1.1. Explaining returns with standard risk factors
We start by considering a four-factor SDF (see Table A2 for a detailed definition of the
risk factors). The first risk factor is the market factor (Mkt), as measured by the daily
return on the MSCI World Index in excess of the daily one-month T-bill rate. The second
and third risk factors are the bond market (Term) and credit spread (Crd) differentials.
Term is the daily change in the spread between the 10- and 2-year US Treasury rates,
which largely measures business-cycle risk. The slope of the term structure is also an
important determinant of bank profitability, given banks’ maturity transformation activities
(Alessandri and Nelson, 2015). Crd is the daily change in the spread between the high-yield
and investment-grade US corporate rates, which captures corporate default risk and thus,
among other things, the riskiness of bank assets. Finally, we also include the TED spread,
computed as the daily change in the yield difference between the one-month Libor and
the US T-bill of the same maturity. TED measures stress in the interbank market, being
strongly related to funding liquidity, which in turn is intertwined with market liquidity
(Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). A larger spread points to a diminished willingness of
banks to provide funding in the interbank market, as occurred at the peak of the global
financial crisis (Brunnermeier, 2009).
Table 1 presents the first-pass regression estimates. As for the double-sorted portfolio
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regressions, the risk factors generally enter with the expected signs; indeed, they load posi-
tively on Mkt and Term, and negatively on Crd and TED. Thus, as risk increases (declines),
bank returns decline (increase). Moreover, Mkt, Term and Crd seem to be key factors in
explaining both equity and CDS portfolios, being generally statistically significant at the 1%
level, while TED helps explain the returns of some of the CDS portfolios. Taken together,
these four factors explain roughly 60% and 30% of the variations in equity and CDS portfolio
returns, respectively.
Turning to the regressions of EGS spread portfolios, the findings are clear cut: standard
risk factors fail to explain EGS spread portfolio returns, as revealed by the low R2s and,
more importantly, by the statistically and economically significant alphas. In essence, the
average realized spread returns (rxj) are basically the same as the risk-adjusted returns
(αj). As a result, based on this set of risk factors, bank returns sorted by deposits to GDP
are an anomaly, as we cannot find evidence that they can be understood as compensation
for risk.
4.1.2. Constructing the EGS factor
A natural way to proceed is to examine the factor structure of the risk-adjusted returns
(see, e.g., Berndt and Obreja, 2010; Gandhi and Lustig, 2015). Thus, we perform a principal
component (PC) analysis of the residuals obtained from the first-pass regressions of the
double-sorted portfolio returns on the set of standard risk factors (Table 1). We extract the
loadings for the first three principal components, displayed in Fig. 3, which explain roughly
85% of the variation in the residuals.22
Of particular interest is that the three PC loadings suggest that the PCs have a clear
economic interpretation. The first PC is a bank level factor, given that it loads positively on
all the portfolios. The second PC is a security factor, being short in equity portfolios and long
in CDS portfolios.23 The third PC is a candidate EGS factor as it is long in high deposit-
to-GDP portfolios and short in low deposit-to-GDP portfolios. Notably, this structure
associated with the weights of the third PC holds both for equity and CDS portfolios.
Moreover, these factor weights align with the pattern of the equity (risk-adjusted) returns,
making the EGS factor as the only likely candidate to be added to the set of risk factors.
Next, as in Gandhi and Lustig (2015), we exploit the PC weights to construct three return
22Note that equity risk-adjusted returns display substantially higher variation than CDS risk-adjusted
returns. Therefore, we standardize the residuals before executing the PC analysis. Also, we use the residuals
from regressions of double-sorted portfolio returns, excluding the spread portfolio returns, to carry out the
PC analysis.
23One could argue that this finding is consistent with the evidence that equity and bond returns respond
differently to capital-market anomalies (Chordia et al., 2017).
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factors (Fig. A2 in the Internet Appendix). While the PCs are generated as PCj,t = ˜tŵ′j,
the return factors are constructed as R[PCj]t = xrtŵ′j, where wj is the vector of principal
component weights associated with the jth PC, and ˜ are the standardized residuals (risk-
adjusted returns). The advantage of working with the return factors rather than with the
raw PCs is that they are tradable risk factors. A factor is considered to be tradable if it is
a convolution of returns, regardless of whether the loadings, or weights, on the returns are
known in real time.24 A convenient feature of a return factor is that its price of risk must
equal its expected return, so that the mean of the factor is its price of risk (e.g., Menkhoff
et al., 2012). It follows that if the mean of the return factor is not statistically different
from zero, then its price of risk is also zero.
Therefore, we examine the statistical significance of the averages of the return factors
presented in the bottom panels of Fig. A2. Our candidate as additional pricing factor is
the EGS return factor, R[PC3]t; thus, we start by examining its mean. We find that it is
roughly 11% per annum, with a p-value of around 1%. Therefore, the EGS price of risk is
both economically and statistically significant, which seems striking, given that the sample
is not only relatively short, but also characterized by severe shocks. By contrast, the level
and security factors average around -12% and 12%, respectively, but none of the two is
statistically significant, with p-values around 25%.
4.1.3. Explaining returns with the EGS factor
Next, we repeat the first-pass regressions by adding the EGS return factor to the set
of risk factors, which results in a five-factor SDF. The main findings, displayed in Table 2,
are easy to summarize. We start by noting that the spread portfolios load positively on
the EGS return factor, and this holds both for equities and CDSs. This finding, in turn,
suggests that an EGS premium is priced consistently in both markets. Not surprisingly,
in light of the statistical properties of the returns, the magnitudes of such EGS loadings
are substantially higher for equities than for CDSs. Nevertheless, the results for equities
are probably of broader interest, given that average risk-adjusted returns for equities are
large and statistically significant, based on the standard set of pricing factors (Table 1). By
including the EGS return factor in the SDF, the alphas on the equity spread portfolios are
24The reason is that, while the portfolios need to be tradable in real time, the factor is not needed to
form the portfolio strategy. Rather, its purpose is to help us understand the risk-return trade-off that
can explain the excess returns arising from the portfolio strategy in terms of compensation for risk. In the
asset-pricing literature, a non-tradable or non-return factor is generally converted to a tradable-return factor
using factor-mimicking portfolios. This conversion is implemented by running OLS regressions, using full
sample information, of the original non-tradable factor on a set of returns. The loadings obtained from such
regressions are then used to construct the factor-mimicking portfolio, by projecting the non-tradable factor
onto the space of returns (e.g., see Breeden et al., 1989; Ang et al., 2006; Menkhoff et al., 2012; Adrian
et al., 2014).
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no longer large in economic terms, and their statistical significance also drops.25 Moreover,
the R2s on the spread portfolios jump, on average, from roughly 5% to 75%, ranging from
a minimum of 45% to a maximum of 90%.
For the equity regressions, the positive loadings of the spread portfolios on the EGS
return factor result from the combination of the negative loadings of the low deposit-to-GDP
portfolios and the positive loadings of the high deposit-to-GDP portfolios. By contrast, for
the CDS regressions, high deposit-to-GDP portfolios have larger EGS exposures than the low
deposit-to-GDP portfolios, but low deposit-to-GDP portfolios at times also display positive
exposures.26 To shed further light on this issue, in the Internet Appendix (Table A4), we
repeat the first-pass regressions by replacing R[PC3]t with PC3,t. Indeed, by doing so, we
find that low deposit-to-GDP CDS portfolios show negative exposures to the EGS PC factor,
and the R2s on the CDS spread portfolios are substantially higher, reaching a maximum
of 17%. However, this exercise also shows one of the major shortcomings of working with
a factor that is not tradable and also has zero mean by construction: the alphas remain
economically large and statistically significant.
Finally, we note that the estimated betas are generally individually significant, regardless
of whether standard-system OLS, GMM-based, or bootstrap procedures are used to compute
standard errors. For brevity, we only report GMM-based standard errors for the first-
pass regressions. Most importantly, a statistically significant spread in the betas across
portfolios is a necessary condition to find a spread in the expected returns across portfolios.
In formulae, the expected return associated with factor k for portfolio j is given by βjkλk.
We test whether βjk = 0 and βjk = βj ∀j, for each factor k =Term, TED, Crd, Mkt and
R[PC3]. As Table A5 shows, we can strongly reject both hypotheses.27 Next, we turn to the
cross-sectional analysis (second-pass regressions).
25The alphas on the low deposit-to-total assets and on the high equity-volatility equity spread portfolios
are no longer statistically significant. Moreover, for the remaining four equity spread portfolios, the alphas
display less statistical and economic significance than the respective average excess returns.
26This finding is likely to result from the following two facts. First, by construction, while the PC weights
are extracted from risk-adjusted returns, the EGS return factor, differently from the associated PC, is not
necessarily independent from the other risk factors; see also the discussion in Gandhi and Lustig (2014) on
this issue. Second, despite us performing the PC analysis on the standardized risk-adjusted portfolio returns
to account for the different variation of equity and CDS returns, we still find that the weights on the third
PC are larger (in absolute terms) for equities than for CDSs. This finding, coupled with the fact that we
use the return factor rather than the PC as risk factor, explains why the return factor largely reflects the
information embedded in the equity portfolios.
27Although the betas on TED are often individually not significant, we show in the Internet Appendix
(Table A5) that they contribute somewhat to the spread in expected returns, in particular when both
double-sorted and spread portfolios are considered. We therefore opt to include TED in the SDF, but the
results are robust to excluding it.
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4.1.4. Cross-sectional asset pricing
The spread in the factor betas is not a sufficient condition to conclude that there is
a spread in the factor excess returns across portfolios, as it also depends on whether the
pricing factor commands a statistically (and economically) significant price of risk.28 Table 3
presents the cross-sectional asset-pricing results. Starting from Panel B.I, which is our main
object of interest, we find a strongly statistically and economically significant positive price
of risk associated with the EGS return factor. Statistically, the price of risk is precisely
estimated according to all three procedures employed to compute standard errors. The
bootstrapped p-value, which is our preferred statistic given the relatively short sample and
the presence of severe shocks that make returns fat tailed, is below 5%. Economically, the
price of risk for a unit exposure to the EGS factor is as high as 12% per annum. The point
estimate is very close to the average of the EGS return factor, and we cannot reject the null
that the two are equal.
We now turn to assess the economic significance in terms of portfolio excess returns,
thus interacting the portfolio betas with the price of risk. This exercise delivers equity
excess returns, associated with the EGS factor, which range across the spread portfolios
from a minimum of 5% to a maximum of 9% per annum. The absolute magnitudes of the
CDS excess returns are clearly much smaller, being on average around 0.15% per annum,
but relative to CDS returns, these premiums are not negligible.29
We employ three measures to evaluate the cross-sectional fit. First, we uncover a good
fit in terms of explained variation: the R2 is 94%. Second, we cannot reject the null that the
pricing errors are zero. Third, the MAE is 0.93% per annum. However, to better evaluate
the contribution of the EGS return factor to the model fit, we compare these statistics
with those obtained from the model containing only the other risk factors (Panel A.I), thus
excluding the EGS factor. It is evident that the inclusion of the EGS factor helps very much
improve the model fit. When the EGS factor is excluded, the R2 drops by 20 percentage
points, and the MAE doubles; the difference in MAEs, 0.97, is statistically significant, based
on the 95% confidence interval, obtained by bootstrap. The evidence is less clear cut when
28When the factor is tradable, one knows its excess return and hence its price of risk. Thus, one can infer
the risk premium associated with that factor from the first-pass regressions. But, when the factor is not
tradable, or the SDF includes a combination of tradable and non-tradable factors – as in our case – then it is
necessary to proceed with the cross-sectional analysis to infer the factor prices of risk. That said, regardless
of whether the factor is tradable or not, it is useful to conduct the cross-sectional analysis since it allows
us to perform tests on the model cross-sectional pricing errors, thus providing additional information about
the ability of the factors to price the cross section of assets.
29When we perform the second-pass regression by replacing R[PC3]t with PC3,t (Table A6), we find that
the EGS risk premium priced in the CDS market is higher, being on average across portfolios around 0.45%
per annum. This finding is likely due to the more precise estimates of the CDS spread portfolios’ exposures
to the EGS factor.
33
looking at the pricing error test, given that the test fails to reject the null of zero pricing
errors also in the model without the EGS factor.30
Although it is not the main focus of the analysis, we briefly comment on the prices
of risk associated with the other risk factors. It is apparent that they are not precisely
estimated, which is particularly evident when using the bootstrap procedure; the only price
of risk with a p-value below 10% is that associated with the credit factor (Crd). However,
the only prices of risk with economically meaningful signs, being therefore consistent with
a risk-return explanation, are those associated with TED and the market factor, although
these effects are economically negligible. These findings largely hold also when the EGS
return factor is excluded from the SDF.
Before proceeding further, let us briefly return to the differences between equity and CDS
excess returns. Our theoretical framework does not allow us to explain why risk premiums
for equities should be much larger than for CDSs, as it focuses on a portfolio comprising
both equity and debt, rather than providing separate expressions for the risk premiums of
these two claims. However, we conjecture that the observed differences in excess returns (rx)
between equity and CDS spread portfolios, evident in Table 1, could arise as a consequence of
the priority of debt over equity, implying that the government guarantee will differentially
affect these two claims in different states of the world. Specifically, the fact that debt
holders are paid before equity holders implies that in the states of the world in which the
guarantee is particularly low, the entire transfer from the government goes to debt holders.
Given that in these states the insurance provided by the guarantee is likely to be valued
the most, the risk premium of a debt claim is unlikely to be substantially increased by the
guarantee. We provide a more formal illustration of how this mechanism could operate in
the Internet Appendix (Section II), where we solve for the risk premium of debt and equity
claims separately, in a simplified framework that abstracts from risk taking.
4.1.5. Bail-in regime
In the summer of 2013, EU members reached an agreement on the adoption of the bail-in
regulation. This new regulation is intended to shield taxpayers from bank bailouts, and help
break the tight nexus between troubled banks and heavily indebted governments. Rating
agencies initially reacted to this new regulation by reducing some of the bank rating uplifts.
However, how the new measures affected market participants’ perceptions of too-big-to-fail
subsidies is not obvious. The academic literature on this topic is yet at its infancy. A notable
30The weaker evidence likely reflects the low power of this particular test in our context, as it is inconsistent
with the other evidence in the table. The above evidence suggests that the EGS factor enters the SDF
significantly, and contributes considerably to the pricing power of the SDF in terms of R2 and reduction in
the magnitude of the pricing errors.
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exception though is the study by Schäfer et al. (2016), which shows that actual bail-ins led
to stronger market reactions than the implementation of resolution regimes. Therefore, the
authors conclude that actions speak louder than words.
Our empirical strategy offers a privileged perspective to infer the market reaction to
this regime change, due to the following reason: in a credible and effective bail-in regime,
banks’ implicit guarantees should be significantly reduced if not eliminated, and we would
no longer expect high deposit-to-GDP banks to benefit from stronger implicit guarantees.
As a result, when a bail-in regime is fully operational and credible, we should no longer find
an EGS risk premium in bank asset returns. But the fact that the new regulation fully came
into effect only in 2016, along with the uncertainty around its implementation, might have
limited the impact on bail-out expectations. For these reasons, an EGS risk premium could
still exist. It is therefore natural to ask to what extent market participants have reacted to
the agreement on the new bail-in regime.
To address this question, we repeat the analysis by excluding the years after the adoption
of the new bail-in regulation. Panel A.II and B.II in Table 3 present the cross-sectional
estimates for the model without and with EGS factor, respectively, for the period from
January 2004 to June 2013. We indeed find that the EGS risk premium was substantially
larger in the years prior to the bail-in regime; in fact, the market price of risk associated with
the EGS factor is economically larger (17% versus 12%). Also note that the alphas on the
equity spread portfolios are no longer statistically significant when the first-pass regressions
are performed over the 2004-2013 period (Table A7 in the Internet Appendix).
Visual inspection of Fig. 4 also shows that the cumulative return of the EGS factor is
essentially zero over the bail-in period. However, it is also apparent that the EGS factor
drops substantially soon after the agreement on the new regime, before stabilizing somewhat.
This evidence seems to suggest that the agreement on the bail-in regime, despite not yet
being fully operational, led market participants to reassess this aspect of the bank-sovereign
nexus. However, around the end of 2015, the EGS factor resumes its rise. The turning point
is around the time four EU lenders were rescued. Thus, a possible interpretation is that
this episode led market participants to reassess the credibility of the bank resolution regime
(Philippon and Salord, 2017).31 Moreover, around the same time, the rating uplift starts
31The rescues of the four European banks could have affected the credibility of the new regime in line with
the findings in Schäfer et al. (2016). It is also worth bearing in mind that the bail-in regime has been phased
in before the completion of other critical measures of the banking union in the EU (Philippon and Salord,
2017). Furthermore, bailouts will still be required in extreme systemic events (Avgouelas and Goodhart,
2014). Having said that, the new regime seems to be producing significant changes under a number of
dimensions (Philippon and Salord, 2017). Our findings, taken together, accord with a bail-in regime that
has produced some changes (in the EGS factor), but it is deemed to be not yet fully credible and effective.
Of course, this evidence, and the associated interpretation, need to be taken with a note of caution, as they
are based on a transition period from the old regime to the new one, which is not complete, as noted before.
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increasing again (see Fig. A4 in the Internet Appendix), which suggests that also the rating
agencies might have changed their initial assessment. This evidence, albeit preliminary,
suggests that a bail-in regime can help attenuate the bank-sovereign nexus.
4.1.6. Equity only analysis: 2000-2018
So far, we have presented the joint analysis of equity and CDS portfolios for the 2004-
2018 period. The sample length is largely dictated by the availability of sufficiently liquid
bank CDSs. However, by using only data for equities we can extend the sample span back
in time. We therefore repeat the analysis using only equity portfolios over the 2000-2018
period. We use January 2000 as cut-off date, given that Capital IQ balance-sheet data are
sufficiently comprehensive since then. That said, as the subsequent analysis will show, there
is probably not much scope in trying to extend the sample further back in the past.
As before, to construct the equity portfolios, we double sort banks by the three measures
of bank risk, and then on deposits to GDP. Next, we perform the first-pass regressions on
the four standard risk factors (Panel A of Table 4). We find that these factors fail to explain
the equity spread portfolios returns; their alphas are positive and statistically significant,
and the R2s are low. We report the PC analysis of the risk-adjusted returns in Fig. A3,
in the Internet Appendix; it shows that the second PC weights are positive for the high
deposit-to-GDP portfolios and negative for the low deposit-to-GDP portfolios. Therefore,
this time, we construct the EGS return factor using the weights associated with the second
PC. The resulting factor resembles the behavior of the previously estimated EGS factor.
Most importantly, there is no evidence of an EGS premium in the years prior to the unfolding
of the sub-prime crisis. This evidence well accords with the time series of the rating uplift
presented in Fig. A4: indeed, the median uplift for the sample of developed countries over
the 2000-2007 period was zero. Possibly due to this reason, during this period there was no
risk-return trade-off associated with government guarantees. A plausible explanation is that
investors during these “good times” simply neglected this type of risk (see, e.g., Gennaioli
et al. (2015) on neglected risks). Such behavior could have been motivated by the fact that,
even though there were cases of bank bailouts, sovereign risk was judged to be, unlike in
recent years, negligible in developed countries. Thus, government guarantees were likely not
considered to be risky to any meaningful degree.
The first-pass estimates of the EGS exposures are very similar to those obtained for the
2004-2018 sample. However, we find that, when the EGS factor is constructed by using
only equity portfolios, none of the alphas is statistically different from zero (Panel B of
Table 4). Moreover, the estimate of the price of EGS risk, albeit somewhat smaller, is still
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economically large and strongly statistically significant (Table 5), and is larger when the
bail-in period is excluded from the analysis.
Overall, the results based on the longer sample using only equities are similar to those
obtained for the 2004–2018 period. Of particular interest is that this additional analysis
confirms that the EGS premium is largely generated in the period between the onset of the
sub-prime crisis and the agreement of EU members on the adoption of the bail-in regulation.
4.1.7. Robustness to additional risk factors
The four-factor benchmark SDF specification used in our empirical analysis includes
factors that are often used in the literature to jointly price the cross section of stock and
bond returns. For example, the use of Term and Crd dates back at least to the seminal
paper of Fama and French (1993). However, this SDF omits some of the factors that are
generally used to price equity portfolios, most notably the Fama-French factors SMB, HML
and MOM. We therefore test the robustness of the findings by augmenting the benchmark
SDF specification, that is, by including the global versions of these three factors, given that
our analysis is based on an international sample of banks. As a result, the standard SDF
now includes seven pricing risk factors.
This alternative SDF clearly better captures risks in the equity market. In fact, in
the first-pass regressions (Table A8 in the Internet Appendix), R2s increase (on average)
across equity double-sorted portfolios by 7 percentage points, while the increase for CDS
portfolios is only around 2 percentage points, relative to the four-factor benchmark SDF
(Table 1). However, we find that also this seven-factor SDF is unable to explain spread
portfolio returns: for the equity and CDS spread portfolios, R2s increase only by 2 and 1
percentage points, respectively. Thus, also based on this richer SDF specification, there
seems to be a puzzle in bank asset returns.
Moreover, the analysis of the risk-adjusted residuals shows that an EGS factor still exists,
as the PC3,t loadings maintain the same structure uncovered in our baseline results, being
positive for high deposit-to-GDP banks, and negative for low deposit-to-GDP banks (Fig.
A5 in the Internet Appendix). It is also evident that the resulting EGS factor does not
present material differences from the EGS factor used in the baseline analysis. We then
repeat the first-pass regressions by including the EGS factor and find that only one of the
alphas in the equity spread portfolios remains weakly statistically significant, although it
is not economically significant, dropping from 10% to 2%. Also the results based on the
second-pass regressions are largely unchanged: the EGS price of risk is around 13% over the
full sample (Table A10 in the Internet Appendix). Overall, we conclude that our findings
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are robust when expanding the set of risk factors used in the SDF specification.
4.1.8. Summing up
The main prediction of our theoretical framework – Prediction 1 – is strongly supported
by the data. Using standard portfolio-sort techniques, where banks are sorted by the EGS,
proxied by deposit-to-GDP ratios, we find a statistically and economically significant risk
premium, consistent with the direct effects of government guarantees. Moreover, this pre-
mium seems to be largely generated in the pre-bail-in period, which is also consistent with
the theoretical predictions: such premium compensates investors for the uncertainty about
government bailouts, which is eliminated under a credible bail-in regime. In essence, we
find empirical evidence in support of the presence of a risk-return trade-off induced by the
presence of government guarantees.
We now turn to assessing Prediction 2 from our theoretical framework, which states that
the EGS risk premium is increasing in the riskiness of the sovereign granting the support. In
what follows, we first examine the EGS risk premium for subgroups of banks that differ in
the credit risk of the domestic sovereign. In Section 4.3, we will further examine Prediction
2 by investigating the types of risks that underlie the EGS factor.
4.2. The EGS premium and sovereign risk
Next, we examine how the EGS risk premium differs across two subsamples of countries,
which we term core EU (including the five largest EU countries) and safe-haven countries
(the United States, Japan, Germany, and Switzerland). These subsamples are of particular
interest: while sovereign risk was a major concern in the EU, it was contained in safe-haven
countries. By doing this, we aim to provide evidence on the validity of Prediction 2, which
states that the EGS risk premium, ceteris paribus, should be higher in more vulnerable
countries.
Starting with core EU, we construct the double-sorted and spread portfolios, by following
the same steps as before. We then perform the first-pass regressions by using the 5-factor
SDF. However, we do not generate again the EGS factor, instead we use the EGS factor
constructed using the whole sample of developed country banks. Table 6 presents the results
of the first-pass regressions. The results are qualitatively in line with those of Table 2 for the
full sample. However, it is evident that the R2s are substantially lower, along with the EGS
exposures being smaller in absolute value, especially those of the spread portfolios. This
finding is, however, not surprising given that the EGS return factor was generated for the
sample of developed country banks, while we try to explain with such factor core EU bank
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portfolios. Also, as a result of this finding, in the second-pass regressions, reported in Table
7, we uncover a larger EGS price of risk, which indeed compensates for the smaller estimates
of the quantity of risk. We also find that the price of risk is more precisely estimated for
the sample of core EU banks; in addition, most of the findings uncovered for the sample of
developed country banks are still present in this restricted sample.
Given that in this section our final object of interest is the excess return associated
with the EGS factor, we are not particularly interested in its decomposition into price and
quantity of risk components but rather in its magnitude. In this regard, we find that the
excess return associated with the EGS factor ranges from a minimum of 12% to a maximum
of 19% per annum for core EU banks. These figures are substantially higher than those
uncovered for the full sample, suggesting that where sovereign risk is particularly high, the
EGS risk premium is indeed higher. However, to further evaluate this argument, we repeat
the analysis for the banks based in safe-haven countries. Table 8 reports the estimates from
the second-pass regressions; the price of risk is not statistically different from zero.
We subject the analysis to a number of robustness tests, three of which are worth men-
tioning. First, we repeat the analysis by generating the EGS factor for the specific sample
at hand, i.e. separately for the core EU and safe-haven samples. Considering the sample
of core EU banks, we first construct the core EU EGS return factor, and we then use this
factor in the first- and second-pass regressions; these regressions are reported, respectively,
in Tables A12–A13 in the Internet Appendix. We find that, while five out of six equity port-
folios have positive, large and statistically significant average returns, none of the alphas
is statistically different from zero. Moreover, the estimated exposures to the core EU EGS
factor (R[PCEU3 ]t) are now substantially higher than those estimated using the EGS factor
(R[PC3]t), being of similar magnitudes to those reported in Table 2. As a result, also the
estimate of the price of risk is more in line with that of Table 3. Moreover, the EGS equity
risk premium is in the range of 8-17% per annum, and the EGS CDS risk premium in the
range of 0.35-0.75% per annum (which reflects larger and more precisely estimated CDS
spread portfolios’ exposures to the EGS factor, when replacing R[PC3]t with R[PCEU3 ]t.)
We follow the same steps for the safe-haven sample, i.e. we generate a safe-haven EGS
factor that we then use to perform the two-pass analysis, and again find no EGS risk pre-
mium (not reported). Second, we find similar results when we replace core EU with the EU
sample. Third, we drop Germany from the sample of safe-haven countries, given that it is
also included in the core EU sample, and the results are unchanged. Finally, we repeat the
analysis at the country level, and find that core EU countries load positively on the EGS
factor, while the US has a negative loading (Fig. A6), possibly reflecting its special status in
international financial markets. Moreover, focusing on the Eurozone, we show that banks of
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countries where sovereign risk is more elevated, such as Italy and Spain, display larger EGS
loadings than banks of countries where sovereign risk is more contained, such as France and
Germany.32 Therefore, also this complementary evidence is broadly in line with Prediction
2.
4.3. Which risks does the EGS factor reflect?
To gain further evidence on Prediction 2, and to refine our understanding of the EGS risk
premium, we explore the risk profile of the EGS return factor using three separate methods.
First, we provide a descriptive analysis of the EGS return factor, focusing on key economic
and policy events of the 2004-2018 period. Second, we assess the relation between the EGS
return factor and sovereign risk, as well as that with economic policy uncertainty and VIX.
Third, we use simple regressions to shed light on the risks spanning the EGS return factor,
and how they differ from those spanning the level and security return factors; here, we also
shed some light on the economic relevance of the direct effect of the guarantee on bank risk
premiums relative to that of the indirect effect. Taken together, the results show that the
risk-return trade-off associated with government guarantees largely stems from the exposure
of the factor to sovereign risk and policy uncertainty, lending further support to Prediction
2.
4.3.1. The EGS factor over time
Fig. 4 plots the cumulative returns on the EGS factor along with major policy and
economic events. The period under scrutiny ranges from January 2004 to November 2018.
We can clearly identify five distinct phases. The first phase covers the pre-crisis period,
when there is no evidence of an EGS premium. The second phase coincides with the onset
and consequent worsening of the sub-prime crisis. During this period, the EGS factor trends
upward, experiencing only few drops, and gains roughly 60% over the period.
The EGS factor inverts its trend when the crisis enters a far more turbulent phase, turning
into the global financial crisis, which marks the start of the third phase. The downward
trend of the EGS intensifies with Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy. Soon after, following the
introduction of system-wide packages to rescue banks, the EGS factor increases sharply.
However, the increase in the EGS factor proves to be short lived, with the factor losing
roughly 50% within the next few weeks. This pattern can be explained by the sovereign-
bank loop shown in Acharya et al. (2014): system-wide guarantees weaken the fiscal position
32A similar ordering holds for the equity and CDS portfolios. However, the UK displays particularly high
equity EGS exposure, while the CDS EGS exposure is slightly negative.
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of sovereigns, which in turn makes such guarantees risky. The introduction of guarantees in
September 2008, despite providing temporary relief to the financial sector, also cast serious
doubts on the capability of the US government to manage the crisis (Mishkin, 2011).
As the tensions diminish, the EGS return factor resumes its upward trend. However, it
stops its rise as the global financial crisis becomes a sovereign debt crisis. Thus, during the
fourth phase, the focus shifts from the US to the Eurozone’s public finances.33 Finally, the
fifth phase covers the period that follows the adoption of the bail-in regulation. As explained
in Section 4.1.3, the turning point of the EGS factor around the end of 2015 coincides with
the rescues of four European lenders, which cast doubt on the credibility of the bail-in regime
(Philippon and Salord, 2017).
4.3.2. Sovereign risk, economic policy uncertainty, and VIX
We complement the above descriptive analysis with another simple analysis of the re-
lation between the EGS return factor and sovereign risk. Specifically, we allocate the ob-
servations of the EGS return factor into four buckets, depending on the distribution of the
innovations to sovereign risk. We measure sovereign risk with the median of the developed
country sovereign 5-year CDS spreads. We then take the first differences of this measure
to compute its innovations; this is our conditioning variable. The first bucket contains the
25% of the EGS return factor observations that coincide with the lowest realizations of the
conditioning variable (reductions in sovereign risk); the fourth bucket contains the 25% of
observations with the highest realizations of the conditioning variable (increases in sovereign
risk). We then compute, for each bucket, the average of the EGS factor returns. The results
are shown in the top panel of Fig. 5, with the bars denoting the annualized mean returns of
the EGS factor for the selected bucket.
As can be seen from the figure, high deposit-to-GDP banks outperform low deposit-to-
GDP banks when sovereign risk drops, and vice versa. Thus, the EGS factor decreases
monotonically when moving from the low to the high sovereign risk buckets. While this
analysis is intentionally simple, it illustrates a clear relation between returns associated
with the EGS factor and innovations to sovereign risk. This finding therefore lends strong
support to the predictions of the theoretical framework, consistent with a risk-return trade-
33The first rescue package for Greece, which soon after is followed by the introduction of the European
Financial Stability Facility, leads to increases in the EGS factor. The introduction of the European Stability
Mechanism seems to produce a similar effect. However, as the fears that the Eurozone debt crisis is spiraling
out of control take hold, i.e. when Spain and Italy become the main source of concern, the EGS factor falls.
Around the second rescue package for Greece, the EGS factor again trends upward. This rise stops with
Draghi’s ‘Whatever it takes speech’, but it soon after resumes its trend with the introduction of the Outright
Monetary Transactions (OMT), which halts the rise in sovereign risk and reduces uncertainty. OMTs are
an insurance device against redenomination risk, in the sense of reducing the probability attached to such
worst-case scenarios (Cœuré, 2013).
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off story, making EGS banks comove negatively with changes in sovereign risk.
Although sovereign risk should be a prominent source of risk for high EGS banks, the
theoretical framework also suggests that EGS banks might be exposed to periods of economic
policy uncertainty (EPU), which might not necessarily coincide with periods of increased
sovereign risk. We therefore replace sovereign risk with the daily US EPU index of Baker
et al. (2016). It is apparent that the EGS factor drops when there are marked increases
in policy uncertainty. This finding provides complementary evidence in support of the
theoretical framework.
Finally, it is interesting to explore the relation between the EGS factor and the VIX
index. The VIX represents a measure of the market’s risk-neutral expectation of stock
market volatility over the next 30 day period. The VIX is often referred to as the fear
index, measuring tail risk or systemic risk, along with investors’ risk aversion, which might
result, for example, from episodes of risk panics in the financial sector (see, e.g., Bacchetta
et al., 2012). Thus, the VIX reflects episodes of financial market turmoil, which do not
stem necessarily from surges in sovereign risk or economic policy uncertainty. Interestingly,
Baker et al. (2016) show that, despite the VIX and the EPU index being correlated at low
frequencies, the EPU index provides additional explanatory power for firms in sectors with
high government exposures. More fundamentally, government guarantees should protect
banks from surges in the VIX, thus reducing the tail risk of banks (Gandhi and Lustig, 2015).
Consistent with this view, we find that the EGS factor increases for positive innovations to
VIX, and vice versa; the relation is monotonic.
Taken together, these pieces of evidence align nicely with the predictions of the theoret-
ical framework: government bailouts protect banks from surges in tail risk, which directly
pertain to the financial sector, but at the same time expose high EGS banks to sovereign
risk and the uncertainty associated with economic policy. Put differently, if the guarantees
were to protect banks from tail risk, without exposing them to sovereign risk and policy
uncertainty, then government bailouts would reduce the risk premiums of high EGS banks.
This conclusion essentially reflects the main mechanism in Gandhi and Lustig (2015) that
might indeed be appropriate for US banks, given that in the US sovereign risk is low. This
effect is also likely to have been operating at the onset of the financial crisis, when the
financial sector was in turmoil, but sovereigns did not yet take on the credit risk of banks,
by guaranteeing the banking sector.
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4.3.3. EGS factor vs level and security factors
To conclude the analysis of the EGS return factor, we compare the risks that span the
EGS return factor with those that span the level and security return factors. To do this,
we single sort banks by balance-sheet variables and proxies of the EGS, as well as sovereign
risk and sovereign exposure variables. The list of sorting variables is reported in Table A2.
We perform a comparison in terms of R2s, where these single-sorted equity portfolios are
used as explanatory variables.
The results are presented in the top panel of Table 9. A number of interesting results
emerge from this horse race, which we can summarize as follows. First, the EGS return
factor is largely spanned by portfolios sorted by proxies of the government support, such
as deposit-to-GDP, size and loan-to-GDP and, to less extent, rating uplift.34 The high
R2s also suggest that the first sorts on bank risk are not central to our results. Second,
and more importantly, portfolios sorted by sovereign risk exposures and sovereign risk also
comove with the EGS factor, thus confirming and complementing the previous pieces of
evidence. Third, level and security factors are exposed to substantially different sources of
risk. Indeed, the bottom panel shows that for these factors sovereign risk and exposures
portfolios display no explanatory power.
Although the focus of the study is not on the indirect effects of the guarantees, the
following observation is in order. Table 9 shows that the regression of the EGS factor on
the spread portfolio constructed by single-sorting banks by the deposit-to-GDP ratio, call
it HML1S, yields an R2 of 91%. This finding seems to suggest that the indirect effects are
economically less relevant than the direct effects. To further examine this possibility, we
compare HML1S with the mean of the spread portfolios obtained by double sorting banks,
first by bank risk and then by deposits to GDP, call it HML2S. We do this exercise by
focusing on equities, as this asset class shows an economically significant EGS risk premium.
As a result, the cross-sectional mean of the double-sorted spread portfolios consists in av-
eraging over six portfolios. Here, the idea is that, for the indirect effect to be economically
negligible, the two spread portfolios should be very similar; by contrast, for the indirect
effect to be relevant, the mean of HML1S should be higher than that of HML2S, with
their difference being informative about the magnitude of the indirect effect. We find that
the mean return of HML1S is 10.2% per annum, whereas that of HML2S is 7.5%. This
simple evidence suggests that 7.5% captures the direct effect, and 2.7% the indirect effect.
34Leverage at book value also turns out to be important, but it largely reflects the regularity that larger
banks tend also to have higher leverage (Gandhi and Lustig, 2015). However, the R2 associated with size
is almost twice as large as that associated with leverage, suggesting that the two reflect somewhat different
information. Moreover, the EGS factor loads negatively on a different measure of bank risk, such as bank
CDS.
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Therefore, this exercise suggests that the indirect effects play a role, but a less important
one quantitatively, relative to the direct effects. On the one hand, based on the model, this
could be the case as in the presence of risky guarantees the effect through risk taking is more
ambiguous. On the other hand, the effect of government support on charter value could also
be empirically relevant, in that it is not clear cut that stronger guarantees induce banks to
take on more risk (e.g., see Brandao-Marques et al., 2018), which makes the indirect effect
of the guarantee weaker.
5. Conclusion
During the recent global financial crisis and, even more so, in the course of the Eurozone
debt crisis, sovereign risk emerged as the main challenge to financial stability. Doubts about
the ability of sovereigns to manage their debt undermined the perceived soundness of banks
in two ways: first, via the bank holdings of sovereign debt, and second, via the dwindling
value of the government guarantees. Our focus in this paper is on the second channel.
We develop a simple theoretical framework to show that government guarantees can
generate a risk-return trade-off in bank asset returns, separately from their indirect effects
operating through the risk taking of banks. On the one hand, government guarantees
are beneficial to banks, given that guaranteed claims generate higher payoffs when the
guarantee is honored. On the other hand, if guarantees are less likely to be honored when
the state of the economy worsens, the payoffs of the guaranteed claims can become more
procyclical, thus providing poor insurance when it would be most valuable. Due to the latter
effect, government guarantees can have a direct positive effect on bank risk premiums. The
theoretical framework yields two testable predictions on the direct effects of guarantees on
bank risk premiums. Namely, among banks of similar riskiness, bank risk premiums should
(1) vary with the strength of the implicit guarantee, and (2) increase with the riskiness of
the sovereign granting it.
We evaluate these predictions empirically using standard asset-pricing methods applied
to bank debt and equity portfolios. To construct the portfolios, we double sort banks, first
by bank risk and then by the deposit-to-GDP ratio, employed as a measure of the gov-
ernment’s willingness to support a bank. Both predictions are supported by the empirical
analysis. First and most fundamentally, we uncover a risk premium associated with expected
government support. While this premium is priced consistently in both markets, it is sub-
stantially higher in equity than in CDS returns. Second, this risk premium is intimately
tied to sovereign risk, meaning that risk premiums on guaranteed banks are, ceteris paribus,
higher when the guarantor is riskier.
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These findings are relevant for asset managers given that the portfolio strategies are
tradable in real time, but they also bear important policy implications. First, they help
inform the design of bank guarantees, given that the risk profile of the guarantee ultimately
determines to what extent bank funding costs fall with the introduction of the guarantee.
The reason is that funding costs not only reflect the (physical) probability of default of the
bank, but they also include a risk premium component. Such premium is likely to be low, and
the guarantee effective, when the riskiness of the guarantor and the uncertainty associated
with the guarantee are low. Second, we show, consistent with our theoretical framework,
that the EGS premium is essentially zero since the adoption of the bail-in regulation in
the EU. More generally, this evidence supports the view that such reforms, to the extent
that they are credible, can reduce investors’ expectations of government support for banks,
thereby weakening the link between sovereigns and banks.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Before presenting the proofs, we summarize the notation employed.
Object Definition
ω State of the world.
F (·) Objective probability distribution function of ω.
G(·) Risk-neutral probability distribution function of ω.
a Level of effort exerted by the managers.
p 1−G(ω¯), where ω¯ is chosen by the managers.
(− ln p)aβ Realized payoff when ω ≥ ω¯, where β < 1.
pib Payoff of the managers.
pil Payoff of the investors.
ατ(ω) Transfer obtained by the investors when ω < ω¯.
R¯ Risk-free rate.
Rl Return of the investor’s claim on the bank.∫ ω¯
−∞ τ(ω)dF (ω)/
∫ ω¯
−∞ τ(ω)dG(ω) Risk premium of the guarantee.
Proof of Lemma 1. Following Bester and Hellwig (1987), we first solve the managers’
problem for given pib and pil. That is,
max
{a,p}
p
[
(− ln p)aβ − pil
]
− a subject to pib + pil + (ln p)aβ = 0. (A.1)
Denoting by λ the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint, the necessary first-
order conditions for a solution are
βp(− ln p)aβ−1 − 1 + λβ(ln p)aβ−1 = 0 (A.2)
(− ln p)aβ − pil − aβ + λa
β
p
= 0. (A.3)
Solving Eq. (A.2) for λ and substituting the solution into Eq. (A.3) yields
pil = (− ln p)aβ − a
βp(− ln p) . (A.4)
When this condition holds, the managers’ expected payoff is positive as long as
− ln p ≤ 1
β
. (A.5)
Conditions in Eqs. (A.4) and (A.5) are identical in form to those in Bester and Hellwig
(1987). However, here p denotes a risk-neutral rather than an objective probability. Due to
the similarity, we refer to Bester and Hellwig (1987) for a proof that Eqs. (A.4) and (A.5)
are sufficient as well as necessary for a solution to the managers’ problem.
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Using Eq. (A.4) to substitute for pil in Eq. (3) yields the following problem
max
{a,p}
α
∫ ω¯
−∞
τ(ω)dG(ω) + p(− ln p)aβ − a
β(− ln p) − I, (A.6)
subject to Eq. (A.5). Note that in this reformulated problem the investors directly choose
a and p. Supposing that the constraint does not bind, we obtain the following necessary
first-order conditions
βp(− ln p)aβ−1 − 1
β(− ln p) = 0 (A.7)
−ατ(ω¯)− (ln p+ 1)aβ − a
βp(− ln p)2 = 0. (A.8)
Employing Eq. (A.7) to solve for a and substituting the solution into Eq. (A.8) yields
− ln p = 1 + β + ατ(ω¯)
[β2p(− ln p)2] β1−β
. (A.9)
For β and τ(ω¯) sufficiently small, − ln p satisfies Eq. (A.5) with strict inequality. Given that
this is the solution we are interested in, we restrict attention to such values of β and ατ(ω¯).
In particular, β is required to satisfy 1 + β < 1
β
.
To conclude the proof, we show how p varies with α. Implicitly differentiating Eq. (A.9)
with respect to α yields
−1
p
[
β2(− ln p)2
] β
1−β
[
1 + (− ln p− 1− β) β1− β
(
2
− ln p − 1
)]
dp
dα = τ(ω¯). (A.10)
The expression in square brackets is positive whenever
(1 + β)2(− ln p)− β(− ln p)2 − 2β(1 + β) > 0. (A.11)
It is straightforward to verify that Eq. (A.11) holds for 1 + β < − ln p < 1
β
and 1 + β < 1
β
.
Given that we are restricting attention to such values of β and τ(ω¯) for which this condition
is satisfied, we have shown that dpdα < 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. Combining Eqs. (A.4) and (A.7) to solve for pil as a function of
p yields
pil = (1− β)(− ln p)
[
β2p(− ln p)2
] β
1−β . (A.12)
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By differentiating with respect to p one obtains
dpil
dp =−
1− β
p
[
β2p(− ln p)2
] β
1−β
+ β(− ln p)β2
[
(− ln p)2 − 2(− ln p)
] [
β2p(− ln p)2
] 2β−1
1−β .
(A.13)
By simplifying one observes that this expression is negative whenever
−(1− β) + β [(− ln p)− 2] < 0. (A.14)
This inequality is equivalent to − ln p < 1+β
β
. Given that we require p to satisfy − ln p < 1
β
this condition is always satisfied. Thus, we have shown that dpildp < 0.
Proof of Proposition 1. Differentiating Eq. (5) with respect to α yields
d
dα
{
E[Rl]− R¯
}
= −τpil [G(ω¯)− F (ω¯)] R¯{ατG(ω¯) + pil [1−G(ω¯)]}2
+ ατ [G(ω¯)− F (ω¯)] R¯{ατG(ω¯) + pil [1−G(ω¯)]}2
dpil
dα
+ ∂
∂ω¯
{
E[Rl]− R¯
} dω¯
dα.
(A.15)
The first term is negative by inspection. We will refer to it as the direct effect of the
guarantee on the risk premium. In the second term, dpildα =
dpil
dp
dp
dα > 0 by Lemmas 1 and 2.
Thus, this term is positive. In the third term, dω¯dα = − 1G′(ω¯) dpdα > 0. The partial derivative in
the third term, on the other hand, is equal to
(pil − ατ)
{
[G′(ω¯)− F ′(ω¯)] {ατG(ω¯) + pil [1−G(ω¯)]}
+G′(ω¯)(pil − ατ) [G(ω¯)− F (ω¯)]
}
R¯
/
{ατG(ω¯) + pil [1−G(ω¯)]}2 .
(A.16)
A sufficient condition for this term to be positive is G′(ω¯) ≥ F ′(ω¯). To complete the proof,
note that if α = 0 and G′(ω¯) [1− F (ω¯)] = F ′(ω¯) [1− F (ω¯)] only the first, negative term
in Eq. (A.15) remains. Thus, in this case the derivate is negative. On the other hand, if
F (ω¯) = G(ω¯) and G′(ω¯) ≥ F ′(ω¯) only the third, positive term remains. Therefore, in this
case the derivate is positive.
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Proof of Proposition 2. Differentiating Eq. (6) with respect to α yields
d
dα
{
E[Rl]− R¯
}
=
∫ ω¯
−∞ τ(ω)dF (ω)
{
α
∫ ω¯
−∞ τ(ω)dG(ω) + pil [1−G(ω¯)]
}
{
α
∫ ω¯
−∞ τ(ω)dG(ω) + pil [1−G(ω¯)]
}2
−
∫ ω¯
−∞ τ(ω)dG(ω)
{
α
∫ ω¯
−∞ τ(ω)dF (ω) + pil [1− F (ω¯)]
}
{
α
∫ ω¯
−∞ τ(ω)dG(ω) + pil [1−G(ω¯)]
}2
+
 [1− F (ω¯)]α
∫ ω¯
−∞ τ(ω)dG(ω){
α
∫ ω¯
−∞ τ(ω)dG(ω) + pil [1−G(ω¯)]
}2
− [1−G(ω¯)]α
∫ ω¯
−∞ τ(ω)dF (ω){
α
∫ ω¯
−∞ τ(ω)dG(ω) + pil [1−G(ω¯)]
}2
dpildα
+
G
′(ω¯) [pil − ατ(ω¯)]
{
α
∫ ω¯
−∞ τ(ω)dF (ω) + pil [1− F (ω¯)]
}
{
α
∫ ω¯
−∞ τ(ω)dG(ω) + pil [1−G(ω¯)]
}2
− F
′(ω¯) [pil − ατ(ω¯)]
{
α
∫ ω¯
−∞ τ(ω)dG(ω) + pil [1−G(ω¯)]
}
{
α
∫ ω¯
−∞ τ(ω)dG(ω) + pil [1−G(ω¯)]
}2
dω¯dα.
(A.17)
The first two terms represent the direct effect of the guarantee on the risk premium, whereas
the remaining terms capture the effects that operate through risk taking. The direct effect
is positive if and only if ∫ ω¯
−∞ τ(ω)dF (ω)∫ ω¯
−∞ τ(ω)dG(ω)
≥ 1− F (ω¯)1−G(ω¯) . (A.18)
That is, if and only if the risk premium of the guarantee exceeds the risk premium of the
underlying unguaranteed claim, 1{ω≥ω¯}pil. Note that, in the case of a constant guarantee,
the ratio on the left-hand side becomes F (ω¯)/G(ω¯) ≤ 1 by stochastic dominance. For this
reason, Eq. (A.18) does not hold and the direct effect is negative. To show that also the
total effect is ambiguous, consider the following two cases. First, suppose that Eq. (A.18)
does not hold, α = 0 and G′(ω¯) [1− F (ω¯)] = F ′(ω¯) [1− F (ω¯)]. In this case, the direct effect
is negative and the effect operating through risk taking is zero. Second, suppose that Eq.
(A.18) is satisfied with equality and G′(ω¯) ≥ F ′(ω¯). In this case, the first four terms of Eq.
(A.18) sum to zero while the last two terms sum to a positive expression. Therefore, also
the total effect is ambiguous.
Proof of Corollary 1. Abstracting from risk taking, the effect of an increase in α
is given by the first two terms in Eq. (A.17). Their sum is positive only if the guarantee
commands a higher risk premium than the underlying unguaranteed claim.
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Table 1: First-pass equity and CDS regressions
This table presents the first-pass time-series regressions of equity and CDS double-sorted portfolio
excess returns (LL, HL, HL, HH) and the spread portfolios returns (L H/L and H H/L) on the risk
factors. Banks are first sorted on bank risk (low, high), and then on deposits to GDP (low, high),
our proxy for the expected government support. For a given measure of bank risk, spread portfolios
are given by LH-LL for low bank risk, and HH-HL for high bank risk. We use three measures of
bank risk: bank book leverage (Leverage), equity volatility (EQ Vol.) estimated over three-month
rolling windows, and deposits to total assets (Dep2TA), which moves in opposite direction to bank
risk. Portfolios are rebalanced at a monthly frequency. The resulting double-sorted and spread
portfolios are regressed on standard risk factors (f t), such as rxit = ai + ftβ′i + it, where i is the
selected portfolio. The f t vector includes changes in Term, changes in TED, changes in Credit
(Crd), and MSCI world stock market excess returns (Mkt). rxi is the mean excess return of
portfolio i. The sample covers all banks and spans the period from 01/2004 to 11/2018 at a daily
frequency. Adjusted R2s are in percent. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote significance, respectively, at the 1-, 5- and
10-percent levels, based on GMM-VARHAC standard errors.
Panel A: EQUITY Returns Panel B: CDS Returns
Leverage (L) Leverage (H) Leverage (L) Leverage (H)
L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L
rxi -4.50 -1.96 2.54 -9.42 -1.25 8.17∗∗ -0.47 -0.59 -0.12 -0.25 -0.61 -0.37
con -10.07∗∗ -6.77 3.31 -14.53∗∗∗ -6.19 8.34∗∗∗ -0.68 -0.72 -0.05 -0.41 -0.76 -0.35
Term 3.32 6.33∗∗∗ 3.01 5.16∗∗ 5.60∗∗∗ 0.44 1.39∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ -0.29 1.18∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ -0.18
TED 0.99 -1.29 -2.28 0.06 -1.45 -1.51 -0.69∗∗ -0.40 0.30 -0.75∗∗ -0.37 0.38∗∗∗
Crd 1.09 -6.95∗∗∗ -8.05∗∗∗ -3.21∗∗∗ -7.53∗∗∗ -4.31∗∗∗ -1.17∗∗∗ -1.44∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗ -1.37∗∗∗ -1.30∗∗∗ 0.07
Mkt 1.50∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗ -0.04 0.08∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.01∗
R2 59.78 63.24 5.59 65.61 65.04 3.96 28.98 32.92 3.21 32.87 33.69 1.86
EQ Vol. (L) EQ Vol. (H) EQ Vol. (L) EQ Vol. (H)
L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L
rxi -4.55 -0.03 4.52 -9.66 -1.33 8.33∗∗ -0.90 -0.82 0.08 -0.38 -0.61 -0.23
con -8.71∗∗ -4.32 4.39 -14.98∗∗∗ -6.23 8.74∗∗∗ -1.04 -0.97∗∗ 0.07 -0.58 -0.76 -0.18
Term 4.39∗∗∗ 1.05 -3.34∗∗∗ 4.79∗∗ 5.52∗∗∗ 0.72 0.75∗∗∗ 0.28 -0.47∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ -0.34
TED -0.47 -2.49 -2.02 0.59 -2.03 -2.62 -0.22 -0.37 -0.16 -0.86∗∗ -0.42 0.44∗∗∗
Crd -2.16∗∗∗ -7.64∗∗∗ -5.49∗∗∗ -2.20∗∗ -8.30∗∗∗ -6.10∗∗∗ -1.07∗∗∗ -1.15∗∗∗ -0.07 -1.41∗∗∗ -1.32∗∗∗ 0.09
Mkt 1.15∗∗∗ 1.12∗∗∗ -0.03 1.46∗∗∗ 1.36∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ -0.01 0.07∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗
R2 68.78 62.64 5.58 66.40 63.46 5.61 25.99 30.38 1.04 34.02 33.61 6.25
Dep2TA (L) Dep2TA (H) Dep2TA (L) Dep2TA (H)
L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L
rxi -12.77 -1.43 11.35∗∗∗ -10.29 -0.37 9.92∗∗ -0.12 -0.74 -0.61 -0.21 -0.61 -0.40
con -17.68∗∗∗ -6.86 10.82∗∗∗ -15.55∗∗∗ -5.27 10.27∗∗∗ -0.29 -0.91 -0.62 -0.37 -0.76 -0.38
Term 9.04∗∗∗ 8.51∗∗∗ -0.53 5.14∗∗ 5.28∗∗∗ 0.15 1.39∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ -0.37∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ -0.18
TED -0.79 -1.65 -0.86 0.66 -1.91 -2.57∗ -0.83∗∗ -0.30 0.54∗∗∗ -0.81∗∗ -0.34 0.47∗∗∗
Crd -6.01∗∗∗ -6.68∗∗∗ -0.66 -2.27∗∗ -8.02∗∗∗ -5.75∗∗∗ -1.48∗∗∗ -1.21∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗ -1.38∗∗∗ -1.28∗∗∗ 0.10
Mkt 1.42∗∗∗ 1.55∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ -0.00 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.01∗
R2 60.11 60.47 1.62 65.81 63.60 4.93 33.59 32.30 2.99 33.82 33.53 2.55
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Table 2: First-pass equity and CDS regressions with EGS factor
This table presents the first-pass time-series regressions of equity and CDS double-sorted portfolio
excess returns (LL, HL, HL, HH) and the spread portfolios returns (L H/L and H H/L) on the risk
factors and the EGS factor. Banks are first sorted on bank risk (low, high), and then on deposits
to GDP (low, high), our proxy for the expected government support. For a given measure of bank
risk, spread portfolios are given by LH-LL for low bank risk, and HH-HL for high bank risk. We
use three measures of bank risk: bank book leverage (Leverage), equity volatility (EQ Vol.), and
deposits to total assets (Dep2TA). Portfolios are rebalanced at a monthly frequency. The EGS
factor (R[PC3]t = xrtŵ′3) is obtained as the sum of double-sorted portfolio excess returns times
the principal component (PC) weights, displayed in the bottom panel of Fig. 3, associated with the
third PC obtained from the joint PCA analysis of double-sorted equity and CDS bank portfolios.
The EGS factor is long in high deposits-to-GDP (Dep2GDP) banks and short in low Dep2GDP
banks. The resulting double-sorted and spread portfolios are regressed on standard risk factors
(f t) and the EGS factor (R[PC3]t), such as rxit = αi + ftβ′i + γR[PC3]t + eit, where i denotes
the selected portfolio. rxi is the mean excess return of portfolio i. The f t vector includes changes
in Term, changes in TED, changes in Credit (Crd), and MSCI world stock market excess returns
(Mkt). The sample covers all banks and spans the period from 01/2004 to 11/2018 at a daily
frequency. Adjusted R2s are in percent. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote significance, respectively, at the 1-, 5- and
10-percent levels, based on GMM-VARHAC standard errors.
Panel A: EQUITY Returns Panel B: CDS Returns
Leverage (L) Leverage (H) Leverage (L) Leverage (H)
L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L
rxi -4.50 -1.96 2.54 -9.42 -1.25 8.17∗∗ -0.47 -0.59 -0.12 -0.25 -0.61 -0.37
con -4.22 -9.64∗∗ -5.41∗∗ -12.33∗∗∗ -9.98∗∗ 2.35∗ -0.67 -0.88 -0.21 -0.46 -0.90 -0.45
Term 3.24∗ 6.37∗∗∗ 3.12∗∗ 5.13∗∗∗ 5.65∗∗∗ 0.52 1.39∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ -0.29 1.18∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ -0.18
TED -0.65 -0.48 0.17 -0.56 -0.39 0.17 -0.70∗∗ -0.35 0.34 -0.73∗∗ -0.33 0.41∗∗∗
Crd -3.29∗∗∗ -4.80∗∗∗ -1.51∗ -4.86∗∗∗ -4.68∗∗∗ 0.18 -1.17∗∗∗ -1.32∗∗∗ -0.15 -1.33∗∗∗ -1.19∗∗∗ 0.14
Mkt 1.41∗∗∗ 1.39∗∗∗ -0.02 1.38∗∗∗ 1.43∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ -0.01
R[PC] -0.49∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ -0.00 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.00 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗
R2 74.17 66.89 74.98 67.88 71.35 83.83 28.96 34.32 5.18 32.98 35.01 3.47
EQ Vol. (L) EQ Vol. (H) EQ Vol. (L) EQ Vol. (H)
L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L
rxi -4.55 -0.03 4.52 -9.66 -1.33 8.33∗∗ -0.90 -0.82 0.08 -0.38 -0.61 -0.23
con -7.81∗∗ -8.65∗∗ -0.84 -11.95∗∗∗ -10.60∗∗ 1.35 -1.10∗ -1.12∗∗ -0.02 -0.62 -0.91 -0.29
Term 4.37∗∗∗ 1.11 -3.27∗∗∗ 4.75∗∗∗ 5.58∗∗∗ 0.82 0.75∗∗∗ 0.28 -0.47∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ -0.34
TED -0.72 -1.27 -0.55 -0.26 -0.80 -0.54 -0.20 -0.33 -0.13 -0.85∗∗ -0.37 0.48∗∗∗
Crd -2.82∗∗∗ -4.39∗∗∗ -1.57∗∗∗ -4.46∗∗∗ -5.03∗∗∗ -0.56∗ -1.03∗∗∗ -1.03∗∗∗ -0.00 -1.38∗∗∗ -1.20∗∗∗ 0.18∗
Mkt 1.14∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗ 1.43∗∗∗ 0.02 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ -0.01 0.08∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗
R[PC] -0.08∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗
R2 69.37 74.02 53.39 70.61 71.56 91.08 26.21 32.51 2.24 34.06 35.00 7.91
Dep2TA (L) Dep2TA (H) Dep2TA (L) Dep2TA (H)
L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L
rxi -12.77 -1.43 11.35∗∗∗ -10.29 -0.37 9.92∗∗ -0.12 -0.74 -0.61 -0.21 -0.61 -0.40
con -16.37∗∗∗ -11.30∗∗ 5.07 -12.47∗∗∗ -9.66∗∗ 2.81∗∗ -0.33 -1.03 -0.69 -0.42 -0.90 -0.47
Term 9.03∗∗∗ 8.57∗∗∗ -0.46 5.09∗∗∗ 5.34∗∗∗ 0.25 1.39∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ -0.37∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ -0.18
TED -1.16 -0.40 0.75 -0.20 -0.68 -0.48 -0.82∗ -0.26 0.56∗∗∗ -0.80∗∗ -0.30 0.49∗∗∗
Crd -6.99∗∗∗ -3.35∗∗ 3.64∗∗∗ -4.57∗∗∗ -4.74∗∗∗ -0.16 -1.45∗∗∗ -1.12∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ -1.34∗∗∗ -1.17∗∗∗ 0.17∗
Mkt 1.40∗∗∗ 1.62∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 1.40∗∗∗ 1.42∗∗∗ 0.02∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ -0.00 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ -0.01
R[PC] -0.11∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.00 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.00 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗
R2 60.76 66.97 46.34 70.16 71.89 90.75 33.65 33.02 3.63 33.91 34.75 3.89
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Table 3: Second-pass equity and CDS cross-sectional regressions
This table reports results for running the cross-sectional regression rxi = β′iλ+ai, where rxi is the
mean excess return of portfolio i, and β̂i is the vector of factor betas associated with portfolio i,
resulting from the first-pass regressions (Tables 1 and 2). For the factor prices of risk (λ), Shanken
p-values are in squared brackets, GMM-VARHAC p-values are in braces, and bootstrapped p-
values are in angled brackets. We also report the cross-sectional adjusted R2s, the pricing error
test statistics p-values based on GMM-VARHAC (PE Test), along with the mean absolute pricing
errors (MAE). ∆MAE denotes the difference between the MAE resulting from the model with
EGS factor, and the MAE resulting from the model without EGS factor; statistical significance
is tested using the bootstrap replications, whereby ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote significance, respectively, at the
1-, 5- and 10-percent levels. Top panels report the results for the model with standard risk factors
but without the EGS factor, while bottom panels include the EGS factor in the set of standard
risk factors. Left panels show the analysis for the full sample period (01/2004-11/2018), while
right panels exclude the bail-in period (01/2004-06/2013). The analysis covers developed country
banks’ equity and CDS portfolios.
Panel A: Model without EGS Factor
Panel A.I: Full Sample (2004-18) Panel A.II: Sample ex Bail-in (2004-13)
λ Shan. GMM Boot λ Shan. GMM Boot
Term -0.73 [0.062] {0.135} <0.139> Term -0.72 [0.092] {0.123} <0.202>
TED -4.83 [0.018] {0.038} <0.268> TED -4.38 [0.029] {0.045} <0.390>
Crd 0.79 [0.212] {0.265} <0.385> Crd 0.37 [0.402] {0.416} <0.290>
Mkt -0.56 [0.461] {0.468} <0.324> Mkt -3.65 [0.318] {0.334} <0.227>
R2 PE Test MAE R2 PE Test MAE
74.2 0.975 1.89 72.3 0.969 2.71
Panel B: Model with EGS Factor
Panel B.I: Full Sample (2004-18) Panel B.II: Sample ex Bail-in (2004-13)
λ Shan. GMM Boot λ Shan. GMM Boot
Term -0.40 [0.165] {0.197} <0.153> Term -0.89 [0.040] {0.053} <0.053>
TED -2.91 [0.028] {0.054} <0.114> TED -2.92 [0.057] {0.087} <0.226>
Crd 1.96 [0.030] {0.046} <0.033> Crd 2.83 [0.057] {0.076} <0.094>
Mkt 2.71 [0.311] {0.323} <0.329> Mkt 1.75 [0.411] {0.417} <0.471>
R[PC] 11.92 [0.031] {0.021} <0.018> R[PC] 17.33 [0.029] {0.018} <0.017>
R2 PE Test MAE ∆MAE R2 PE Test MAE ∆MAE
93.8 0.954 0.926 0.97∗∗ 95.0 0.996 0.976 1.73∗∗
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Table 4: First-pass equity only regressions: 2000-2018
This table presents the first-pass time-series regressions of equity double-sorted portfolio excess
returns (LL, HL, HL, HH) and the spread portfolios returns (L H/L and H H/L) on the risk factors
without EGS factor (Panel A) and with EGS factor (Panel B). Banks are first sorted on bank risk
(low, high), and then on deposits to GDP (low, high), our proxy for the expected government
support. For a given measure of bank risk, spread portfolios are given by LH-LL for low bank risk,
and HH-HL for high bank risk. We use three measures of bank risk: bank book leverage (Leverage),
equity volatility (EQ Vol.), and deposits to total assets (Dep2TA). Portfolios are rebalanced at a
monthly frequency. The EGS factor (R[PC2]t = xrtŵ′2) is obtained as the sum of double-sorted
portfolio excess returns times the principal component (PC) weights associated with the third PC
obtained from the joint PCA analysis of double-sorted equity and CDS bank portfolios (Fig. A3 in
the Internet Appendix). The EGS factor is long in high deposits-to-GDP (Dep2GDP) banks and
short in low Dep2GDP banks. The resulting double-sorted and spread portfolios are regressed on
standard risk factors (f t) and the EGS factor (R[PC2]t), such as rxit = αi + ftβi + γR[PC2]t + eit,
where i denotes the selected portfolio. rxi is the mean excess return of portfolio i. The f t vector
includes changes in Term, changes in TED, changes in Credit (Crd), and MSCI world stock market
excess returns (Mkt). The sample covers all banks and spans the period from 01/2000 to 11/2018
at a daily frequency. Adjusted R2s are in percent. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote significance, respectively, at the
1-, 5- and 10-percent levels, based on GMM-VARHAC standard errors.
Panel A: Model without EGS Factor Panel B: Model with EGS Factor
Leverage (L) Leverage (H) Leverage (L) Leverage (H)
L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L
rxi -2.28 0.10 2.38 -6.17 0.44 6.60∗∗ -2.28 0.10 2.38 -6.17 0.44 6.60∗∗
con -4.49 -1.98 2.51 -8.32∗∗ -1.74 6.58∗∗ 0.61 -4.38 -4.99∗∗ -6.29∗ -4.81 1.48
Term 4.71∗∗ 7.71∗∗∗ 3.01 6.27∗∗∗ 7.26∗∗∗ 1.00 4.86∗∗∗ 7.64∗∗∗ 2.79∗∗∗ 6.33∗∗∗ 7.17∗∗∗ 0.85
TED 0.61 -2.63 -3.24∗∗ -0.89 -2.80 -1.91∗ -1.51 -1.63 -0.11 -1.73 -1.52 0.21
Crd 0.73 -4.28∗∗∗ -5.01∗∗∗ -1.95∗∗∗ -4.72∗∗∗ -2.77∗∗∗ -1.96∗∗∗ -3.02∗∗∗ -1.06∗∗∗ -3.02∗∗∗ -3.10∗∗∗ -0.08
Mkt 1.37∗∗∗ 1.18∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗ -0.05 1.19∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
R[PC] . . . . . . -0.49∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗
R2 57.30 56.49 4.32 62.67 59.55 2.79 74.28 60.65 76.19 65.79 66.18 85.00
EQ Vol. (L) EQ Vol. (H) EQ Vol. (L) EQ Vol. (H)
L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L
rxi -2.67 2.06 4.73 -6.21 0.35 6.56∗ -2.67 2.06 4.73 -6.21 0.35 6.56∗
con -4.39 0.30 4.69∗ -8.42∗∗ -1.83 6.59∗∗ -3.69 -3.22 0.47 -5.81 -5.24 0.57
Term 5.75∗∗∗ 3.42∗∗∗ -2.33∗∗ 6.02∗∗∗ 7.08∗∗∗ 1.06 5.77∗∗∗ 3.31∗∗∗ -2.45∗∗∗ 6.10∗∗∗ 6.98∗∗∗ 0.88∗
TED -1.56 -3.75∗∗ -2.20∗ -0.49 -3.24∗ -2.74∗∗ -1.85 -2.28 -0.44 -1.58 -1.81 -0.23
Crd -1.42∗∗∗ -4.41∗∗∗ -2.99∗∗∗ -1.48∗∗∗ -5.06∗∗∗ -3.58∗∗∗ -1.79∗∗∗ -2.55∗∗∗ -0.77∗∗∗ -2.86∗∗∗ -3.26∗∗∗ -0.40∗∗
Mkt 1.01∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗ 1.32∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗ 1.34∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
R[PC] . . . . . . -0.07∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗
R2 62.71 52.73 2.86 64.17 57.89 3.70 63.28 64.99 48.21 69.21 65.84 88.22
Dep2TA (L) Dep2TA (H) Dep2TA (L) Dep2TA (H)
L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L
rxi -8.80 0.18 8.98∗∗ -6.63 0.78 7.41∗∗ -8.80 0.18 8.98∗∗ -6.63 0.78 7.41∗∗
con -11.06∗∗ -2.20 8.86∗∗ -8.82∗∗ -1.41 7.41∗∗ -9.63∗∗ -5.82 3.82 -6.10 -4.90 1.20
Term 9.45∗∗∗ 10.01∗∗∗ 0.56 6.36∗∗∗ 6.72∗∗∗ 0.36 9.49∗∗∗ 9.91∗∗∗ 0.41 6.44∗∗∗ 6.62∗∗∗ 0.18
TED -1.85 -3.21∗ -1.35 -0.34 -3.19∗ -2.85∗∗ -2.45 -1.70 0.75 -1.47 -1.74 -0.27
Crd -3.42∗∗∗ -4.22∗∗∗ -0.80 -1.42∗∗∗ -5.04∗∗∗ -3.62∗∗∗ -4.18∗∗∗ -2.32∗∗∗ 1.86∗∗∗ -2.85∗∗∗ -3.19∗∗∗ -0.35∗∗
Mkt 1.32∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗ 0.05 1.31∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ 1.27∗∗∗ 1.49∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
R[PC] . . . . . . -0.14∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗
R2 57.92 54.67 0.52 63.14 58.38 3.51 59.19 61.61 48.62 68.59 66.75 89.89
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Table 5: Second-pass equity only cross-sectional regressions: 2000-2018
This table reports results for running the cross-sectional regression rxi = β′iλ+ai, where rxi is the
mean excess equity return of portfolio i, and β̂i is the vector of factor betas associated with portfolio
i, resulting from the first-pass regressions (Table 4). For the factor prices of risk (λ), Shanken p-
values are in squared brackets, GMM-VARHAC p-values are in braces, and bootstrapped p-values
are in angled brackets. We also report the cross-sectional adjusted R2s, the pricing error test
statistics p-values based on GMM-VARHAC (PE Test), along with the mean absolute pricing
errors (MAE). ∆MAE denotes the difference between the MAE resulting from the model with
EGS factor, and the MAE resulting from the model without EGS factor; statistical significance
is tested using the bootstrap replications, and ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote significance, respectively, at the 1-,
5- and 10-percent levels. Top panels report the results for the model with standard risk factors
but without the EGS factor, while bottom panels add the EGS factor to the set of standard risk
factors. The analysis covers all banks, but it is restricted to the equity portfolios. Left panels show
the analysis for the full sample period (01/2000-11/2018), while right panels exclude the bail-in
period (01/2000-06/2013).
Panel A: Model without EGS Factor
Panel A.I: Full Sample (2000-18) Panel A.II: Sample ex Bail-in (2000-13)
λ Shan. GMM Boot λ Shan. GMM Boot
Term -0.58 [0.176] {0.252} <0.193> Term -0.53 [0.237] {0.290} <0.256>
TED -4.97 [0.062] {0.118} <0.239> TED -5.09 [0.079] {0.130} <0.295>
Crd 2.12 [0.159] {0.208} <0.476> Crd 2.33 [0.219] {0.264} <0.386>
Mkt -1.27 [0.420] {0.439} <0.398> Mkt -2.97 [0.340] {0.369} <0.276>
R2 PE Test MAE R2 PE Test MAE
73.5 0.935 1.95 76.2 0.985 2.17
Panel B: Model with EGS Factor
Panel B.I: Full Sample (2000-18) Panel B.II: Sample ex Bail-in (2000-13)
λ Shan. GMM Boot λ Shan. GMM Boot
Term -0.87 [0.036] {0.039} <0.037> Term -1.44 [0.018] {0.027} <0.034>
TED 0.29 [0.431] {0.441} <0.449> TED 1.24 [0.282] {0.332} <0.454>
Crd 1.89 [0.113] {0.124} <0.089> Crd 1.17 [0.293] {0.307} <0.212>
Mkt 7.14 [0.119] {0.156} <0.114> Mkt 6.92 [0.194] {0.244} <0.231>
R[PC] 10.3 [0.048] {0.038} <0.016> R[PC] 13.13 [0.051] {0.039} <0.022>
R2 PE Test MAE ∆MAE R2 PE Test MAE ∆MAE
93.5 0.794 0.95 1.00∗∗ 94.7 0.984 1.03 1.13∗∗
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Table 6: First-pass equity and CDS regressions with EGS factor: core Europe
This table presents the first-pass time-series regressions of equity and CDS double-sorted portfolio
excess returns (LL, HL, HL, HH) and the spread portfolios returns (L H/L and H H/L) on the
risk factors and the EGS factor. Banks are first sorted on bank risk (low, high), and then on
deposits to GDP (low, high), our proxy for the expected government support. For a given measure
of bank risk, spread portfolios are given by LH-LL for low bank risk, and HH-HL for high bank
risk. We use three measures of bank risk: bank book leverage (Leverage), equity volatility (EQ
Vol.), and deposits to total assets (Dep2TA). Portfolios are rebalanced at a monthly frequency.
The EGS factor (R[PC3]t = xrtŵ′3) is obtained as the sum of double-sorted portfolio excess returns
times the principal component (PC) weights, displayed in the bottom panel of Fig. 3, associated
with the third PC obtained from the joint PCA analysis of double-sorted equity and CDS bank
portfolios for the sample of Developed Countries banks. The EGS factor is long in high deposits-
to-GDP (Dep2GDP) banks and short in low Dep2GDP banks. The resulting double-sorted and
spread portfolios are regressed on standard risk factors (f t) and the EGS factor (R[PC3]t), such
as rxit = αi + ftβ′i + γR[PC3]t + eit, where i denotes the selected portfolio. rxi is the mean excess
return of portfolio i. The f t vector includes changes in Term, changes in TED, changes in Credit
(Crd), and MSCI world stock market excess returns (Mkt). The sample covers Core EU (DE, FR,
IT, ES, GB) banks and spans the period from 01/2004 to 11/2018 at a daily frequency. Adjusted
R2s are in percent. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote significance, respectively, at the 1-, 5- and 10-percent levels,
based on GMM-VARHAC standard errors.
Panel A: EQUITY Returns Panel B: CDS Returns
Leverage (L) Leverage (H) Leverage (L) Leverage (H)
L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L
rxi -14.13 -7.73 6.40 -19.95∗∗ -6.78 13.16∗∗∗ -0.18 -0.70 -0.52 -0.02 -0.70 -0.68
con -17.14∗∗ -14.74∗∗ 2.40 -23.77∗∗∗ -15.15∗∗∗ 8.63∗∗ -0.31 -1.06 -0.75 -0.17 -1.04 -0.87
Term 11.57∗∗∗ 9.77∗∗∗ -1.80 11.08∗∗∗ 9.38∗∗∗ -1.70 1.94∗∗∗ 2.22∗∗∗ 0.28 1.32∗∗∗ 1.89∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗
TED -0.20 -1.02 -0.83 0.67 -0.69 -1.35 0.13 -0.22 -0.35 -0.25 -0.27 -0.02
Crd -7.07∗∗∗ -5.52∗∗∗ 1.55∗∗ -6.48∗∗∗ -4.59∗∗∗ 1.89∗∗∗ -1.63∗∗∗ -1.58∗∗∗ 0.05 -1.54∗∗∗ -1.42∗∗∗ 0.12
Mkt 1.26∗∗∗ 1.51∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 1.36∗∗∗ 1.61∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
R[PC] -0.10∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ -0.06∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.00 0.01∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.00 0.01∗∗ 0.01
R2 41.12 54.13 17.55 47.78 59.95 25.23 19.81 29.49 4.51 25.30 31.20 7.52
EQ Vol. (L) EQ Vol. (H) EQ Vol. (L) EQ Vol. (H)
L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L
rxi -13.98∗ -4.56 9.43∗∗ -19.84∗∗ -9.06 10.78∗∗∗ -0.69 -0.64 0.05 -0.27 -0.28 -0.01
con -18.33∗∗∗ -11.91∗∗ 6.42 -23.99∗∗∗ -17.18∗∗∗ 6.81∗ -0.90 -1.00 -0.10 -0.46 -0.63 -0.17
Term 8.93∗∗∗ 9.20∗∗∗ 0.27 10.07∗∗∗ 10.11∗∗∗ 0.04 1.80∗∗∗ 1.64∗∗∗ -0.16 2.05∗∗∗ 2.04∗∗∗ -0.01
TED -0.73 -1.10 -0.37 0.26 -0.55 -0.81 0.08 -0.17 -0.24 -0.29 -0.26 0.04
Crd -5.03∗∗∗ -4.41∗∗∗ 0.62 -6.20∗∗∗ -5.29∗∗∗ 0.91 -1.53∗∗∗ -1.33∗∗∗ 0.20 -1.77∗∗∗ -1.44∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗
Mkt 1.20∗∗∗ 1.44∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 1.36∗∗∗ 1.63∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
R[PC] 0.03 0.22∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ -0.04 0.22∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.01∗∗ 0.01
R2 47.41 60.95 12.68 48.35 58.51 20.45 17.22 31.49 1.71 24.68 31.36 2.39
Dep2TA (L) Dep2TA (H) Dep2TA (L) Dep2TA (H)
L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L
rxi -21.16∗∗ -6.74 14.42∗∗ -21.73∗∗ -6.54 15.20∗∗∗ -0.22 -0.58 -0.37 -0.14 -0.49 -0.36
con -24.87∗∗∗ -16.34∗∗ 8.53 -25.11∗∗∗ -15.32∗∗ 9.79∗∗ -0.39 -0.89 -0.49 -0.30 -0.82 -0.52
Term 12.06∗∗∗ 13.16∗∗∗ 1.10 10.23∗∗∗ 9.95∗∗∗ -0.27 1.13∗∗∗ 1.94∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗ 1.81∗∗∗ 0.40
TED -0.64 0.59 1.22 0.05 0.10 0.05 -0.46 -0.31 0.15 -0.29 -0.27 0.02
Crd -7.63∗∗∗ -4.13∗∗ 3.50∗∗ -6.90∗∗∗ -4.30∗∗∗ 2.60∗∗ -1.39∗∗∗ -1.34∗∗∗ 0.04 -1.57∗∗∗ -1.39∗∗∗ 0.17
Mkt 1.38∗∗∗ 1.81∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗ 1.69∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
R[PC] -0.08∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.00 0.01∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.01∗∗ 0.00
R2 44.66 57.28 19.11 45.25 59.86 24.96 25.51 30.63 6.44 24.92 31.37 5.93
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Table 7: Second-pass equity and CDS cross-sectional regressions: core Europe
This table reports results for running the cross-sectional regression rxi = β′iλ + ai, where rxi is
the mean excess return of portfolio i, and β̂i is the vector of factor betas associated with portfolio
i, resulting from the first-pass regressions (Table A11, in the Interent Appendix, and Table 6).
For the factor prices of risk (λ), Shanken p-values are in squared brackets, GMM-VARHAC p-
values are in braces, and bootstrapped p-values are in angled brackets. We also report the cross-
sectional adjusted R2s, the pricing error test statistics p-values based on GMM-VARHAC (PE
Test), along with the mean absolute pricing errors (MAE). ∆MAE denotes the difference between
the MAE resulting from the model with EGS factor, and the MAE resulting from the model
without EGS factor; statistical significance is tested using the bootstrap replications, and ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗
denote significance, respectively, at the 1-, 5- and 10-percent levels. Top panels report the results
for the model with standard risk factors but without the EGS factor, while bottom panels include
the EGS factor in the set of standard risk factors. Left panels show the analysis for the full sample
period (01/2004-11/2018), while right panels exclude the bail-in period (01/2004-06/2013). The
analysis covers core EU (DE, FR, IT, ES, GB) banks’ equity and CDS portfolios.
Panel A: Model without EGS Factor
Panel A.I: Full Sample (2004-18) Panel A.II: Sample ex Bail-in (2004-13)
λ Shan. GMM Boot λ Shan. GMM Boot
Term -0.09 [0.472] {0.482} <0.292> Term -2.55 [0.078] {0.114} <0.303>
TED -7.18 [0.016] {0.045} <0.237> TED -3.49 [0.054] {0.100} <0.305>
Crd 3.00 [0.085] {0.206} <0.424> Crd 0.14 [0.476] {0.481} <0.432>
Mkt 2.95 [0.392] {0.422} <0.425> Mkt 5.12 [0.309] {0.344} <0.367>
R2 PE Test MAE R2 PE Test MAE
79.5 1 3.09 68.2 0.999 3.44
Panel B: Model with EGS Factor
Panel B.I: Full Sample (2004-18) Panel B.II: Sample ex Bail-in (2004-13)
λ Shan. GMM Boot λ Shan. GMM Boot
Term 0.82 [0.144] {0.175} <0.328> Term 0.73 [0.206] {0.228} <0.374>
TED -1.12 [0.242] {0.218} <0.366> TED -0.82 [0.345] {0.340} <0.436>
Crd 0.74 [0.240] {0.268} <0.444> Crd 2.31 [0.098] {0.120} <0.195>
Mkt -15.04 [0.022] {0.032} <0.037> Mkt -16.43 [0.053] {0.058} <0.064>
R[PC] 49.53 [0.005] {0.009} <0.003> R[PC] 58.13 [0.024] {0.033} <0.013>
R2 PE Test MAE ∆MAE R2 PE Test MAE ∆MAE
97.4 0.972 0.925 2.17∗∗∗ 97.7 1 0.96 2.48∗∗
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Table 8: Second-pass equity and CDS cross-sectional regressions: safe havens
This table reports results for running the cross-sectional regression rxi = β′iλ+ai, where rxi is the
mean excess return of portfolio i, and β̂i is the vector of factor betas associated with portfolio i,
resulting from the first-pass regressions. For the factor prices of risk (λ), Shanken p-values are in
squared brackets, GMM-VARHAC p-values are in braces, and bootstrapped p-values are in angled
brackets. We also report the cross-sectional adjusted R2s, the pricing error test statistics p-values
based on GMM-VARHAC (PE Test), along with the mean absolute pricing errors (MAE). ∆MAE
denotes the difference between the MAE resulting from the model with EGS factor, and the MAE
resulting from the model without EGS factor; statistical significance is tested using the bootstrap
replications, whereby ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote significance, respectively, at the 1-, 5- and 10-percent levels.
Top panels report the results for the model with standard risk factors but without the EGS factor,
while bottom panels include the EGS factor in the set of standard risk factors. Left panels show
the analysis for the full sample period (01/2004-11/2018), while right panels exclude the bail-in
period (01/2004-06/2013). The analysis covers safe-haven (US, CH, DE, JP) banks’ equity and
CDS portfolios.
Panel A: Model without EGS Factor
Panel A.I: Full Sample (2004-18) Panel A.II: Sample ex Bail-in (2004-13)
λ Shan. GMM Boot λ Shan. GMM Boot
Term -0.33 [0.164] {0.172} <0.302> Term -0.01 [0.495] {0.495} <0.397>
TED -0.32 [0.326] {0.327} <0.371> TED 1.87 [0.068] {0.098} <0.208>
Crd 0.68 [0.154] {0.144} <0.160> Crd -0.34 [0.402] {0.395} <0.427>
Mkt -3.29 [0.260] {0.273} <0.263> Mkt -6.34 [0.190] {0.221} <0.251>
R2 PE Test MAE R2 PE Test MAE
68.4 0.909 1.28 84.8 1 1.14
Panel B: Model with EGS Factor
Panel B.I: Full Sample (2004-18) Panel B.II: Sample ex Bail-in (2004-13)
λ Shan. GMM Boot λ Shan. GMM Boot
Term -0.36 [0.146] {0.140} <0.237> Term -0.16 [0.378] {0.375} <0.411>
TED -0.42 [0.267] {0.258} <0.325> TED 1.30 [0.175] {0.198} <0.255>
Crd 1.37 [0.116] {0.136} <0.152> Crd 1.16 [0.323] {0.320} <0.193>
Mkt -1.55 [0.399] {0.413} <0.401> Mkt -3.35 [0.352] {0.355} <0.426>
R[PC] -1.05 [0.457] {0.459} <0.487> R[PC] 0.69 [0.482] {0.482} <0.357>
R2 PE Test MAE ∆MAE R2 PE Test MAE ∆MAE
71.7 0.942 1.37 −0.08 87.7 1 1.11 0.03
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Table 9: What risks do the R[PC]s reflect?
This table reports results for running the regressions of the three R[PC]s on single-sorted bank eq-
uity spread portfolios (hmlEQ), R[PC]jt = aj +φjthmlEQ+ujt for j = 1, 2, 3. Equity single-sorted
portfolios are constructed using balance-sheet and sovereign-risk variables as sorting variables; for
a given sorting variable, banks are grouped into a high or low portfolios, then the spread portfolio
is simply the high minus low portfolios. R[PCj ]t = xrtŵ′j , where ŵj are the principal component
weights associated with the j-th PC, and xrt are the equity and CDS portfolios’ excess returns.
Panel A shows the top 10 portfolios ordered in terms of the estimated R2s. Panel B focuses on
single-sorted portfolios constructed in terms of: i) sovereign risk, using domestic sovereign CDSs
or sovereign yields as sorting variables; ii) bank sovereign exposures, obtained by regressing bank
CDS returns on the domestic sovereign CDS returns, including (SovExp(c)) or not (Sov Exp)
the standard risk factors as controls; and, iii) total assets at book value to GDP (TA2GDP(bv))
and the rating uplift (UpLift) as alternative measures of the EGS. The sample includes developed
countries’ banks. Variables are standardized. The period is 01/2004-11/2018. Adjusted R2s are in
percent. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote significance, respectively, at the 1-, 5- and 10-percent levels, based on the
Newey-West approach with optimal lag selection.
Panel A: Horse Race
R[PC1] R[PC2] R[PC3]
Port. φ R2 Port. φ R2 Port. φ R2
LEV(mv) 0.63∗∗∗ 40.22 EQvol −0.64∗∗∗ 41.29 Dep2GDP 0.95∗∗∗ 90.84
EQvol 0.63∗∗∗ 39.49 LEV(mv) −0.63∗∗∗ 39.41 TA2GDP(bv) 0.89∗∗∗ 79.31
PVB −0.60∗∗∗ 36.47 PVB 0.61∗∗∗ 36.94 Loan2GDP 0.86∗∗∗ 73.86
ROA −0.53∗∗∗ 27.65 ROA 0.54∗∗∗ 29.06 LEV(bv) 0.63∗∗∗ 39.99
Dep2TA −0.46∗∗∗ 21.32 Dep2TA 0.45∗∗∗ 20.21 BnkCDS −0.45∗∗∗ 20.39
BnkCDS 0.43∗∗∗ 18.76 BnkCDS −0.45∗∗∗ 20.13 Sov.Exp. 0.42∗∗∗ 15.27
ZSCORE −0.41∗∗∗ 16.82 ZSCORE 0.43∗∗∗ 18.90 SovCDS 0.40∗∗∗ 14.58
TDebt 0.27∗∗∗ 7.28 TDebt −0.29∗∗∗ 8.45 Sov.Exp(c) 0.41∗∗∗ 14.52
TA2GDP(bv) 0.23∗∗∗ 5.23 CASHR −0.20∗∗∗ 4.10 SovYld 0.30∗∗∗ 9.15
TA(mv) 0.19∗∗∗ 3.67 TA(mv) −0.20∗∗∗ 3.90 Bnk2SovRat −0.28∗∗∗ 8.00
Panel B: Size, UpLift and Sovereign Risk
R[PC1] R[PC2] R[PC3]
Port. φ R2 Port. φ R2 Port. φ R2
TA2GDP(bv) 0.23∗∗∗ 5.23 TA2GDP(bv) −0.18∗∗∗ 3.31 TA2GDP(bv) 0.89∗∗∗ 79.31
UpLift −0.11∗∗∗ 1.09 UpLift 0.12∗∗∗ 1.53 UpLift 0.26∗∗∗ 6.81
SovCDS 0.09∗ 0.72 SovCDS −0.06 0.28 SovCDS 0.40∗∗∗ 14.58
SovYld −0.04 0.12 SovYld 0.07 0.52 SovYld 0.30∗∗∗ 9.15
Sov.Exp. 0.10 0.74 Sov.Exp. −0.06 0.26 Sov.Exp. 0.42∗∗∗ 15.27
Sov.Exp(c) 0.03 0.04 Sov.Exp(c) 0.01 −0.03 Sov.Exp(c) 0.41∗∗∗ 14.52
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Fig. 1. Timing of actions in the model
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Note: The figure shows the sequence of the actions taken by the agents in the theoretical model.
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Fig. 2. Portfolio sorting strategy
LL LH HL HH
L H1st Sort: Bank Risk
L H L H2nd Sort: EGS
Note: The figure shows how we double sort banks into portfolios based on bank risk and the
EGS instrument, i.e. deposits-to-GDP ratio. We use the following three alternative measures o
bank risk: (book) leverage, equity volatility, and deposits to total assets; in the Internet Appendix
(Table A2), we provide a detailed description of the sorting variables. We implement 2×2 sorts:
we first group banks according to their risk (L,H), then, for a given level of bank risk, we group
banks according to their EGS level. For a given variable of bank risk, the resulting double-sorted
portfolios are LL, LH, HL, and HH, and the EGS spread portfolios are LH-LL for low bank risk,
and HH-HL for high bank risk. We construct these double-sorted portfolios separately for equity
and CDS returns. Portfolios are rebalanced at a monthly frequency.
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Fig. 3. Level, security, and EGS factor loadings
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Note: The figure shows the joint principal component analysis (PCA) of the risk-adjusted equity
and CDS excess returns of the double-sorted portfolios. Banks are first sorted on bank risk (low,
high), and then on deposits to GDP (low, high), our proxy for the expected government support,
i.e. Dep2GDP. Portfolios are rebalanced at a monthly frequency. We use three measures of bank
risk: bank book leverage (S1: LEV bv), equity volatility estimated over a three-month rolling
windows (S1: EQ vol), and deposits to total assets (S1: Dep2TA). For each measure of bank risk,
we obtain four portfolios. The resulting double-sorted equally-weighted equities and CDS portfolios
are regressed on standard risk factors such as: i) changes in Term, i.e. the 10- minus the 2-yr US
Treasury rates; ii) changes in TED, i.e. the difference between the interest rates on interbank loans
(1-month Libor) and on short-term U.S. government debt (1-month TBill); iii) changes in Credit
(Crd), i.e. the difference between high-yield and investment grade yields for the US; and, MSCI
world stock market excess returns (Mkt). We perform the PCA analysis on standardized risk-
adjusted excess returns, i.e. the standardized residuals from the first-pass regressions. PC loadings
for the first-three PCs (ŵj , for j=1,2,3) are displayed. Left panels, i.e. EQ Portfolios, present the
loadings associated with the equity portfolios, whereas right panels, i.e. CDS Portfolios, those with
the CDS portfolios. The double-sorted portfolios are denoted by LL, LH, HL, HH, where the first
letter denotes the level of the first sorting variable (S1: bank risk) and the second letter that of
the second sorting variable (S2: Dep2GDP). The sample includes the developed countries’ banks
and spans the period 1/2004–11/2018 at a daily frequency.
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Fig. 4. EGS factor with events
Note: The figure shows the cumulative sum of the expected government support (EGS) factor
with selected relevant economic, financial, and policy events. The EGS factor (R[PC3]t = xrtŵ′3)
is obtained as the sum of portfolios excess returns times the principal component (PC) weights,
displayed in the bottom panel of Fig. 3, associated with the third PC obtained from the joint PCA
analysis of double-sorted equity and CDS bank portfolios. The EGS factor is long in high deposits-
to-GDP banks and short in low deposits-to-GDP banks. Shaded areas delimit the following phases:
Phase 1: Pre-crisis (01/2004–12/2006); Phase 2: Sub-prime crisis (01/2007–07/2008); Phase 3:
Global financial crisis (07/2008–10/2009); Phase 4: Eurozone debt crisis (11/2009–04/2013); and,
Phase 5: Bail-in regime (05/2013–11/2018). The sample includes developed countries’ banks and
spans the period 01/2004–11/2018 at a daily frequency.
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Fig. 5. EGS factor, economic policy uncertainty, sovereign risk, and VIX
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Note: The figure shows mean excess returns for the expected government support (EGS) factor
(R[PC3]t = xrtŵ′3) conditional on innovations to sovereign risk (top panel), the Economic Policy
Uncertainty (EPU) Index (mid panel), and VIX (bottom panel), being within the lowest and
highest quartile of their sample distributions (four categories from lowest highest shown on the
x-axis of each panel). The EGS factor, resulting from the joint PC analysis of double-sorted equity
and CDS bank risk-adjusted excess returns, is long in high deposits-to-GDP banks and short in
low deposits-to-GDP banks. Sovereign risk is measured as the mean of developed countries’ 5-year
CDSs. We exclude those observations for which either sovereign CDSs are not available or display
zero changes, which reflect the limited number of sovereign CDSs available at the beginning of the
sample. Fig. A8 in the Internet Appendix illustrates the results when these observations are not
excluded. VIX is the CBOE Volatility Index. The daily EPU Index quantifies newspaper coverage
of policy-related economic uncertainty (see www.policyuncertainty.com). The sample includes the
developed country banks and spans the period 01/2004 -11/2018 at a daily frequency.
63
References
Acharya, V., Anginer, D., Warburton, A. J., 2016. The end of market discipline? Investor
expectations of implicit government guarantees. Working Paper, New York University -
Leonard N. Stern School of Business.
Acharya, V., Drechsler, I., Schnabl, P., 2014. A pyrrhic victory? Bank bailouts and sovereign
credit risk. The Journal of Finance 69, 2689–2739.
Adrian, T., Etula, E., Muir, T., 2014. Financial intermediaries and the cross-section of asset
returns. The Journal of Finance 69, 2557–2596.
Albul, B., Jaffee, D. M., Tchistyi, A., 2016. Contingent convertible bonds and capital struc-
ture decisions, mimeo.
Alessandri, P., Nelson, B. D., 2015. Simple banking: Profitability and the yield curve.
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 47, 143–175.
Altavilla, C., Pagano, M., Simonelli, S., 2017. Bank exposures and sovereign stress trans-
mission. Review of Finance 21, 2103–2139.
Ang, A., Chen, J., Xing, Y., 2006. Downside risk. The Review of Financial Studies 19,
1191–1239.
At, C., Thomas, L., 2017. Optimal lending contracts. Oxford Economic Papers 69, 263–277.
Avgouelas, E., Goodhart, C., 2014. A critical evaluation of bail-in as a bank recapitalisation
mechanisms. Discussion Paper 10065, CEPR.
Bacchetta, P., Tille, C., van Wincoop, E., 2012. Self-fulfilling risk panics. The American
Economic Review 102, 3674–3700.
Baker, S. R., Bloom, N., Davis, S. J., 2016. Measuring economic policy uncertainty. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 131, 1593–1636.
Beltratti, A., Stulz, R. M., 2012. The credit crisis around the globe: Why did some banks
perform better? Journal of Financial Economics 105, 1–17.
Berndt, A., Obreja, I., 2010. Decomposing European CDS returns. Review of Finance 14,
189–233.
Bester, H., Hellwig, M., 1987. Moral hazard and equilibrium credit rationing: An overview
of the issues. In: Bamberg, G., Spreemann, K. (eds.), Agency Theory, Information, and
Incentives, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Germany, pp. 135–166.
64
Brandao-Marques, L., Correa, R., Sapriza, H., 2013. International evidence on government
support and risk taking in the banking sector. International Finance Discussion Papers
1086, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Brandao-Marques, L., Correa, R., Sapriza, H., 2018. Government support, regulation, and
risk taking in the banking sector. Journal of Banking & Finance forthcoming.
Breeden, D. T., Gibbons, M. R., Litzenberger, R. H., 1989. Empirical tests of the
consumption-oriented CAPM. The Journal of Finance 44, 231–262.
Brunnermeier, M. K., 2009. Deciphering the liquidity and credit crunch 2007-2008. Journal
of Economic Perspectives 23, 77–100.
Brunnermeier, M. K., Garicano, L., Lane, P. R., Pagano, M., Reis, R., Santos, T., Thes-
mar, D., Van Nieuwerburgh, S., Vayanos, D., 2016. The sovereign-bank diabolic loop and
ESBies. American Economic Review 106, 508–512.
Brunnermeier, M. K., Pedersen, L. H., 2009. Market liquidity and funding liquidity. Review
of Financial Studies 22, 2201–2238.
Campbell, J. Y., Taksler, G. B., 2003. Equity volatility and corporate bond yields. The
Journal of Finance 58, 2321–2350.
Chen, N., Glasserman, P., Nouri, B., Pelger, M., 2017. Agency costs, risk management, and
capital structure. The Review of Financial Studies 30, 3921–3969.
Chen, N., Kou, S. G., 2009. Credit spreads, optimal capital structure, and implied volatility
with endogenous default and jump risk. Mathematical Finance 19, 343–378.
Chordia, T., Goyal, A., Nozawa, Y., Subrahmanyam, A., Tong, Q., 2017. Are capital market
anomalies common to equity and corporate bond markets? An empirical investigation.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 52, 1301–1342.
Cochrane, J. H., 2009. Asset Pricing. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey,
USA, Revised ed.
Cœuré, B., 2013. Outright monetary transactions, one year on. Speech, Berlin, 2 September.
Correa, R., Lee, K.-H., Sapriza, H., Suarez, G. A., 2014. Sovereign credit risk, banks’
government support, and bank stock returns around the world. Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking 46, 93–121.
65
Croushore, D., 1993. Money in the utility function: Functional equivalence to a shopping-
time model. Journal of Macroeconomics 15, 175–182.
Dalang, R. C., Morton, A., Willinger, W., 1990. Equivalent martingale measures and no-
arbitrage in stochastic securities market models. Stochastics and Stochastic Reports 29,
185–201.
Della Corte, P., Riddiough, S. J., Sarno, L., 2016. Currency premia and global imbalances.
Review of Financial Studies 29, 2161–2193.
Duffie, D., Singleton, K. J., 2003. Credit Risk: Pricing, Measurement, and Management.
Princeton Series in Finance, Princeton University Press.
Egan, M., Hortaçsu, A., Matvos, G., 2017. Deposit competition and financial fragility:
Evidence from the us banking sector. American Economic Review 107, 169–216.
Eichengreen, B., Mody, A., Nedeljkovic, M., Sarno, L., 2012. How the subprime crisis went
global: Evidence from bank credit default swap spreads. Journal of International Money
and Finance 31, 1299–1318.
Elton, E. J., Gruber, M. J., Agrawal, D., Mann, C., 2001. Explaining the rate spread on
corporate bonds. The Journal of Finance 56, 247–277.
European Commission, 2017. Coping with the international financial crisis at the national
level in a european context. Staff Working Document 4, Directorate-General for Financial
Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union.
Fama, E. F., French, K. F., 1993. Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds.
Journal of Financial Economics 33, 3–56.
Fama, E. F., MacBeth, J. D., 1973. Risk, return, and equilibrium: Empirical tests. Journal
of Political Economy 81, 607–636.
Feenstra, R. C., 1986. Functional equivalence between liquidity costs and the utility of
money. Journal of Monetary Economics 17, 271–291.
Gandhi, P., Lustig, H., 2014. Reply to Amit Goyal’s comment ‘No size anomalies in U.S.
bank stock returns’, mimeo.
Gandhi, P., Lustig, H., 2015. Size anomalies in U.S. bank stock returns. The Journal of
Finance 70, 733–768.
66
Gandhi, P., Lustig, H. N., Plazzi, A., 2017. Equity is cheap for large financial institutions.
Research Paper 16-22, Swiss Finance Institute.
Gennaioli, N., Martin, A., Rossi, S., 2014. Sovereign default, domestic banks, and financial
institutions. The Journal of Finance 69, 819–866.
Gennaioli, N., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 2015. Neglected risks: The psychology of financial
crises. American Economic Review 105, 310–314.
Gropp, R., Hakenes, H., Schnabel, I., 2011. Competition, risk-shifting, and public bail-out
policies. Review of Financial Studies 24, 2084–2120.
Gürkaynak, R. S., Sack, B., Wright, J. H., 2007. The U.S. treasury yield curve: 1961 to the
present. Journal of Monetary Economics 54, 2291–2304.
Haldane, A. G., Alessandri, P., 2009. Banking on the state. Speech, Bank of England, 6
November.
He, Z., Kelly, B., Manela, A., 2017. Intermediary asset pricing: New evidence from many
asset classes. Journal of Financial Economics 126, 1–35.
Hellmann, T., Stiglitz, J., 2000. Credit and equity rationing in markets with adverse selec-
tion. European Economic Review 44, 281–304.
Hellwig, M. F., 2009. A reconsideration of the Jensen-Meckling model of outside finance.
Journal of Financial Intermediation 18, 495–525.
Hilscher, J., Nosbusch, Y., 2010. Determinants of sovereign risk: Macroeconomic fundamen-
tals and the pricing of sovereign debt. Review of Finance 14, 235–262.
Iannotta, G., Nocera, G., Sironi, A., 2013. The impact of government ownership on bank
risk. Journal of Financial Intermediation 22, 152–176.
Jeanneret, A., 2015. The dynamics of sovereign credit risk. Journal of Financial and Quan-
titative Analysis 50, 963–985.
Jensen, M. C., Meckling, W. H., 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency
costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305–360.
Kahle, K. M., Stulz, R. M., 2013. Access to capital, investment, and the financial crisis.
Journal of Financial Economics 110, 280–299.
67
Keeley, M. C., 1990. Deposit insurance, risk, and market power in banking. American Eco-
nomic Review 80, 1183–1200.
Kelly, B., Lustig, H., Van Nieuwerburgh, S., 2016. Too-systemic-to-fail: What option mar-
kets imply about sector-wide government guarantees. American Economic Review 106,
1278–1319.
Leland, H. E., 1994. Corporate debt value, bond covenants, and optimal capital structure.
The Journal of Finance 49, 1213–1252.
Leland, H. E., 1998. Agency costs, risk management, and capital structure. The Journal of
Finance 53, 1213–1243.
Lewellen, J., Nagel, S., Shanken, J., 2010. A skeptical appraisal of asset pricing tests. Journal
of Financial Economics 96, 175–194.
Li, J., Zinna, G., 2017. How much of bank credit risk is sovereign risk? Evidence from
Europe. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking forthcoming.
Mayordomo, S., Peña, J. I., Schwartz, E. S., 2014. Are all credit default swap databases
equal? European Financial Management 20, 677–713.
Menkhoff, L., Sarno, L., Schmeling, M., Schrimpf, A., 2012. Carry trades and global foreign
exchange volatility. The Journal of Finance 67, 681–718.
Merton, R. C., 1974. On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest rates.
The Journal of Finance 29, 449–470.
Mishkin, F. S., 2011. Over the cliff: From the subprime to the global financial crisis. Journal
of Economic Perspectives 25, 49–70.
Panetta, F., Faeh, T., Grande, G., Ho, C., King, M., Levy, A., Signoretti, F. M., Taboga, M.,
Zaghini, A., 2009. An assessment of financial sector rescue programmes. BIS Papers 48,
Bank for International Settlements.
Pástor, Ľ., Veronesi, P., 2013. Political uncertainty and risk premia. Journal of Financial
Economics 110, 520–545.
Pástor, Ľ., Veronesi, P., 2017. Explaining the puzzle of high policy uncertainty and low
market volatility. Column, VOX.
68
Philippon, T., Salord, A., 2017. Bail-ins and bank resolution in Europe: A progress re-
port. Geneva Reports on the World Economy Special Report 4, International Center for
Monetary and Banking Studies (ICMB).
Philippon, T., Sannikov, Y., 2007. Real options in a dynamic agency model, with applica-
tions to financial development, IPOs, and business risk. Working Paper 13584, NBER.
Poterba, J. M., Rotemberg, J. J., 1986. Money in the utility function: An empirical imple-
mentation. Working Paper 1796, NBER.
Romer, D., 1985. Financial intermediation, reserve requirements, and inside money: A
general equilibrium analysis. Journal of Monetary Economics 16, 175–194.
Ross, S., 2015. The recovery theorem. The Journal of Finance 70, 615–648.
Schäfer, A., Schnabel, I., Weder di Mauro, B., 2016. Bail-in expectations for European
banks: Actions speak louder than words. Discussion Paper 11061, CEPR.
Schich, S., Lind, S., 2012. Implicit guarantees for bank debt: Where do we stand? OECD
Journal: Financial Market Trends 2012, 1–22.
Shanken, J., 1992. On the estimation of beta-pricing models. Review of Financial Studies 5,
1–33.
Tirole, J., 2006. The Theory of Corporate Finance. Princeton University Press, Princeton,
New Jersey, USA.
69
Internet Appendix
(not for publication)
Risky Bank Guarantees
70
Appendix I. CDS Returns
A CDS is a single-name over-the-counter insurance contract. The protection seller takes
on the risk of an agreed event against the payment of a premium from the protection buyer.
The protection seller covers the loss that the protection buyer might incur contingent on
the credit event. In return, the protection buyer pays a quarterly premium, quoted as
annualized percentage of the notional value, to the protection seller. The protection buyer
stops paying the premium to the seller when the contract reaches maturity or, before then,
if the credit event materializes. The three principal credit events for corporate borrowers
are bankruptcy, failure to pay, and restructuring.
In what follows, we show how to compute CDS excess-returns using as input CDS
spreads; thus, we detail the steps necessary to derive Eq. (10), Section 3.2, which we repeat
here for convenience:
rCDSi,t = CDSi(t− 1, T )/252︸ ︷︷ ︸
Carry
Component
−∆CDSi(t, T )×RDi(t, T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Capital-gain
Component
, (I.1)
where CDSi(t, T ) is the annualized premium for the CDS contract maturing in T-years
written on a generic bank i, and RDi(t, T ) is the risky duration.
Next, we show how to derive the capital-gain component; we follow closely the method-
ology proposed by Berndt and Obreja (2010). We start from the premise that a portfolio
that combines a long position in a T-year par defaultable bond issued by bank i with a short
position in a T-year par riskless bond replicates a 100% leveraged position in the risky bond.
The resulting cash-flows, to a close approximation, equal the cash-flows resulting from sell-
ing protection on bank i via a T-year CDS contract with a nominal value at par;35 therefore,
the change in value of the CDS contract (we omit the bank identifier for simplicity) is given
by:
∆VCDS︸ ︷︷ ︸
change in value
CDS contract
= ∆PD︸ ︷︷ ︸
change in value
defaultable bond
− ∆PRF .︸ ︷︷ ︸
change in value
risk-free bond
(I.2)
Then, by dividing each side by par, we obtain the CDS-implied excess return on defaultable
debt associated with the capital gain component,
xrD = ∆VCDS = −∆CDS(t, T )RD(t, T ), (I.3)
where the risky duration, or annuity, is given by
RD(t, T ) = 1/4
4T∑
s=1
δ(t, s/4)q(s;λ). (I.4)
Therefore, to compute RD(t,T), we need estimates of the risk-less discount curve, δ(t, s) =
e−rft×s, and, the survival probabilities, q(s;λ) = e−λ×s. Specifically, we use the data pro-
vided by Gürkaynak et al. (2007) to construct the risk-less discount curve. We instead detail
below the steps to extract the default intensity from CDS contracts.
Extracting risk-neutral intensity of default. Let assume that the premium is paid quar-
35Over a short interval, the change in value of the CDS contract is equal to the change in value of the
long-short bond position (Duffie and Singleton, 2003).
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terly and the default intensity λ is constant; then, the present value of the premium leg of
a CDS contract is given by
P (t, T ) = CDS(t, T )
(
1/4
4T∑
s=1
δ(t, s/4)q(s;λ)
)
.︸ ︷︷ ︸
T-year annuity, RD(t,T)
(I.5)
Next, given a constant risk-neutral fractional recovery rate RQ, the protection leg is
PR(t, T ) = (1−RQ)
( 4T∑
s=1
δ(t, s/4) (q((s− 1)/4;λ)− q(s/4;λ))
)
. (I.6)
At inception time t, the fair value CDS(t, T ) is determined such that the premium leg,
P(t,T), is equal to the protection leg, PR(t,T),
CDS(t, T )RD(t, T ) = (1−RQ)
( 4T∑
s=1
δ(t, s/4) (q((s− 1)/4;λ)− q(s/4;λ))
)
= (1−RQ)
( 4T∑
s=1
δ(t, s/4) (e−λ(s−1)/4 − e−λs/4
)
= (1−RQ)
( 4T∑
s=1
δ(t, s/4) e−λs/4(eλ/4 − 1)
)
= (1−RQ)
4T∑
s=1
δ(t, s/4) e−λs/4︸ ︷︷ ︸
4 × RD(t,T)
(eλ/4 − 1).
(I.7)
Thus, the bank-i intensity of default is given by
λ = 4log
(
1 + CDS(t, T )4(1−RQ)
)
. (I.8)
We use 5-year contracts to compute the CDS implied excess return on defaultable debt, so
that T=5 years.
However, CDS returns also include the premium component. We therefore depart from
Berndt and Obreja (2010) and add to the capital gain component the premium component,
similar to He et al. (2017), among others. As a result, time-t CDS excess-returns for bank-i
are given by:
xrCDSi,t = rCDSi,t − rft−1. (I.9)
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Appendix II. Risk premiums of debt and equity claims
As pointed out in Section 2 of the paper, the investors in the theoretical framework
can be thought of as holding a portfolio consisting of a debt and an equity claim on the
bank. The payoffs of these two claims, being functions of the managers’ choices, vary non-
trivially with the strength of the government guarantee. As a result, it is cumbersome to
characterize the effects of the guarantee on the risk premiums of debt and equity claims
when they are considered separately. For this reason, we assume here that the level of risk
taking does not vary with the strength of the guarantee. In this way, we are able to analyze
the risk premiums of debt and equity claims separately, though in a framework which does
not feature all the mechanisms uncovered in Section 2. Thus, the treatment of the issue here
should be viewed as shedding light on some potential reasons behind the observed differences
between the two claims.
Formally, the asset payoff in this simplified framework is given by
pi(ω) =

pi if ω ≥ ω¯
0 if ω < ω¯,
(II.1)
with pi and ω¯ being fixed parameters, rather than equilibrium objects as in Section 2. Sup-
pose that the investors and the managers stipulate a debt contract specifying a reimburse-
ment of f < pi, and additionally agree that a share of profits net of the debt reimbursement is
paid to the investors. Denoting this share of the equity held by the investors by θ, the payoff
of their equity claim is given by θmax{0, pi(ω) − f}. Also, let the guarantee be such that
τ(ω) is increasing in ω, ατ(ω¯) > f and that there exists ω∗ such that ατ(ω∗) = f . These
assumptions imply that in all of the states of the world in which the bank’s assets yield the
positive payoff pi, i.e. ω ≥ ω¯, the debt holders are fully reimbursed. This, however, is not
the case in all of the states in which the investors obtain a transfer from the government,
ω < ω¯. Moreover, due to the priority of debt over equity, when the debt holders are only
partially reimbursed by the government, the equity holders obtain nothing. More precisely,
the assumptions about the structure of the payoffs and the guarantee allow the state space
to be partitioned into the following three regions:
Region I
ατ(ω) < f ω∗
Region II
ατ(ω) ≥ f ω¯
Region III
pi(ω) > f
The investors’ debt and equity claim yield the following payoffs in these three regions of
the state space:
Region I : Given that the transfer from the government falls short of f , the debt holders are
only partially reimbursed, obtaining ατ(ω). The equity claims yields a payoff of 0 as debt
holders obtain the entire transfer from the government.
Region II : As the transfer from the government exceeds f , the debt holders are fully reim-
bursed. Thus, the payoffs of the debt and equity claims are f and ατ(ω)− f , respectively.36
Region III : Given that the bank’s assets yield the positive payoff pi, there is no transfer from
the government. The debt claim yields f and the equity claim θ(pi − f).
36Recall that the investors obtain the entire transfer from the government ατ(ω). For this reason, the
payoff of the equity claim does not depend on θ in Region II.
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Partitioning the state space in this way illustrates how the debt and equity claims are
influenced by the guarantee in different states of the world. Such effects can be analyzed
more formally by deriving the risk premiums of these two claims. Following analogous steps
as in Section 2.2.2 yields the following expressions:
E[Rd]− R¯ =
{
α
∫ ω∗
−∞ τ(ω)dF (ω) + f [1− F (ω∗)]
α
∫ ω∗
−∞ τ(ω)dG(ω) + f [1−G(ω∗)]
− 1
}
R¯ (II.2)
E[Re]− R¯ =
{∫ ω¯
ω∗ [ατ(ω)− f ] dF (ω) + θ(pi − f) [1− F (ω¯)]∫ ω¯
ω∗ [ατ(ω)− f ] dG(ω) + θ(pi − f) [1−G(ω¯)]
− 1
}
R¯, (II.3)
where Rd and Re denote the returns of the debt and the equity claim, respectively. Differ-
entiating with respect to α and rearranging as in the proof of Proposition 2 delivers:
d
dα
{
E[Rd]− R¯
}
≥ 0 ⇔ α
∫ ω∗
−∞ τ(ω)dF (ω)
α
∫ ω∗
−∞ τ(ω)dG(ω)
≥ 1− F (ω
∗)
1−G(ω∗) (II.4)
d
dα
{
E[Re]− R¯
}
≥ 0 ⇔
∫ ω¯
ω∗ [ατ(ω)− f ] dF (ω)∫ ω¯
ω∗ [ατ(ω)− f ] dG(ω)
≥ 1− F (ω¯)1−G(ω¯) . (II.5)
As in Proposition 2, the inequalities can be interpreted in terms of different risk premiums.
The left-hand side of each inequality reflects the risk premium of the guarantee. However,
debt and equity claims are influenced by the riskiness of the guarantee in different states
of the world. The equity holders obtain a transfer from the government only in Region II.
Thus, the effect of an increase in the strength of the guarantee on the risk premium of the
equity claim depends on how the guarantee varies across the states of the world in Region
II. The debt holders, on the other hand, are fully reimbursed by the government in Region
II, and obtain a partial reimbursement in Region I. For this reason, a marginal increase in
the strength of the guarantee only has an effect on the payoff of the debt claim in Region
I. How the risk premium of the debt claim changes when the guarantee becomes stronger
thus depends on the riskiness of the guarantee in Region I.
For each claim, the riskiness of the guarantee in the relevant states of the world, captured
by the left-hand side, is compared to the riskiness of the claim when it yields the full payoff.
For the equity claim, the right-hand side term in Eq. (II.4) reflects the risk premium of
the underlying, unguaranteed equity claim. For the debt claim, on the other hand, the
right-hand side term in Eq. (II.5) captures the riskiness of the debt claim not only in Region
III but also in Region II as the debt holders are fully reimbursed by the government in the
latter region.
Our empirical results suggest that in the case of equity claims stronger government
guarantees are associated with higher risk premiums. In the case of debt claims, there is
much weaker evidence of such an association. This finding would be consistent with the
inequality in Eq. (II.4) being violated and that in Eq. (II.5) being satisfied. Let us examine
why this may be the case. Note that the debt holders benefit from an increase in the
strength of the guarantee in Region I, i.e. the “worst” states of the world. In these states,
the investors’ highly value an additional unit of payoff, implying that G′(ω) exceeds F ′(ω).
Consequently, even though the guarantee may vary across the states of the world, the risk
premium associated with it is likely to be small in Region I. In the “intermediate” states of
the world of Region II, on the other hand, the investors attach a lower value to an additional
unit of payoff. Therefore, the risk premium of the equity guarantee depends more strongly
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on its variability across the states of the world, and may exceed that of the underlying
unguaranteed equity claim. These considerations suggest that a guarantee which varies
across the states of the world can: (i) generate different risk premia for debt and equity
claims, and (ii) have more scope to raise the risk premium of an equity claim.
It is, however, worth pointing out that the mechanism discussed here is only one among
many possible explanations for the differences between the risk premiums of equities and
CDSs that we uncover. As pointed out in Section 4 of the paper, the differences could
equally well be related to the smaller variability of CDS returns, which makes it difficult to
estimate a statistically significant risk premium. In light of these observations, we believe
that examining competing explanations for the differential effects of guarantees on different
financing instruments constitutes an important avenue for future theoretical and empirical
research.
75
Appendix III. Additional Tables
Table A1: Bank names and data
This table reports bank names, along with information about the bank asset returns and key
sorting variables. Specifically, we report the country identifier (ISO), the asset returns (CDS and
equities), book leverage (Lev bv), equity volatility (EQ vol), bank deposits (Dep.), and the rating
uplift (UpLift). Variables are defined in Table (A2). The 3-tick indicates if a variable is available,
while the 7-tick if it is not available. As for the subsidiary indicator (Subs.) column, a bank is
denoted as a subsidiary (3-tick) using the Capital IQ classification; specifically, we label a bank
subsidiary, when the ultimate parent is another entity, having a different name according to Capital
IQ. The banks form the Developed Country sample, for a total of 88 banks, which is the benchmark
sample we use throughout the paper. The list of countries, with the ISO code in braces, is Italy
(IT), Spain (ES), Germany (DE), France (FR), the Netherlands (NL), Belgium (BE), the United
Kingdom (GB), Denmark (DK), the United States (US), Japan (JP), Switzerland (CH), Austria
(AT), Australia (AU), Sweden (SE), and Norway (NO). Data sources: S&P Capital IQ for balance-
sheet variables, CMA for CDS data, Datastream for equity returns and Bloomberg for Moody’s
rating uplifts.
Name ISO CDS Eq. Lev (bv) EQVol Dep. UpLift Subs.
ABN AMRO BANK NL 3 7 3 7 3 3 3
ALLIANCE & LEICESTER GB 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP AU 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
BANCA MONTE DEI PASCHI DI SIENA IT 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
BANCA POPOLARE DI MILANO IT 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA ES 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
CAJA DE AHORROS DEL MEDITERRÁNEO ES 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
BANCO DE SABADELL ES 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
BANCO DI SICILIA IT 3 7 7 7 3 3 3
BANCO PASTOR ES 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
BANCO POPOLARE IT 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
BANCO POPULAR ESPAÑOL ES 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
BANCO SANTANDER ES 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
BANK OF AMERICA US 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
BANK OF SCOTLAND GB 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
BANKIA ES 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
BANKINTER ES 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
BARCLAYS BANK GB 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
BAWAG P.S.K. AT 3 7 3 7 3 3 7
BAYERISCHE LANDESBANK DE 3 7 3 7 3 3 3
BNP PARIBAS FORTIS BE 3 7 3 7 3 3 3
BNP PARIBAS FR 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
BRADFORD & BINGLEY GB 3 3 3 3 7 3 3
CAIXA D’ESTALVIS DE CATALUNYA ES 3 7 3 7 3 3 7
CAIXA DE AFORROS DE GALICIA ES 3 7 3 7 3 3 7
CAIXABANK ES 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
BANCO CAM ES 3 7 3 7 3 3 7
CAPITAL ONE BANK (USA) US 3 3 7 3 3 3 3
CITIBANK US 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
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Name ISO CDS Eq. Lev (bv) EQVol Dep. UpLift Subs
COMMERZBANK DE 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA AU 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
COÖPERATIEVE CENTRALE RAIFFEISEN-BOER. NL 3 7 3 7 3 3 7
COUNTRYWIDE BANK US 3 3 3 3 7 3 3
CRÉDIT AGRICOLE FR 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
DANSKE BANK DK 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
DEXIA CRÉDIT LOCAL FR 3 3 3 3 7 3 3
DNB BANK NO 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
DRESDNER BANK DE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
DZ BANK DE 3 7 3 7 3 3 7
ERSTE GROUP BANK AT 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
HSBC BANK GB 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
HSH NORDBANK DE 3 7 3 7 3 3 3
IKB DEUTSCHE INDUSTRIEBANK DE 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
ING BANK NL 3 7 3 7 3 3 3
INTESA SANPAOLO IT 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK US 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
KBC BANK BE 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
LANDESBANK BADEN-WÜERTTEMBERG DE 3 7 3 7 3 3 7
LANDESBANK HESSEN-THÜRINGEN DE 3 7 3 7 3 3 7
LLOYDS BANK GB 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
MACQUARIE BANK AU 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
MIZUHO BANK JP 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK AU 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
NATIXIS FR 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
NIBC BANK NL 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
NORDDEUTSCHE LANDESBANK GIROZENTRALE DE 3 7 3 7 3 3 7
NORDEA BANK SE 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
RAIFFEISEN BANK INTERNATIONA AT 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
RAIFFEISEN ZENTRALBANK ÖSTERREICH AT 3 7 3 7 3 3 3
SANPAOLO IMI IT 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
SANTANDER UK GB 3 3 7 3 7 3 3
SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA BANKEN SE 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
SNS BANK NL 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE FR 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
ST.GEORGE BANK AU 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK GB 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
SUMITOMO MITSUI BANKING CORPORATION JP 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
SUNTRUST BANK US 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
SVENSKA HANDELSBANKEN SE 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
SWEDBANK SE 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
BANK OF TOKYO-MITSUBISHI UFJ JP 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
NORINCHUKIN BANK JP 3 7 3 7 3 3 7
PNC BANK US 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND GB 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
U.S. BANK US 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
UNICREDIT BANK AUSTRIA AT 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
UNICREDIT IT 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
UBI BANCA IT 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
WACHOVIA BANK US 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
WELLS FARGO BANK US 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION AU 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
CREDIT SUISSE CH 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
DEUTSCHE BANK DE 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
MERRILL LYNCH BANK USA US 3 3 3 3 7 3 3
MORGAN STANLEY BANK US 3 3 3 3 7 3 7
PORTIGON DE 3 7 3 7 3 3 7
GOLDMAN SACHS BANK USA US 3 3 3 3 7 3 7
UBS CH 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
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Table A2: Sorting variables and risk factors descriptions
This table reports sorting variables and risk factors’ names, descriptions and sources.
Sorting Variables
Description Source
UpLift Rating uplift, computed as the difference between the bank all-
in-all credit rating, i.e. the bank’s ability to repay it deposits
obligations, measured using Moodys’ foreign-currency deposit
ratings, and the stand-alone credit rating, i.e. the bank’s intrin-
sic safety and soundness, measured using Moody’s bank financial
strength (BFS), or bank credit assessment, ratings. Deposits rat-
ings are converted into the BFS scale, and then into a numerical
scale 1 (E) to 13 (A). The difference between the two types of
rating gives the uplift.
Bloomberg
UpLift (%) Percentage uplift indicates the fraction of bank rating which is
due to the uplift, computed as the UpLift over the bank rating.
Bloomberg
TA (bv) Total assets at book value. Capital IQ
TL (bv) Total liabilities at book value. Capital IQ
EQ (bv) Equity at book value constructed as the difference between TA
(bv) and TL (bv).
Capital IQ
Lev (bv) Leverage at book value constructed as the TA (bv) over EQ (bv) Capital IQ
TA (mv) Market value of total assets, which is constructed as total liabil-
ities plus market value of equity.
Capital IQ
EQ (mv) Market value of equity. Capital IQ
Lev (mv) Leverage at market value; TA (mv) over EQ (mv). Capital IQ
ROA Return on assets. Capital IQ
TDebt Total bank debt. Capital IQ
STDebt Short-term bank debt. Capital IQ
CASHR Cash reserves. Capital IQ
D2D Merton’s distance-to-default measure computed as in Acharya,
Anginer and Warburton (2015; AAW).
Capital IQ
ZSCORE Z-score, constructed as the sum of ROA and equity ratio (ratio
of EQ (bv) to TA (bv)), averaged over four years, divided by the
standard deviation of ROA over the period (see, AWW 2015).
Capital IQ
PVB Ratio of market and book value of equity. Capital IQ
Loan Total bank loans. Capital IQ
Dep. Total bank deposits. Capital IQ
Loan2TA Bank loans over total assets. Capital IQ
Dep2TA Total bank deposits over bank total assets. Capital IQ
DVR Dividend ratio. Capital IQ
TA2GDP (bv) Book value of total assets to the country GDP. OECD & Capi-
tal IQ
TA2GDP (mv) Market value of total assets to the country GDP. OECD & Capi-
tal IQ
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Sorting Variables (cntd’)
Description Source
iBCA Moody’s bank credit assessment rating, converted into the 1-13
scale, with 1 indicating the highest bank quality.
Bloomberg
SP Bank survival probability derived from Merton model as in
AWW (2015).
Capital IQ
SovYld 10-year sovereign bond yields. CMA
SovCDS 5-year sovereign CDS. CMA
BnkCDS 5-year bank CDS. CMA
iSovRat Moody’s sovereign rating, converted into the 1-13 scale, with 1
indicating the highest issuer quality.
Bloomberg
Sov.Exp. Banks’ sovereign exposures, estimated from market prices, by
regressing bank daily CDS returns on the domestic sovereign
CDS returns over three-month rolling windows.
CMA
Sov.Exp(c) Banks’ sovereign exposures with controls, estimated as Sov.Exp.
but by adding standard risk factors as controls in the regression.
CMA
B2SRat Ratio of bank rating (iBCA) and sovereign rating (iSovRat). Bloomberg
EQvol Stock return volatility computed using returns over the past 3
months.
Datastream
Risk Factors
Description Source
Mkt The market excess return is computed as the MSCI world stock
market return minus the 1-month TBill.
FRED & Datas-
tream
TED The spread is the difference between the interest rates on inter-
bank loans (1-month Libor) and on short-term U.S. government
debt (1-month TBill).
Datastream
Crd Credit is the difference between US high-yield and investment-
grade yields.
FRED
Term The term spread is the difference between the 10- minus the 2-yr
US Treasury rates.
FRED
G-SMB The Fama-French global SMB factor. French’s website
G-HML The Fama-French global HML factor. French’s website
G-MOM The Fama-French global momentum factor. French’s website
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Table A3: Bank asset return statistics
This table presents daily asset return statistics for the mean bank, and the 25th, 50th and 75th
percentiles for the cross section of developed country banks displayed in Table A2. We report
the mean return and standard deviation (both annualized), the minimum and maximum daily
returns, and the first order autocorrelation coefficient (AC(1)). Panel A shows summary statistics
for equity returns, while Panel B for CDS returns. Period A presents the summary statistics for
the full-sample period 2004-2018, whereas Periods B-E the subperiod analysis.
Panel A: Equity Returns Panel B: CDS Returns
Period A: 01/2004-11/2018
Mean 25th 50th 75th Mean 25th 50th 75th
Mean (% p.a.) -4.44 -253.1 -10.21 228.98 0.85 -15.92 0.64 17.14
Std.Dev. (% p.a.) 28.05 29.37 26.55 28.04 2.49 2.44 1.93 2.46
Min (%) -19.83 -22.31 -16.00 -8.63 -1.23 -1.58 -0.96 -0.66
Max (%) 17.1 10.55 17.23 24.00 2.54 0.68 1.62 3.18
AC(1) 0.1 0.19 0.08 0.12 0.31 0.41 0.29 0.35
Period B: 01/2004-06/2007
Mean 25th 50th 75th Mean 25th 50th 75th
Mean (% p.a.) 20.31 -137.99 10.84 164.00 0.27 -2.74 0.10 3.04
Std.Dev. (% p.a.) 11.70 11.92 11.75 11.77 0.20 0.22 0.16 0.20
Min (%) -3.05 -4.17 -3.14 -2.09 -0.10 -0.16 -0.12 -0.02
Max (%) 2.46 1.67 2.98 3.62 0.11 0.02 0.13 0.17
AC(1) 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.14 0.29 0.08 0.20
Period C: 06/2007-10/2009
Mean 25th 50th 75th Mean 25th 50th 75th
Mean (% p.a.) -34.46 -454.72 -40.64 354.81 -0.69 -28.26 0.20 26.80
Std.Dev. (% p.a.) 49.22 49.50 45.87 48.63 3.76 3.14 2.84 3.60
Min (%) -19.83 -22.31 -16.00 -8.63 -1.23 -1.58 -0.96 -0.39
Max (%) 17.10 10.55 17.23 24.00 2.54 0.38 1.62 3.18
AC(1) 0.09 0.18 0.06 0.09 0.32 0.43 0.26 0.25
Period D: 10/2009-11/2018
Mean 25th 50th 75th Mean 25th 50th 75th
Mean (% p.a.) -6.33 -244.8 -10.59 220.7 1.45 -17.7 0.95 19.92
Std.Dev. (% p.a.) 24.72 25.8 23.62 24.56 2.54 2.6 2.00 2.47
Min (%) -13.63 -20.94 -10.73 -6.23 -1.09 -1.44 -0.92 -0.66
Max (%) 10.79 5.84 9.84 15.2 1.45 0.68 1.30 2.01
AC(1) 0.11 0.14 0.09 0.12 0.31 0.37 0.31 0.36
Period E: 06/2007-11/2018
Mean 25th 50th 75th Mean 25th 50th 75th
Mean (% p.a.) -11.78 -287.3 -16.45 248.26 1.02 -19.83 0.80 21.33
Std.Dev. (% p.a.) 31.29 32.5 29.53 31.18 2.83 2.73 2.20 2.75
Min (%) -19.83 -22.31 -16.00 -8.63 -1.23 -1.58 -0.96 -0.66
Max (%) 17.10 10.55 17.23 24 2.54 0.68 1.62 3.18
AC(1) 0.10 0.18 0.07 0.11 0.31 0.39 0.29 0.33
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Table A4: First-pass equity and CDS regressions with the PC EGS factor
This table presents the first-pass time-series regressions of equity and CDS double-sorted portfolio
excess returns (LL, HL, HL, HH) and the spread portfolio returns (L H/L and H H/L) on the risk
factors and the EGS factor. Banks are first sorted on bank risk (low, high), and then on deposits
to GDP (low, high), our proxy for the expected government support. For a given measure of bank
risk, spread portfolios are given by LH-LL for low bank risk, and HH-HL for high bank risk. We
use three measures of bank risk: bank book leverage (Leverage), equity volatility (EQ Vol.), and
deposits to total assets (Dep2TA). Portfolios are rebalanced at a monthly frequency. The EGS
factor (PC3,t = ˜tŵ′3) is the third principal component (PC) obtained from the joint PC analysis
of double-sorted equity and CDS bank portfolios, presented in the Internet Appendix (Fig. A2).
The EGS factor is long in high deposits-to-GDP banks and short in low deposits-to-GDP banks.
The resulting double-sorted and spread portfolios are regressed on standard risk factors (f t) and
the EGS factor (PC3,t), such as rxit = αi + ftβi + γPC3,t + eit, where i denotes the selected
portfolio. rxi is the mean excess return of portfolio i. The f t vector includes changes in Term,
changes in TED, changes in Credit (Crd), and MSCI world stock market excess returns (Mkt).
The sample covers Developed Country banks and spans the period from 01/2004 to 11/2018 at a
daily frequency. Adjusted R2s are in percent. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote significance, respectively, at the 1-,
5- and 10-percent levels, based on GMM-VARHAC standard errors.
Panel A: EQUITY Returns Panel B: CDS Returns
Leverage (L) Leverage (H) Leverage (L) Leverage (H)
L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L
rxi -4.50 -1.96 2.54 -9.42 -1.25 8.17∗∗ -0.47 -0.59 -0.12 -0.25 -0.61 -0.37
con -10.07∗∗ -6.77 3.31 -14.53∗∗∗ -6.19 8.34∗∗∗ -0.68 -0.72 -0.05 -0.41 -0.76 -0.35
Term 3.32∗ 6.33∗∗∗ 3.01∗ 5.16∗∗∗ 5.60∗∗∗ 0.44 1.39∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ -0.29 1.18∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ -0.18
TED 0.99 -1.29 -2.28∗∗ 0.06 -1.45 -1.51∗∗∗ -0.69∗∗ -0.40 0.30 -0.75∗∗ -0.37 0.38∗∗∗
Crd 1.09 -6.95∗∗∗ -8.05∗∗∗ -3.21∗∗∗ -7.53∗∗∗ -4.31∗∗∗ -1.17∗∗∗ -1.44∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗ -1.37∗∗∗ -1.30∗∗∗ 0.07
Mkt 1.50∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.01∗
R[PC] -137.81∗∗∗ 47.88∗∗∗ 185.69∗∗∗ -60.33∗∗∗ 67.33∗∗∗ 127.67∗∗∗ -6.17∗∗∗ 2.08∗∗∗ 8.24∗∗∗ -3.64∗∗∗ 1.83∗∗∗ 5.47∗∗∗
R2 75.79 65.27 68.70 69.05 69.02 76.76 31.74 33.39 13.70 34.14 34.09 12.31
EQ Vol. (L) EQ Vol. (H) EQ Vol. (L) EQ Vol. (H)
L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L
rxi -4.55 -0.03 4.52 -9.66 -1.33 8.33∗∗ -0.90 -0.82 0.08 -0.38 -0.61 -0.23
con -8.71∗∗ -4.32 4.39 -14.98∗∗∗ -6.23 8.74∗∗∗ -1.04 -0.97∗∗ 0.07 -0.58 -0.76 -0.18
Term 4.39∗∗∗ 1.05 -3.34∗∗∗ 4.79∗∗∗ 5.52∗∗∗ 0.72 0.75∗∗∗ 0.28 -0.47∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ -0.34
TED -0.47 -2.49 -2.02∗∗ 0.59 -2.03 -2.62∗∗∗ -0.22 -0.37 -0.16 -0.86∗∗ -0.42 0.44∗∗∗
Crd -2.16∗∗∗ -7.64∗∗∗ -5.49∗∗∗ -2.20∗∗ -8.30∗∗∗ -6.10∗∗∗ -1.07∗∗∗ -1.15∗∗∗ -0.07 -1.41∗∗∗ -1.32∗∗∗ 0.09
Mkt 1.15∗∗∗ 1.12∗∗∗ -0.03 1.46∗∗∗ 1.36∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ -0.01 0.07∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗
R[PC] -29.21∗∗∗ 84.82∗∗∗ 114.02∗∗∗ -78.69∗∗∗ 80.39∗∗∗ 159.08∗∗∗ -1.73∗∗ 2.83∗∗∗ 4.56∗∗∗ -4.29∗∗∗ 1.95∗∗∗ 6.24∗∗∗
R2 70.06 71.38 51.18 72.13 68.96 85.06 26.36 31.75 6.47 35.43 34.06 16.89
Dep2TA (L) Dep2TA (H) Dep2TA (L) Dep2TA (H)
L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L
rxi -12.77 -1.43 11.35∗∗∗ -10.29 -0.37 9.92∗∗ -0.12 -0.74 -0.61 -0.21 -0.61 -0.40
con -17.68∗∗∗ -6.86 10.82∗∗∗ -15.55∗∗∗ -5.27 10.27∗∗∗ -0.29 -0.91 -0.62 -0.37 -0.76 -0.38
Term 9.04∗∗∗ 8.51∗∗∗ -0.53 5.14∗∗∗ 5.28∗∗∗ 0.15 1.39∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ -0.37∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ -0.18
TED -0.79 -1.65 -0.86 0.66 -1.91 -2.57∗∗∗ -0.83∗ -0.30 0.54∗∗∗ -0.81∗∗ -0.34 0.47∗∗∗
Crd -6.01∗∗∗ -6.68∗∗∗ -0.66 -2.27∗∗ -8.02∗∗∗ -5.75∗∗∗ -1.48∗∗∗ -1.21∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗ -1.38∗∗∗ -1.28∗∗∗ 0.10
Mkt 1.42∗∗∗ 1.55∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ -0.00 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.01∗
R[PC] -43.33∗∗∗ 78.47∗∗∗ 121.80∗∗∗ -79.55∗∗∗ 80.52∗∗∗ 160.07∗∗∗ -3.33∗∗∗ 1.12 4.45∗∗∗ -3.66∗∗∗ 1.72∗∗∗ 5.37∗∗∗
R2 61.56 64.53 41.91 71.66 69.20 84.17 34.49 32.42 8.02 35.10 33.89 12.12
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Table A5: Test for spreads in factor betas across portfolios
This table reports results for running the following tests: βjk = 0 (Panel A) and βjk = βj (Panel B)
∀j, for each factor k = TED, Term, Crd, Mkt, R[PC3]. The factor betas βjks are those estimated
in the first-pass regressions with (top two rows in each panel) and without (bottom two rows in
each panel) the return EGS factor R[PC3], which are reported, respectively, in Tables 1 and 2.
We show the results for j = 24 (2S), i.e. when only double-sorted portfolios are included, and for
j = 36, i.e. when the spread portfolios are included along with the double-sorted portfolios (All).
The period is 01/2004-11/2018. We report the p-values based on the VARHAC GMM approach.
Panel A: βjk = 0
con Term TED Crd Mkt R[PC3]
2S 0.18 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00
All 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2S 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00
All 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B: H0: βjk = βk
con Term TED Crd Mkt R[PC3]
2S 0.39 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00
All 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2S 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
All 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table A6: Second-pass equity and CDS cross-sectional regressions using PC EGS factor
This table reports results for running the cross-sectional regression rxi = β′iλ + ai, where rxi
is the mean excess return of portfolio i, and β̂i is the vector of factor betas associated with
portfolio i, resulting from the first-pass regressions (Table A4 in the Internet Appendix). For the
factor prices of risk (λ), Shanken p-values are in squared brackets, GMM-VARHAC p-values are
in braces, and bootstrapped p-values are in angled brackets. We also report the cross-sectional
adjusted R2, the pricing error test statistics (PE Test) p-values based on GMM-VARHAC, along
with the mean absolute pricing errors (MAE). ∆MAE denotes the difference between the MAE
resulting from the model with EGS factor, and the MAE resulting from the model without EGS
factor; statistical significance is tested using the bootstrap replications, whereby ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote
significance, respectively, at the 1-, 5- and 10-percent levels. Top panels report the results for the
model with standard risk factors (f t) but without the EGS factor, while bottom panels add the EGS
factor (PC3t) beta to the set of standard risk factors. Left panels show the analysis for the full-
sample period (01/2004-11/2018), while right panels exclude the bail-in period (01/2004-06/2013).
The analysis covers developed country banks’ equity and CDS portfolios.
Panel A: Model without EGS Factor
Panel A.I: Full Sample (2004-18) Panel A.II: Sample ex Bail-in (2004-13)
λ Shan. GMM Boot λ Shan. GMM Boot
Term -0.73 [0.062] {0.135} <0.140> Term -0.72 [0.092] {0.123} <0.198>
TED -4.83 [0.018] {0.038} <0.267> TED -4.38 [0.029] {0.045} <0.380>
Crd 0.79 [0.212] {0.265} <0.392> Crd 0.37 [0.402] {0.416} <0.295>
Mkt -0.56 [0.461] {0.468} <0.328> Mkt -3.65 [0.318] {0.334} <0.233>
R2 PE Test MAE R2 PE Test MAE
74.2 0.975 1.89 72.3 0.969 2.71
Panel B: Model with EGS Factor
Panel B.I: Full Sample (2004-18) Panel B.II: Sample ex Bail-in (2004-13)
λ Shan. GMM Boot λ Shan. GMM Boot
Term -0.32 [0.228] {0.258} <0.225> Term -0.74 [0.079] {0.098} <0.106>
TED -3.21 [0.023] {0.047} <0.087> TED -3.49 [0.042] {0.068} <0.186>
Crd 2.02 [0.032] {0.048} <0.038> Crd 2.99 [0.057] {0.075} <0.101>
Mkt 3.18 [0.285] {0.298} <0.314> Mkt 3.44 [0.335] {0.342} <0.415>
R[PC] 0.08 [0.013] {0.020} <0.013> R[PC] 0.11 [0.009] {0.013} <0.008>
R2 PE Test MAE ∆MAE R2 PE Test MAE ∆MAE
93.6 0.974 0.92 0.97∗∗ 94.7 0.998 1 1.70∗∗
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Table A7: First-pass equity and CDS regressions with EGS Factor: 2004-2013
This table presents the first-pass time-series regressions of equity and CDS double-sorted portfolio
excess returns (LL, HL, HL, HH) and the spread portfolios returns (L H/L and H H/L) on the risk
factors and the EGS factor. Banks are first sorted on bank risk (low, high), and then on deposits
to GDP (low, high), our proxy for the expected government support. For a given measure of bank
risk, spread portfolios are given by LH-LL for low bank risk, and HH-HL for high bank risk. We
use three measures of bank risk: bank book leverage (Leverage), equity volatility (EQ Vol.), and
deposits to total assets (Dep2TA). Portfolios are rebalanced at a monthly frequency. The EGS
factor (R[PC3]t = xrtŵ′3) is obtained as the sum of double-sorted portfolio excess returns times
the principal component (PC) weights associated with the third PC obtained from the joint PCA
analysis of double-sorted equity and CDS bank portfolios. The EGS factor is long in high deposits-
to-GDP (Dep2GDP) banks and short in low Dep2GDP banks. The resulting double-sorted and
spread portfolios are regressed on standard risk factors (f t) and the EGS factor (R[PC3]t), such
as rxit = αi + ftβ′i + γR[PC3]t + eit, where i denotes the selected portfolio. rxi is the mean excess
return of portfolio i. The f t vector includes changes in Term, changes in TED, changes in Credit
(Crd), and MSCI world stock market excess returns (Mkt). The sample covers Developed Country
banks and spans the period from 01/2004 to 06/2013 at a daily frequency. Adjusted R2s are in
percent. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote significance, respectively, at the 1-, 5- and 10-percent levels, based on
GMM-VARHAC standard errors.
Panel A: EQUITY Returns Panel B: CDS Returns
Leverage (L) Leverage (H) Leverage (L) Leverage (H)
L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L
rxi -9.09 -3.94 5.15 -11.54 -2.55 8.99∗ -1.55 -1.66∗ -0.11 -1.41 -1.51 -0.10
con -4.81 -11.86∗ -7.06∗ -12.81∗∗ -11.99∗ 0.81 -1.73 -2.04∗∗ -0.31 -1.64 -1.89∗∗ -0.25
Term 1.49 5.37∗∗∗ 3.89∗∗∗ 3.33 4.05∗ 0.72 1.67∗∗∗ 1.20∗∗∗ -0.47 1.38∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ -0.28
TED -0.20 -0.30 -0.10 -0.07 0.01 0.09 -0.75∗∗ -0.39 0.35 -0.80∗∗ -0.36 0.44∗∗∗
Crd -2.33∗∗ -3.41∗∗∗ -1.08 -3.28∗∗∗ -3.30∗∗∗ -0.02 -1.06∗∗∗ -1.18∗∗∗ -0.12 -1.22∗∗∗ -1.08∗∗∗ 0.14
Mkt 1.47∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗∗ -0.01 1.43∗∗∗ 1.50∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ -0.01
R[PC] -0.49∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.00 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗
R2 75.42 71.17 76.78 71.08 74.80 82.99 28.65 34.19 6.83 32.13 34.44 3.99
EQ Vol. (L) EQ Vol. (H) EQ Vol. (L) EQ Vol. (H)
L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L
rxi -10.67 0.24 10.92∗∗ -13.22 -1.49 11.73∗∗ -1.63∗ -1.61∗∗ 0.01 -1.51 -1.44 0.06
con -12.89∗∗∗ -9.19∗ 3.70 -13.21∗∗ -11.91∗ 1.29 -1.84∗ -2.00∗∗∗ -0.16 -1.76 -1.83∗ -0.07
Term 2.47 -0.71 -3.18∗∗∗ 3.26 3.59 0.33 0.91∗∗ 0.25 -0.66∗∗ 1.56∗∗∗ 1.11∗∗∗ -0.45
TED -0.19 -0.96 -0.77 0.17 -0.29 -0.47 -0.23 -0.34 -0.12 -0.91∗∗ -0.41 0.50∗∗∗
Crd -2.13∗∗∗ -3.39∗∗∗ -1.27∗∗∗ -3.03∗∗∗ -3.56∗∗∗ -0.53 -0.99∗∗∗ -0.94∗∗∗ 0.05 -1.25∗∗∗ -1.08∗∗∗ 0.17∗
Mkt 1.16∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 1.47∗∗∗ 1.49∗∗∗ 0.02 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ -0.01 0.08∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗
R[PC] -0.04 0.39∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗
R2 69.66 76.81 55.02 73.63 75.12 91.79 25.15 33.06 3.11 33.65 34.48 9.07
Dep2TA (L) Dep2TA (H) Dep2TA (L) Dep2TA (H)
L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L
rxi -15.50 -2.23 13.27∗∗ -13.58 -0.68 12.90∗∗ -1.20 -1.48 -0.28 -1.39 -1.44 -0.06
con -18.42∗∗∗ -13.14∗ 5.29 -13.54∗∗ -11.03∗ 2.51 -1.43 -1.83∗ -0.41 -1.62 -1.81∗ -0.19
Term 7.21∗∗∗ 6.83∗∗ -0.38 3.36 3.64 0.28 1.65∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗ -0.53∗∗ 1.32∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗∗ -0.26
TED -0.77 0.30 1.08 0.24 -0.18 -0.42 -0.89∗∗ -0.29 0.60∗∗∗ -0.87∗∗ -0.33 0.54∗∗∗
Crd -4.92∗∗∗ -1.80 3.12∗∗∗ -3.05∗∗∗ -3.36∗∗∗ -0.32 -1.35∗∗∗ -1.00∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ -1.23∗∗∗ -1.06∗∗∗ 0.17
Mkt 1.45∗∗∗ 1.71∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 1.46∗∗∗ 1.50∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ -0.01 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ -0.01
R[PC] -0.03 0.42∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.00∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗
R2 65.91 70.01 45.12 73.47 75.10 91.39 33.79 32.40 5.09 33.18 34.19 4.42
84
Table A8: First-pass equity and CDS regressions robustness: additional risk factors
This table presents the first-pass time-series regressions of equity and CDS double-sorted portfolio
excess returns (LL, HL, HL, HH) and the spread portfolios returns (L H/L and H H/L) on the
risk factors. We perform the first-pass regressions as in Table 1 on a set of standard risk factors.
However, we augment the set of risk factors by including the three Fama-French Global factors,
namely SMB (G-SMB), HML (G-HML) and, MOM (G-MOM), in addition to Crd, Term, TED and
Mkt. As a result, the SDF nows consists of seven factors. The sample covers all banks and spans
the period from 01/2004 to 10/2018 at a daily frequency. Adjusted R2s are in percent. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗
denote significance, respectively, at the 1-, 5- and 10-percent levels, based on GMM-VARHAC
standard errors.
Panel A: EQUITY Returns Panel B: CDS Returns
Leverage (L) Leverage (H) Leverage (L) Leverage (H)
L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L
rxi -4.80 -2.08 2.71 -9.49 -1.29 8.21∗∗ -0.46 -0.57 -0.11 -0.23 -0.59 -0.36
con -8.47∗∗ -6.12 2.35 -13.19∗∗∗ -5.42 7.76∗∗∗ -0.58 -0.70 -0.12 -0.35 -0.71 -0.36
Term 0.87 4.66∗∗∗ 3.79 3.00∗ 3.85∗∗ 0.85 1.27∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ -0.25 1.08∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ -0.16
TED 1.20 -1.30 -2.50 0.18 -1.46 -1.64 -0.69∗∗ -0.40 0.29 -0.75∗∗ -0.37 0.38∗∗∗
Crd 1.97∗ -5.87∗∗∗ -7.83∗∗∗ -2.16∗∗ -6.35∗∗∗ -4.19∗∗∗ -1.06∗∗∗ -1.36∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗∗ -1.28∗∗∗ -1.24∗∗∗ 0.04
Mkt 1.26∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗ 0.00 1.24∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ 0.05 0.07∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗
G-SMB -0.26∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ -0.02 0.25∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.03∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.00 0.03∗∗ 0.02∗ -0.01
G-HML 1.53∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗ -0.39∗∗∗ 1.38∗∗∗ 1.18∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ -0.02∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.02
G-MOM -0.47∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗ -0.42∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗ 0.01∗
R2 71.01 68.83 9.44 75.25 71.12 6.69 31.75 34.70 4.09 35.35 35.39 2.45
EQ Vol. (L) EQ Vol. (H) EQ Vol. (L) EQ Vol. (H)
L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L
rxi -4.66 -0.11 4.55 -9.75 -1.36 8.40∗∗ -0.87 -0.81 0.06 -0.35 -0.59 0.23
con -8.05∗∗∗ -3.78 4.27 -13.47∗∗∗ -5.46 8.01∗∗ -1.05 -0.93∗∗ 0.12 -0.51 -0.72 -0.21
Term 3.02∗∗∗ 0.03 -2.99∗∗ 2.58 3.80∗∗ 1.23 0.69∗∗ 0.23 -0.46∗ 1.23∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ -0.30
TED -0.40 -2.56 -2.16 0.73 -2.03 -2.76∗ -0.22 -0.37 -0.15 -0.86∗∗∗ -0.42 0.44∗∗∗
Crd -1.53∗∗ -6.48∗∗∗ -4.94∗∗∗ -1.09 -7.12∗∗∗ -6.03∗∗∗ -1.03∗∗∗ -1.08∗∗∗ -0.06 -1.32∗∗∗ -1.26∗∗∗ 0.07
Mkt 1.05∗∗∗ 1.12∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗ -0.00 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ -0.01 0.07∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗
G-SMB -0.01 0.43∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ -0.02 0.26∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.00 0.02∗ 0.02∗∗ -0.00
G-HML 0.88∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ 1.40∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ -0.01 0.08∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗
G-MOM -0.23∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗ -0.03 -0.45∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗ -0.00 -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗ 0.01∗∗
R2 74.59 66.68 8.27 76.46 69.16 8.23 26.99 31.88 1.26 36.49 35.35 7.19
Dep2TA (L) Dep2TA (H) Dep2TA (L) Dep2TA (H)
L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L
rxi -12.78 -1.37 11.40∗∗∗ -10.38 -0.39 10.00∗∗ -0.10 -0.70 -0.60 -0.19 -0.58 -0.39
con -16.66∗∗∗ -5.53 11.13∗∗∗ -14.06∗∗∗ -4.56 9.50∗∗∗ -0.20 -0.83 -0.64 -0.31 -0.71 -0.4
Term 6.92∗∗∗ 6.51∗∗∗ -0.42 2.90∗ 3.60∗∗ 0.70 1.29∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ -0.35∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ -0.15
TED -0.73 -1.54 -0.81 0.80 -1.92 -2.72∗ -0.83∗∗ -0.29 0.54∗∗∗ -0.81∗∗∗ -0.34 0.47∗∗∗
Crd -4.87∗∗∗ -5.63∗∗∗ -0.76 -1.18 -6.85∗∗∗ -5.67∗∗∗ -1.38∗∗∗ -1.17∗∗∗ 0.21∗ -1.29∗∗∗ -1.22∗∗∗ 0.06
Mkt 1.28∗∗∗ 1.40∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗ 0.02 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗
G-SMB 0.10 0.03 -0.07 -0.04 0.28∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ -0.00 -0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.01 -0.01
G-HML 1.41∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ -0.12 1.42∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.01 0.07∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.01
G-MOM -0.37∗∗∗ -0.39∗∗∗ -0.02 -0.45∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗ 0.01∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗ 0.01∗∗
R2 67.61 66.27 1.72 76.06 69.15 8.25 35.93 33.86 4.06 36.37 35.21 3.26
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Table A9: First-pass equity and CDS regressions with EGS factor robustness: additional
risk factors
This table presents the first-pass time-series regressions of equity and CDS double-sorted portfolio
excess returns (LL, HL, HL, HH) and the spread portfolios returns (L H/L and H H/L) on the risk
factors and the EGS factor (R[PC3]t). However, as in Table A8, the set of risk factors includes the
three Fama-French Global factors, namely SMB (G-SMB), HML (G-HML) and, MOM (G-MOM),
in addition to Crd, Term, TED, and Mkt. The EGS factor obtained from the PC analysis of
the residuals resulting from the seven-factor SDF first-pass regressions is presented in the Internet
Appendix (Fig. A5). The sample covers all banks and spans the period from 01/2004 to 10/2018
at a daily frequency. Adjusted R2s are in percent. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote significance, respectively, at the
1-, 5- and 10-percent levels, based on GMM-VARHAC standard errors.
Panel A: EQUITY Returns Panel B: CDS Returns
Leverage (L) Leverage (H) Leverage (L) Leverage (H)
L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L
rxi -4.80 -2.08 2.71 -9.49 -1.29 8.21∗∗ -0.46 -0.57 -0.11 -0.23 -0.59 -0.36
con -2.96 -9.29∗∗ -6.34∗∗ -11.27∗∗∗ -9.59∗∗ 1.68 -0.60 -0.86 -0.26 -0.41 -0.87 -0.45
Term 1.16 4.49∗∗∗ 3.32∗∗∗ 3.11∗∗ 3.63∗∗ 0.53 1.27∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ -0.26 1.08∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ -0.16
TED -0.44 -0.35 0.10 -0.39 -0.21 0.18 -0.69∗∗ -0.35 0.33 -0.73∗∗ -0.32 0.41∗∗∗
Crd -1.88∗∗ -3.65∗∗∗ -1.77∗∗ -3.50∗∗∗ -3.45∗∗∗ 0.05 -1.05∗∗∗ -1.25∗∗∗ -0.20 -1.23∗∗∗ -1.13∗∗∗ 0.10
Mkt 1.20∗∗∗ 1.30∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.01∗
G-SMB -0.02 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.03∗ 0.02∗∗ -0.00 0.02∗∗ 0.01 -0.01∗
G-HML 1.23∗∗∗ 1.31∗∗∗ 0.08 1.28∗∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ -0.01 0.07∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ -0.01
G-MOM -0.37∗∗∗ -0.37∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.38∗∗∗ -0.40∗∗∗ -0.02 -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ 0.01
R[PC] -0.46∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.00 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.01∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗
R2 83.04 73.04 74.28 76.88 78.28 84.26 31.74 36.11 5.53 35.53 36.78 3.76
EQ Vol. (L) EQ Vol. (H) EQ Vol. (L) EQ Vol. (H)
L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L
rxi -4.66 -0.11 4.55 -9.75 -1.36 8.40∗∗ -0.87 -0.81 0.06 -0.35 -0.59 -0.23
con -7.43∗∗ -8.31∗∗∗ -0.88 -10.72∗∗∗ -10.21∗∗∗ 0.52 -1.12∗ -1.09∗∗ 0.02 -0.57 -0.88 -0.31
Term 3.06∗∗∗ -0.21 -3.27∗∗∗ 2.72∗∗ 3.55∗∗ 0.83 0.68∗∗ 0.22 -0.47∗ 1.23∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ -0.31
TED -0.59 -1.21 -0.62 -0.09 -0.61 -0.52 -0.20 -0.32 -0.12 -0.84∗∗∗ -0.37 0.47∗∗∗
Crd -1.97∗∗∗ -3.32∗∗∗ -1.35∗∗∗ -3.00∗∗∗ -3.81∗∗∗ -0.81∗∗ -0.98∗∗∗ -0.97∗∗∗ 0.01 -1.28∗∗∗ -1.14∗∗∗ 0.14
Mkt 1.04∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 1.25∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ -0.01 0.07∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗
G-SMB 0.02 0.23∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.10 0.05 -0.05 0.02∗ 0.02∗ -0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.01
G-HML 0.85∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 1.25∗∗∗ 1.42∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ -0.00 0.08∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ -0.02∗
G-MOM -0.22∗∗∗ -0.35∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.40∗∗∗ -0.41∗∗∗ -0.02 -0.01 -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗
R[PC] -0.05∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗
R2 74.86 78.39 51.97 79.72 78.17 90.87 27.24 34.03 2.38 36.61 36.81 8.41
Dep2TA (L) Dep2TA (H) Dep2TA (L) Dep2TA (H)
L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L
rxi -12.78 -1.37 11.40∗∗∗ -10.38 -0.39 10.00∗∗ -0.10 -0.70 -0.60 -0.19 -0.58 -0.39
con -15.53∗∗∗ -10.49∗∗ 5.03 -11.27∗∗∗ -9.31∗∗∗ 1.96∗ -0.25 -0.96 -0.71 -0.37 -0.86 0.49
Term 6.98∗∗∗ 6.24∗∗∗ -0.74 3.05∗∗ 3.35∗∗ 0.30 1.28∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ -0.35∗ 1.03∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 0.16
TED -1.07 -0.06 1.01 -0.03 -0.50 -0.47 -0.82∗∗ -0.25 0.57∗∗∗ -0.79∗∗ -0.30 0.50∗∗∗
Crd -5.66∗∗∗ -2.16 3.49∗∗∗ -3.12∗∗∗ -3.54∗∗∗ -0.41 -1.34∗∗∗ -1.08∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗ -1.24∗∗∗ -1.12∗∗∗ 0.12
Mkt 1.27∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 1.24∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗
G-SMB 0.15 -0.19 -0.34∗∗∗ 0.08 0.07 -0.01 0.03∗∗ -0.01 -0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.01 -0.02∗∗
G-HML 1.35∗∗∗ 1.56∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 1.27∗∗∗ 1.40∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ -0.01 0.07∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.01
G-MOM -0.35∗∗∗ -0.48∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.40∗∗∗ -0.40∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗ 0.01∗∗
R[PC] -0.09∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.00∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗
R2 68.06 73.93 49.07 79.43 78.32 90.78 36.04 34.69 4.65 36.54 36.51 4.33
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Table A10: Second-pass equity and CDS cross-sectional regressions robustness: additional
risk factors
This table reports results for running the cross-sectional regression rxi = β′iλ + ai, where rxi is
the mean excess return of portfolio i, and β̂i is the vector of factor betas associated with port-
folio i, resulting from the first-pass regressions (Tables A8 and A9). For the factor prices of risk
(λ), Shanken p-values are in squared brackets, GMM-VARHAC p-values are in braces, and boot-
strapped p-values are in angled brackets. We also report the cross-sectional adjusted R2s, the
pricing error test statistics (PE Test) p-values based on GMM-VARHAC, along with the mean
absolute pricing errors (MAE). ∆MAE denotes the difference between the MAE resulting from the
model with EGS factor, and the MAE resulting from the model without EGS factor; statistical
significance is tested using the bootstrap replications, whereby ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote significance, respec-
tively, at the 1-, 5- and 10-percent levels. Top panels report the results for the model with standard
risk factors but without the EGS factor, while bottom panels include the EGS factor in the set of
standard risk factors. Left panels show the analysis for the full-sample period (01/2004-10/2018),
while right panels exclude the bail-in period (01/2004-06/2013). The analysis covers all banks’
equity and CDS portfolios.
Panel A: Model without EGS Factor
Panel A.I: Full Sample (2004-18) Panel A.II: Sample ex Bail-in (2004-13)
λ Shan. GMM Boot λ Shan. GMM Boot
Term -2.03 [0.009] {0.091} <0.076> Term -2.11 [0.009] -0.002 <0.069>
TED -1.61 [0.136] {0.228} <0.245> TED -2.21 [0.112] -0.063 <0.286>
Crd -2.14 [0.093] {0.166} <0.229> Crd -2.31 [0.119] -0.069 <0.233>
Mkt 16.01 [0.103] {0.188} <0.354> Mkt 3.73 [0.379] -0.356 <0.380>
G-SMB -40.00 [0.032] {0.078} <0.092> G-SMB -36.39 [0.052] -0.021 <0.118>
G-HML -10.38 [0.220] {0.276} <0.366> G-HML 2.14 [0.433] -0.416 <0.484>
G-MOM 29.48 [0.134] {0.246} <0.345> G-MOM 27.5 [0.230] -0.175 <0.418>
R2 PE Test MAE R2 PE Test MAE
88.2 0.999 1.25 90.4 0.999 1.5
Panel B: Model with EGS Factor
Panel B.I: Full Sample (2004-18) Panel B.II: Sample ex Bail-in (2004-13)
λ Shan. GMM Boot λ Shan. GMM Boot
Term -1.22 [0.039] -0.018 <0.069> Term -1.13 [0.071] {0.085} <0.070>
TED -2.82 [0.014] -0.005 <0.072> TED -2.25 [0.082] {0.129} <0.216>
Crd 0.97 [0.136] -0.094 <0.286> Crd 2.11 [0.069] {0.112} <0.208>
Mkt -3.20 [0.386] -0.366 <0.350> Mkt -17.67 [0.095] {0.133} <0.098>
G-SMB -14.03 [0.179] -0.133 <0.216> G-SMB 2.23 [0.452] {0.458} <0.498>
G-HML 11.89 [0.127] -0.085 <0.231> G-HML 15.1 [0.080] {0.091} <0.189>
G-MOM 26.73 [0.142] -0.098 <0.283> G-MOM 9.98 [0.390] {0.403} <0.396>
R[PC] 12.84 [0.026] -0.026 <0.063> R[PC] 18.26 [0.026] {0.017} <0.023>
R2 PE Test MAE ∆ MAE R2 PE Test MAE ∆ MAE
96.3 0.996 0.642 0.61∗∗ 98.1 1.0 0.6 0.89∗∗
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Table A11: First-pass equity and CDS regressions: core Europe
This table presents the first-pass time-series regressions of equity and CDS double-sorted portfolio
excess returns (LL, HL, HL, HH) and the spread portfolio returns (L H/L and H H/L) on the risk
factors. Banks are first sorted on bank risk (low, high), and then on deposits to GDP (low, high),
our proxy for the expected government support. For a given measure of bank risk, spread portfolios
are given by LH-LL for low bank risk, and HH-HL for high bank risk. We use three measures of
bank risk: bank book leverage (Leverage), equity volatility (EQ Vol.), and deposits to total assets
(Dep2TA). Portfolios are rebalanced at a monthly frequency. The resulting double-sorted and
spread portfolios are regressed on standard risk factors (f t), such as rxit = αi + ftβi + eit, where
i is the selected portfolio. The f t vector includes changes in Term, changes in TED, changes in
Credit (Crd), and MSCI world stock market excess returns (Mkt). rxi is the mean excess return
of portfolio i. The sample covers core EU (DE, FR, IT, ES, GB) banks and spans the period from
01/2004 to 11/2018 at a daily frequency. Adjusted R2s are in percent. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote significance,
respectively, at the 1-, 5- and 10-percent levels, based on GMM-VARHAC standard errors.
Panel A: EQUITY Returns Panel B: CDS Returns
Leverage (L) Leverage (H) Leverage (L) Leverage (H)
L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L
rxi -14.13 -7.73 6.40 -19.95∗∗ -6.78 13.16∗∗∗ -0.18 -0.70 -0.52 -0.02 -0.70 -0.68
con -18.29∗∗ -12.80∗∗ 5.49 -24.52∗∗∗ -12.22∗∗ 12.31∗∗∗ -0.30 -0.93 -0.63 -0.13 -0.92 -0.78
Term 11.58∗∗∗ 9.74∗∗∗ -1.84 11.09∗∗∗ 9.34∗∗∗ -1.75 1.94∗∗∗ 2.21∗∗∗ 0.28 1.31∗∗∗ 1.88∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗
TED 0.12 -1.57 -1.69 0.88 -1.51 -2.39∗∗ 0.13 -0.25 -0.38 -0.26 -0.30 -0.05
Crd -6.21∗∗∗ -6.97∗∗∗ -0.77 -5.91∗∗∗ -6.78∗∗∗ -0.87 -1.63∗∗∗ -1.68∗∗∗ -0.04 -1.57∗∗∗ -1.51∗∗∗ 0.06
Mkt 1.27∗∗∗ 1.48∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗ 1.56∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
R2 40.71 52.97 4.30 47.61 57.34 4.63 19.82 29.15 3.89 25.27 30.81 7.02
EQ Vol. (L) EQ Vol. (H) EQ Vol. (L) EQ Vol. (H)
L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L
rxi -13.98∗ -4.56 9.43∗∗ -19.84∗∗ -9.06 10.78∗∗∗ -0.69 -0.64 0.05 -0.27 -0.28 -0.01
con -18.03∗∗∗ -9.35∗ 8.68∗∗ -24.48∗∗∗ -14.55∗∗ 9.93∗∗ -0.82 -0.88 -0.07 -0.41 -0.51 -0.10
Term 8.92∗∗∗ 9.16∗∗∗ 0.24 10.07∗∗∗ 10.07∗∗∗ -0.00 1.80∗∗∗ 1.64∗∗∗ -0.16 2.05∗∗∗ 2.04∗∗∗ -0.01
TED -0.82 -1.82 -1.00 0.40 -1.28 -1.68 0.05 -0.20 -0.25 -0.31 -0.29 0.02
Crd -5.25∗∗∗ -6.32∗∗∗ -1.07∗ -5.83∗∗∗ -7.26∗∗∗ -1.43∗∗ -1.59∗∗∗ -1.42∗∗∗ 0.18 -1.80∗∗∗ -1.53∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗
Mkt 1.20∗∗∗ 1.40∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗ 1.59∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
R2 47.39 58.43 4.77 48.28 56.52 6.02 17.09 31.09 1.69 24.64 31.07 2.16
Dep2TA (L) Dep2TA (H) Dep2TA (L) Dep2TA (H)
L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L
rxi -21.16∗∗ -6.74 14.42∗∗ -21.73∗∗ -6.54 15.20∗∗∗ -0.22 -0.58 -0.37 -0.14 -0.49 -0.36
con -25.77∗∗∗ -12.66∗ 13.11∗∗ -26.09∗∗∗ -12.23∗ 13.87∗∗∗ -0.35 -0.79 -0.44 -0.25 -0.71 -0.47
Term 12.07∗∗∗ 13.11∗∗∗ 1.03 10.24∗∗∗ 9.91∗∗∗ -0.33 1.13∗∗∗ 1.93∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗ 1.81∗∗∗ 0.40
TED -0.38 -0.45 -0.06 0.32 -0.77 -1.09 -0.47 -0.34 0.13 -0.31 -0.30 0.00
Crd -6.95∗∗∗ -6.89∗∗∗ 0.07 -6.16∗∗∗ -6.61∗∗∗ -0.45 -1.42∗∗∗ -1.41∗∗∗ 0.00 -1.60∗∗∗ -1.47∗∗∗ 0.13
Mkt 1.40∗∗∗ 1.75∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 1.30∗∗∗ 1.64∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
R2 44.44 54.16 5.32 44.94 57.19 7.93 25.45 30.38 6.27 24.84 31.07 5.74
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Table A12: First-pass regressions with core EU EGS factor
This table presents the first-pass time-series regressions of equity and CDS double-sorted portfolio
excess returns and the spread portfolios returns on the risk factors and the core EU EGS factor.
The core EU EGS factor (R[PCEU3 ]t = xrtω̂′3) is still obtained as the sum of double-sorted portfolio
excess returns times the principal component (PC) weights. However, the weights are now those
associated with the third PC obtained from the joint PC analysis of core EU double-sorted equity
and CDS bank portfolios, rather than of developed countries’ portfolios as in Table (6). Also in
this case, the EGS factor is long in high deposits-to-GDP banks and short in low deposits-to-GDP
banks. The resulting double-sorted and spread portfolios are regressed on standard risk factors
(f t) and the core EU EGS factor (R[PCEU3 ]t), such as rxit = ai + ftβi + γR[PCEU3 ]t + eit, where i
denotes the selected portfolio. rxi is the mean excess return of portfolio i. The f t vector includes
changes in Term, changes in TED, changes in Credit (Crd), and MSCI world stock market excess
returns (Mkt). The sample covers core EU (DE, FR, IT, ES, GB) banks and spans the period from
01/2004 to 11/2018 at a daily frequency. Adjusted R2s are in percent. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote significance,
respectively, at the 1-, 5- and 10-percent levels, based on GMM-VARHAC standard errors.
Panel A: EQUITY Returns Panel B: CDS Returns
Leverage (L) Leverage (H) Leverage (L) Leverage (H)
L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L
rxi -14.13 -7.73 6.40 -19.95∗∗ -6.78 13.16∗∗∗ -0.18 -0.70 -0.52 -0.02 -0.70 -0.68
con -1.38 -4.26 -2.88 -9.20∗ -7.39 1.81 0.70 -0.63 -1.32∗ 0.58 -0.71 -1.29∗∗
Term 7.43∗∗∗ 7.65∗∗∗ 0.22 7.33∗∗∗ 8.16∗∗∗ 0.82 1.69∗∗∗ 2.14∗∗∗ 0.45 1.14∗∗∗ 1.83∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗
TED -1.24 -2.26 -1.02 -0.35 -1.90 -1.54∗∗ 0.05 -0.28 -0.33 -0.32 -0.32 -0.01
Crd -3.65∗∗∗ -5.68∗∗∗ -2.03∗∗∗ -3.60∗∗∗ -6.05∗∗∗ -2.45∗∗∗ -1.48∗∗∗ -1.63∗∗∗ -0.15 -1.46∗∗∗ -1.48∗∗∗ -0.02
Mkt 0.99∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 1.11∗∗∗ 1.48∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
R[PCEU ] -1.82∗∗∗ -0.92∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ -1.65∗∗∗ -0.52∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
R2 70.91 60.54 36.80 73.38 59.71 60.58 27.83 29.80 10.97 32.00 31.19 13.23
EQ Vol. (L) EQ Vol. (H) EQ Vol. (L) EQ Vol. (H)
L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L
rxi -13.98∗ -4.56 9.43∗∗ -19.84∗∗ -9.06 10.78∗∗∗ -0.69 -0.64 0.05 -0.27 -0.28 -0.01
con -6.73 -4.75 1.97 -9.71∗∗ -9.08 0.64 -0.02 -0.77 -0.74 0.46 -0.33 -0.79
Term 6.15∗∗∗ 8.04∗∗∗ 1.89∗ 6.45∗∗∗ 8.73∗∗∗ 2.28∗∗ 1.60∗∗∗ 1.61∗∗∗ 0.00 1.83∗∗∗ 1.99∗∗∗ 0.16
TED -1.73 -2.19 -0.46 -0.79 -1.72 -0.93 -0.01 -0.21 -0.20 -0.38 -0.30 0.07
Crd -3.54∗∗∗ -5.63∗∗∗ -2.09∗∗∗ -3.60∗∗∗ -6.43∗∗∗ -2.84∗∗∗ -1.47∗∗∗ -1.40∗∗∗ 0.07 -1.67∗∗∗ -1.50∗∗∗ 0.17
Mkt 1.01∗∗∗ 1.32∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 1.12∗∗∗ 1.50∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
R[PCEU ] -1.22∗∗∗ -0.49∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ -1.59∗∗∗ -0.59∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.01 0.07∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
R2 65.58 61.15 28.11 72.75 59.40 48.93 21.68 31.21 7.42 30.78 31.35 11.99
Dep2TA (L) Dep2TA (H) Dep2TA (L) Dep2TA (H)
L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L L H H/L
rxi -21.16∗∗ -6.74 14.42∗∗ -21.73∗∗ -6.54 15.20∗∗∗ -0.22 -0.58 -0.37 -0.14 -0.49 -0.36
con -8.78∗ -10.32 -1.54 -9.79∗∗ -8.35 1.44 0.10 -0.62 -0.72 0.46 -0.51 -0.97∗
Term 7.90∗∗∗ 12.53∗∗∗ 4.63∗∗ 6.24∗∗∗ 8.96∗∗∗ 2.72∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ 1.89∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 1.24∗∗∗ 1.76∗∗∗ 0.52∗
TED -1.75 -0.63 1.12 -0.99 -1.08 -0.09 -0.51 -0.35 0.16 -0.36 -0.32 0.04
Crd -4.38∗∗∗ -6.53∗∗∗ -2.15∗ -3.70∗∗∗ -6.03∗∗∗ -2.33∗∗∗ -1.35∗∗∗ -1.39∗∗∗ -0.04 -1.50∗∗∗ -1.44∗∗∗ 0.06
Mkt 1.11∗∗∗ 1.72∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗ 1.57∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
R[PCEU ] -1.83∗∗∗ -0.25∗ 1.58∗∗∗ -1.75∗∗∗ -0.42∗∗∗ 1.34∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
R2 72.03 54.57 52.45 75.09 58.59 60.93 28.38 30.66 8.20 31.07 31.46 11.77
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Table A13: Second-pass cross-sectional regressions with core EU EGS factor
This table reports results for running the cross-sectional regression rxi = β′iλ + ai, where rxi
is the mean excess return of portfolio i, and β̂i is the vector of factor betas associated with
portfolio i, resulting from the first-pass regression (Tables A12 in the Internet Appendix). For the
factor prices of risk (λ), Shanken p-values are in squared brackets, GMM-VARHAC p-values are
in braces, and bootstrapped p-values are in angled brackets. We also report the cross-sectional
adjusted R2s, the pricing error test statistics (PE Test) p-values based on GMM-VARHAC, along
with the mean absolute pricing errors (MAE). ∆MAE denotes the difference between the MAE
resulting from the model with EGS factor, and the MAE resulting from the model without EGS
factor; statistical significance is tested using the bootstrap replications, whereby ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote
significance, respectively, at the 1-, 5- and 10-percent levels. Top panels report the results for the
model with standard risk factors but without EGS factor, while bottom panels include the EGS
factor in the set of standard risk factors. Left panels show the analysis for the full sample period
(01/2004-11/2018), while right panels exclude the bail-in period (01/2004-06/2013). The analysis
covers core EU (DE, FR, IT, ES, GB) banks’ equity and CDS portfolios, and the EGS factor is
generated for this specific sample.
Panel A: Model without EGS Factor
Panel A.I: Full Sample (2004-18) Panel A.II: Sample ex Bail-in (2004-13)
λ Shan. GMM Boot λ Shan. GMM Boot
Term -0.09 [0.472] {0.482} <0.287> Term -2.29 [0.088] {0.122} <0.301>
TED -7.18 [0.016] {0.045} <0.242> TED -3.93 [0.041] {0.080} <0.312>
Crd 3.00 [0.085] {0.206} <0.419> Crd 0.59 [0.382] {0.409} <0.423>
Mkt 2.95 [0.392] {0.422} <0.428> Mkt 5.03 [0.315] {0.348} <0.376>
R2 PE Test MAE R2 PE Test MAE
79.5 1 3.09 68.3 0.999 3.47
Panel B: Model with EGS Factor
Panel B.I: Full Sample (2004-18) Panel B.II: Sample ex Bail-in (2004-13)
λ Shan. GMM Boot λ Shan. GMM Boot
Term 0.47 [0.264] {0.285} <0.441> Term 0.13 [0.438] {0.441} <0.489>
TED -1.67 [0.138] {0.123} <0.268> TED -1.48 [0.225] {0.234} <0.290>
Crd 0.39 [0.355] {0.374} <0.409> Crd 1.12 [0.239] {0.260} <0.346>
Mkt -3.97 [0.272] {0.280} <0.303> Mkt -0.41 [0.481] {0.480} <0.498>
R[PCEU ] 10.88 [0.000] {0.001} <0.001> R[PCEU ] 11.37 [0.002] {0.003} <0.002>
R2 PE Test MAE ∆MAE R2 PE Test MAE ∆MAE
97 0.871 1.11 1.99∗∗∗ 97.1 0.993 1.2 2.27∗∗
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Table A14: What risks do the equity R[PC]s reflect?
This table reports results for running the regressions of the three equity R[PC]s on single-sorted
bank equity spread portfolios (hmlEQ), which takes the form of R[PCEQj ]t = aj + φjthmlEQ + ujt
for j = 1, 2, 3. Note that the EGS return factor in this case is that associated with the second PC
weights. Single-sorted portfolios are constructed using balance-sheet and sovereign-risk variables
as sorting variables; for a given sorting variable, banks are grouped into a high or low portfolios,
then the spread portfolio is simply the high minus low portfolios. R[PCEQj ]t = xrtŵ
′
j , where ŵj
are the principal component weights associated with the j-th PC, and xrt are the equity portfolios’
excess returns. Panel A shows the top 10 portfolios ordered in terms of the estimated R2s. Panel
B focuses on single-sorted portfolios constructed in terms of: i) sovereign risk, using domestic
sovereign CDSs or sovereign yields as sorting variables; ii) bank sovereign exposures, obtained by
regressing bank CDS returns on the domestic sovereign CDS returns, including (SovExp(c)) or
not (Sov Exp) the standard risk factor as controls; and, iii) total assets at book value to GDP
(TA2GDP(bv)) and the rating uplift (UpLift) as alternative measures of the EGS. The sample
includes developed countries’ banks. Variables are standardized. The period is 01/2000-11/2018.
Adjusted R2s are in percent. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote significance, respectively, at the 1-, 5- and 10-percent
levels, based on the Newey-West approach with optimal lag selection.
Panel A: Horse Race
R[PCEQ1 ] R[PCEQ2 ] R[PCEQ3 ]
Port. φ R2 Port. φ R2 Port. φ R2
EQvol 0.63∗∗∗ 39.37 Dep2GDP 0.93∗∗∗ 86.98 EQvol 0.73∗∗∗ 53.44
LEV(mv) 0.57∗∗∗ 32.78 TA2GDP(mv) 0.88∗∗∗ 77.89 BnkCDS 0.47∗∗∗ 20.55
PVB −0.56∗∗∗ 31.86 TA2GDP(bv) 0.86∗∗∗ 74.80 ROA −0.43∗∗∗ 18.08
ROA −0.47∗∗∗ 22.54 Loan2GDP 0.85∗∗∗ 72.28 PVB −0.41∗∗∗ 17.00
BnkCDS 0.47∗∗∗ 19.15 LEV(bv) 0.58∗∗∗ 33.79 ROACIQ −0.39∗∗∗ 15.34
Dep2TA −0.42∗∗∗ 17.70 BnkCDS −0.51∗∗∗ 25.63 Dep2TA −0.37∗∗∗ 13.70
ROACIQ −0.33∗∗∗ 10.97 ULmixSov 0.44∗∗∗ 17.33 iSovRat 0.29∗∗∗ 8.12
TDebt 0.31∗∗∗ 9.44 ZSCORE 0.40∗∗∗ 16.30 SovRatFS 0.28∗∗∗ 7.64
TA(mv) 0.24∗∗∗ 5.69 Sov.Exp. 0.42∗∗∗ 14.73 iBCA 0.26∗∗∗ 6.66
LEV(bv) 0.22∗∗∗ 4.66 Sov.Exp(c) 0.42∗∗∗ 14.56 Sov.Exp(c) 0.21∗∗∗ 3.32
Panel B: Size, UpLift and Sovereign Risk
R[PCEQ1 ] R[PCEQ2 ] R[PCEQ3 ]
Port. φ R2 Port. φ R2 Port. φ R2
TA2GDP(bv) 0.20∗∗∗ 3.93 TA2GDP(bv) 0.86∗∗∗ 74.80 TA2GDP(bv) 0.04 0.17
UpLift −0.16∗∗∗ 2.46 UpLift 0.22∗∗∗ 4.67 UpLift −0.06∗∗ 0.34
SovCDS 0.08 0.52 SovCDS 0.39∗∗∗ 13.99 SovCDS 0.19∗∗∗ 3.21
SovYld −0.05 0.27 SovYld 0.28∗∗∗ 7.99 SovYld 0.02 0.01
Sov.Exp. 0.09 0.52 Sov.Exp. 0.42∗∗∗ 14.73 Sov.Exp. 0.27∗∗∗ 5.77
Sov.Exp(c) 0.02 −0.01 Sov.Exp(c) 0.42∗∗∗ 14.56 Sov.Exp(c) 0.21∗∗∗ 3.32
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Appendix IV. Additional Figures
Fig. A1. Bank EGSs and sovereign exposures
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Note: The figure shows the scatter plot of banks’ time-series averages of deposits to GDP on the
y-axis and banks’ sovereign exposures on the x-axis. Banks’ sovereign exposures are estimated
from market prices, by regressing bank daily CDS returns on the domestic sovereign CDS returns
over three-month rolling windows, we then report the averages of the estimated rolling exposures.
The panel of banks’ exposures is unbalanced. Returns are standardized so that the estimated
exposures are correlations. Top scatter plots show the results for the entire sample of banks (ALL
Banks), mid plots for German, French, Italian, Spanish, and British banks (Core EU Banks), and
bottom plots for the banks of the remaining EU countries (Non-Core EU Banks). Left plots refer
to the ex bail-in period (2004–2013), whereas right plots to the full-sample period (2004–2018).
The gray line denotes the fitted line, and ρ its slope, i.e. the sample correlation.
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Fig. A2. Level, security, and EGS factors
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Note: The figure shows the joint principal component analysis (PCA) of the risk-adjusted equity
and CDS excess returns of the double-sorted portfolios. Banks are first sorted on bank risk (low,
high), and then on deposits to GDP (low, high), our proxy for the expected government support.
Portfolios are rebalanced at a monthly frequency. We use three measures of bank risk: bank book
leverage (EQ: P1-P4 and CDS: P13-P16), equity volatility estimated over a three-month rolling
windows (EQ: P5-P8 and CDS: P17-P20), and deposits to total assets (EQ: P9-P12 and CDS: P21-
P24). The resulting double-sorted equally-weighted equities and CDS portfolios are regressed on
the four standard risk factors (Crd, Term, TED, and Mkt), described in Table A2. We then perform
the PCA analysis on standardized risk-adjusted excess returns, i.e. the standardized residuals from
the first-pass regressions. PC loadings for the first-three PCs (ŵj , for j=1,2,3) are displayed in
the top charts, which contain the same information of Fig. 3. Left panels (EQ. Port.) present the
loadings associated with the equity portfolios (P1-P12), whereas right panels (CDS Port.) those
with the CDS portfolios (P13-P24). The double-sorted portfolios (P1-P24) are denoted by LL,
LH, HL, HH, where the first letter denotes the level of the first sorting variable (S1: bank risk)
and the second letter that of the second sorting variable (S2: Dep2GDP). We then present the
cumulative sum of the PCs in the mid charts, and the cumulative sum of the return factors, i.e.
portfolios excess returns times the PC weights (R[PCj ]t = xrtŵ′j), in the bottom charts. The
sample includes all banks and spans the period 2004–2018 at a daily frequency.
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Fig. A3. Equity EGS factor: 2000-2018
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Note: The figure shows the principal component analysis (PCA) of the risk-adjusted equity excess
returns of the double-sorted portfolios. Banks are first sorted on bank risk (low, high), and then
on deposits to GDP (low, high), our proxy for the expected government support. Portfolios are
rebalanced at a monthly frequency. We use three measures of bank risk: bank book leverage (P1-
P4), equity volatility (P5-P8), and deposits to total assets (P9-P12). The resulting double-sorted
equally-weighted equities and CDS portfolios are regressed on the four standard risk factors (Crd,
Term, TED, and Mkt), described in Table A2. We then perform the PCA analysis on standardized
risk-adjusted excess returns, i.e. the standardized residuals from the first-pass regressions. PC
loadings for the first-three PCs (ŵj , for j=1,2,3) are displayed in the top charts. The double-
sorted portfolios (P1-P12) are denoted by LL, LH, HL, HH, where the first letter denotes the level
of the first sorting variable (S1: bank risk) and the second letter that of the second sorting variable
(S2: Dep2GDP). We then present the cumulative PCs in the mid charts, and the cumulative
portfolios excess returns times the PC weights (R[PCj ]t = xrtŵ′j) in the bottom charts. The
sample includes all banks for which equity data are available and spans the period 1/2000–11/2018
at a daily frequency.
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Fig. A4. Rating uplifts over time
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Note: The figure presents an alternative measure of the expected government support, the so-called
rating uplift. This measure is computed as the difference between the bank all-in-all credit rating,
i.e. the bank ability to repay it deposit obligations, measured using Moody’s foreign-currency
deposit ratings, and the stand-alone credit rating, i.e. the bank intrinsic safety and soundness,
measured using Moody’s bank financial strength (BFS), or bank credit assessment, ratings. Deposit
ratings are converted into the BFS scale, and then into a numerical scale 1 (E) to 13 (A). The
difference between the two types of rating gives the uplift. Top panel shows the cross-sectional
averages across banks, while bottom panel denotes the number of uplift increases and decreases
over time. The period is 1/2000–11/2018 and the sample includes all banks.
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Fig. A5. Level, security, and EGS factors robustness: additional risk factors
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Note: The figure shows the joint principal component analysis (PCA) of the risk-adjusted equity
and CDS excess returns of the double-sorted portfolios using the seven-factor SDF described in
the Internet Appendix (Table A8). Banks are first sorted on bank risk (low, high), and then on
the deposits to GDP (low, high), our proxy for the expected government support. Portfolios are
rebalanced at a monthly frequency. We use three measures of bank risk: bank book leverage
(EQ: P1-P4 and CDS: P13-P16), equity volatility estimated over a three-month rolling windows
(EQ: P5-P8 and CDS: P17-P20), and deposits to total assets (EQ: P9-P12 and CDS: P21-P24).
The resulting double-sorted equally-weighted equities and CDS portfolios are regressed on the four
standard risk factors, as well as the three global Fama-French factors, described in Table A2. We
then perform the PCA analysis on standardized risk-adjusted excess returns, i.e. the standardized
residuals from the first-pass regressions of Table A8. PC loadings for the first-three PCs (ŵj ,
for j=1,2,3) are displayed in the top charts, which contain the same type of information of Fig.
3. Left panels (EQ. Port.) present the loadings associated with the equity portfolios (P1-P12),
whereas right panels (CDS Port.) those with the CDS portfolios (P13-P24). The double-sorted
portfolios (P1-P24) are denoted by LL, LH, HL, HH, where the first letter denotes the level of the
first sorting variable (S1: bank risk) and the second letter that of the second sorting variable (S2:
Dep2GDP). We then present the cumulative sum of the PCs in the mid charts, and the cumulative
sum of the return factors, i.e. portfolios excess returns times the PC weights (R[PCj ]t = xrtŵ′j),
in the bottom charts. The sample covers all banks and spans the period 01/2004–10/2018 at a
daily frequency.
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Fig. A6. Country EGS betas
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Note: The figure shows the estimated exposures (betas) of country spread portfolios to the expected
government support (EGS) factor, controlling for the standard risk factors. For a given country,
banks are first grouped into the high and low portfolios according to their deposits, and then the
spread portfolio is obtained as the difference between the high and low portfolios. The EGS factor,
resulting from the joint PC analysis of double-sorted equity and CDS bank risk-adjusted excess
returns, is long in high deposit-to-GDP banks and short in low deposit-to-GDP banks (see Fig.
A2). Left panel shows the EGS betas for equity portfolios, while right panel for CDS portfolios.
We include those countries for which a sufficient number of banks is available. The period is
1/2004–11/2018.
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Fig. A7. Level, security, and EGS factors robustness: excluding subsidiaries
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Note: The figure shows the joint principal component analysis (PCA) of the risk-adjusted equity
and CDS excess returns of the double-sorted portfolios. Banks are first sorted on bank risk (low,
high), and then on the deposits to GDP (low, high), our proxy for the expected government
support. Portfolios are rebalanced at a monthly frequency. We use three measures of bank risk:
bank book leverage (EQ: P1-P4 and CDS: P13-P16), equity volatility estimated over a three-
month rolling windows (EQ: P5-P8 and CDS: P17-P20), and deposits to total assets (EQ: P9-P12
and CDS: P21-P24). The resulting double-sorted equally-weighted equities and CDS portfolios are
regressed on the four standard risk factors (Crd, Term, TED, and Mkt), described in Table A2. We
then perform the PCA analysis on standardized risk-adjusted excess returns, i.e. the standardized
residuals from the first-pass regressions. PC loadings for the first-three PCs (ŵj , for j=1,2,3)
are displayed in the top charts, which contain the same information of Fig. 3. Left panels (EQ.
Port.) present the loadings associated with the equity portfolios (P1-P12), whereas right panels
(CDS Port.) those with the CDS portfolios (P13-P24). The double-sorted portfolios (P1-P24) are
denoted by LL, LH, HL, HH, where the first letter denotes the level of the first sorting variable
(S1: bank risk) and the second letter that of the second sorting variable (S2: Dep2GDP). We then
present the cumulative sum of the PCs in the mid charts, and the cumulative sum of the return
factors, i.e. portfolios excess returns times the PC weights (R[PCj ]t = xrtŵ′j), in the bottom
charts. The sample excludes subsidiaries (as defined in Table A1) from the all banks sample, and
spans the period 2004–2018 at a daily frequency.
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Fig. A8. EGS factor, sovereign risk, economic policy uncertainty, and VIX
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Note: The figure shows, in the left panel, mean excess returns for the expected government support
(EGS) factor (R[PC3]t = xrtŵ′3) conditional on the Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) Index
(left panel), sovereign risk (mid panel), and VIX (right panel) innovations, i.e. changes, being within
the lowest and highest quartile of their sample distributions (four categories from lowest to highest
shown on the x-axis of each panel). The EGS factor, resulting from the joint PC analysis of double-
sorted equity and CDS bank risk-adjusted excess returns, is long in high deposit-to-GDP banks
and short in low deposit-to-GDP banks. Sovereign risk is measured as the mean of developed
countries’ 5-year CDSs. VIX is the CBOE Volatility Index. The daily EPU Index quantifies
newspaper coverage of policy-related economic uncertainty (see www.policyuncertainty.com). The
sample includes the developed country banks and spans the period 01/2004–11/2018 at a daily
frequency.
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